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The Central Asian energy system (CAES) was built during the Soviet period and designed 
without concern for what are today national borders. The resource sharing mechanism ensured 
the security of the CAES—reliable and stable energy supplies to meet the needs of both the 
people and the economy. However, following the breakup of the Soviet Union this mechanism 
came under pressure from emergent geopolitical and economic challenges such as the 
monetization of energy trade (oil products, gas and electricity) and tensions between domestic 
water and energy needs. Since the Central Asian energy sectors were initially designed to operate 
within a unified system, the management of such highly interdependent entities requires 
coordinated action by all relevant actors. Central Asian states’ particular energy policies, which 
stress self-reliance and self-control, threaten the overall security of the CAES.  
The study suggests that the insecurity of the CAES can be most efficiently addressed 
through reinstating intra-Central Asian energy trade. The sustainability of the CAES, however, 
requires an effective regional energy governance mechanism. This research analyzes factors 
affecting the extent of multilateral cooperation in the gas and electric power sectors among 
Central Asian countries and with external customers within the framework of the stag-hunt 
game. Most importantly, it explores the potential collective benefits of, and major challenges for 
governance innovations to, improving security of the CAES within such institutions and 
programs as (a) the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation, (b) the Eurasian Economic 
Union, (c) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (d) the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, (e) the Central Asian Water–Energy Development Program promoted by the World Bank, 
and (f) the Regional Environmental Centres for Central Asia.  
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 The Central Asian energy system (CAES), a complex network of gas pipelines and 
electric power grids, was designed and built during the Soviet period, when 
political/administrative borders and sovereignty issues were not obstacles to coordinated 
operation of national energy sectors. The resource-sharing mechanism of the CAES ensured 
reliable and stable energy supplies to meet both population and economic needs, even after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Hydrocarbons-producing Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan provided a continuous supply of oil products and natural gas, as well as thermal 
electricity to the neighbouring upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
in return, released the required amount of water for irrigation purposes and exported 
hydroelectricity to downstream countries in the summer. While downstream countries, within the 
resource-sharing mechanism, were primarily interested in water release, huge hydro-power 
potential of upstream neighbours’ also provided some prospects for increasing the share of clean 
and renewable energy sources in the overall consumption balance. However, new geopolitical 
and economic challenges—such as the monetization of the energy trade (oil products, gas and 
electricity) while preserving water sharing interactions, increasing energy export capacity to 
external markets at the expense of domestic and intra-Central Asian consumption, the shift from 
water to energy operation mode of the hydro-power sector—began to strain the mechanism. As a 
result, the CAES has changed. State actors now pursue divergent energy policies, negatively 
affecting the security of energy supplies within the region. 
 Central Asian countries’ energy sectors were initially designed to operate within a unified 
energy system. Management of highly interdependent Central Asian energy sectors required 
coordinated actions to be taken by all parties involved. Even though there is no longer a 
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supranational body controlling coordinated operation of these sectors, Central Asian countries, to 
a varying extent, still remain dependent on each other in ensuring their energy security and 
energy led economic growth as well as mutually beneficial water management. Within such 
interdependence the importance of using regional level approach, to studying energy security 
challenges that Central Asian countries are facing and searching for possibilities to overcome 
them, should not be underestimated.  
 Central Asia enjoys an abundance of energy resources capable of ensuring sufficient 
energy supplies for intraregional consumption and, to some extent, meeting external demand by 
major customers such as Russia, China, India, and the European Union. While competing energy 
interests of these powers may affect their own geopolitical and economic gains, it is the impact 
of these competing interests on the level of energy security that poses threat to the security of the 
CAES. The external demand for Central Asian resources, along with obligations by regional 
producers to meet the volume of expected energy supplies, is growing faster than the energy-
production capacity of the region. The temptation of revenues from exporting large quantities of 
energy to external markets, on the one hand, and the inability to unilaterally redirect energy 
supplies due to asymmetry in power balance, on the other, force Central Asian producers to 
increase the volume of exports even at the expense of domestic and intra-Central Asian energy 
consumption. Limited availability of energy resources within the region resulted in escalation of 
tensions over the construction of large hydro-power plants, disputes over the price for fossil fuels 
and unstable energy supplies. Asymmetrical interdependence among energy actors and strategic 
interests in states’ energy export/import relations mean that energy resources are used for 
purposes other than to ensure energy security in Central Asia, thus causing frequent energy 
supply disruptions, especially when it is needed the most (the winter period).  
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Statement of the Problem 
 There are three interlinked pillars of a secure CAES: energy security, regional energy 
cooperation/trade, and an effective enforcement mechanism. During the Soviet period, the 
energy security of the Central Asian region was ensured through intraregional cooperation 
regulated by a supranational administrative body. In the 1990s, parallel operation of energy 
systems within the framework of the resource-sharing mechanism under the condition of mutual 
trust secured the sufficiency of energy supplies within the region. Currently, however, the 
absence of a resource-sharing mechanism has affected the level of cooperation in the energy 
sector within Central Asia, leading to greater energy insecurity. Isolationist energy policies, both 
in terms of full self-reliance and self-control, without the establishment of self-sustaining 
independent energy systems threaten the security of the CAES, in which everyone’s energy 
security interests are supposed to be met simultaneously. Without regional-level energy 
governance innovations, however, restoring and sustaining cooperative dynamics within the 
CAES seem to be problematic.  
 Designed to operate within a unified energy system, the Central Asian energy sectors 
were regulated from Tashkent and controlled by Moscow. After gaining independence, Central 
Asian governments reached a common understanding regarding the benefits of sustaining close 
regional energy cooperation. Interestingly, however, these same governments later started 
pursuing policies that distanced countries from each other, leading to the disintegration of the 
CAES. An attempt to break an interdependent system into separate entities (national energy 
systems) has, to varying extents, affected the level of energy security in all five countries. Energy 
security can thus be most efficiently addressed through increasing the intra-Central Asian energy 
trade and greater regional cooperation. Several governance innovations (regional-level energy 
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governance mechanisms established after the collapse of the Soviet unified energy management 
system to respond to the energy security challenges) were designed to promote regional 
cooperation in the energy sector in Central Asia, with the expectation that they would contribute 
to improving the level of energy security in the region.  
 In this research work, I ask the following main research question: what governance 
innovations, if any, offer the best prospects for achieving security of the CAES? To answer the 
main question, however, it is important to find out why governance innovations became 
necessary in the first place by asking a secondary question: why is the CAES in the process of 
disintegration despite the fact that everyone is worse off as a result of the breakdown? 
 The purpose of this research is to study non-cooperative dynamics within the CAES that 
have negatively affected the level of energy security and regional-level energy governance 
innovations to address energy security challenges in Central Asia. More specifically, this work 
examines whether innovative (energy) governance mechanisms possess powerful instruments to 
encourage Central Asian states to fulfill their commitments to ensure the stability of energy 
supplies within the region. And whether such governance mechanisms establish particular 
relationships between states in which sacrificing some of their political and economic interests 
would still be better than non-compliance with the terms of energy-trading arrangements. 
 Exploring the compatibility of Central Asian states’ energy policies to ensure the security 
of the CAES as well as external factors affecting intra-Central Asian energy trade is both timely 
and important. Newly signed gas supply agreements between China and Central Asian countries 
almost doubled the volume of gas to be exported to China, thus forcing regional producers to 
increase export capacity, even at the expense of domestic and intraregional consumption. Recent 
critical drops of water levels in reservoirs and severe energy insecurity caused by energy supply 
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cuts from downstream neighbours forced Central Asian upstream countries to promote their giant 
hydro-power plant (HPP) projects. In its final assessment for the Rogun HPP in Tajikistan, which 
found that a 335m high dam is economically the most efficient with acceptable environmental 
and social impacts, the World Bank practically gave a green light to Tajik authorities to pursue 
the construction of the project, which is capable of affecting the water-energy balance in the 
region. Uzbekistan opposes construction of large dams, because it fears that its upstream 
neighbours could interfere with the water supply necessary for the downstream irrigation and 
particularly cotton industry, upon which Uzbek economy is highly dependent. Fundamental 
disagreements between the region’s demand for water for irrigation and the use of water to 
generate electricity, along with disputes over the price for fossil fuels and energy trade, can 
seriously escalate the conflict between upstream and downstream countries.  
 By identifying the roots of the major energy security challenges preventing intra-Central 
Asian energy cooperation/trade, and the major weaknesses of existing regional energy 
governance mechanisms, this research work aims to contribute to the broader literature on energy 
governance and conflictive/cooperative dynamics of interaction in the strategically important 
energy sector. While most of the literature focuses on explaining why actors fail to achieve 
greater levels of cooperation, this particular work focuses on conditions in which—despite a long 
history of mutually beneficial cooperation—regional actors suddenly decided to pursue 
myopically self-interested energy policies. The governance of the CAES represents a unique case 
in which energy security, provided by a highly authoritative supra-national management 
system—later replaced by cooperative relationships based solely on trust—now faces serious 
challenges, despite the fact that six main regional-level energy governance mechanisms were put 
in place to deal with insecurity of the unified system. By identifying the major drawbacks of 
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energy governance innovations, policy makers would be able to use the knowledge to address 
these shortcomings to make better decisions and improve energy policies that prioritize regional 
cooperation and intra-Central Asian energy trade. 
 This dissertation is organized as follows. The introduction presents the problem 
statement, methods used for data collection, and theoretical framework that can best map non-
cooperative dynamics in the energy sector in Central Asia. Chapter I looks at broader literature 
explaining the evolution of the energy security concept, major energy security threats, and 
possible solutions to challenges affecting the sufficiency and sustainability of energy supplies 
while taking into account specific characteristics of the Central Asian region. Chapter II, “Major 
Energy Security Concerns and Energy (Security) Policy Priorities of the Central Asian 
Countries,” assesses the level of energy security in Central Asia and analyzes the compatibility 
of regional state actors’ competing energy policy priorities to sustain regional cooperation in the 
energy sector. Chapter III, “Security of the Central Asian Energy (Gas and Electric Power) 
Systems,” studies conflictive and cooperative dynamics of natural gas and electricity supply 
relations within the Central Asian region and between regional exporters and external customers. 
Chapter IV, “Central Asian Energy Security through Regional Cooperation and Energy Trade,” 
highlights the direct contribution of intraregional energy cooperation on the level of energy 
security of the Central Asian states. Chapter V, “Regional Energy Governance Innovations in 
Central Asia,” studies prospects offered by governance innovations in the energy sector and 
major weaknesses limiting their contribution to improving security of the CAES. The concluding 
chapter explains the changing power dynamics affecting regional actors’ ability to coordinate 
their actions to achieve a maximally secure CAES. It summarizes the major challenges 
preventing regional-level energy governance innovations from ensuring greater energy security 
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in Central Asia. This section ends with several practical recommendations to reinstate energy 
trade and facilitate cooperation in the energy sector in Central Asia.  
Method 
 This dissertation draws on both qualitative and quantitative research. Based on the 
analysis of primary (government publications, state agencies’ websites, official speeches, reports 
and statistical data) and secondary sources as well as extended semi-structured expert interviews, 
this research work analyzes the level of energy insecurity, the main factors preventing Central 
Asian state actors from achieving greater cooperation in the energy sector, and the prospects—as 
well as challenges—that the regional energy governance innovations face in achieving a 
maximally secure CAES.  
 A modified set of criteria developed by Vlado Vivoda was chosen to assess Central Asian 
countries’ level of energy security. It contains a comprehensive list of measurement criteria 
(supply and demand security, economic, environmental, political/security, and technological), 
and also includes a policy dimension, which is important for the evaluation of Central Asian 
countries’ capability to respond to energy security challenges. Analysis of the regional state 
actors’ energy policies is useful to understand the extent to which governments prioritize 
regional energy cooperation and are willing to promote governance innovations to sustain such 
cooperation.  
 Information for the assessment was primarily collected from databases such as the 
International Energy Agency (www.iea.org), US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
(www.eia.gov) and the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), which provide information for all 
countries simultaneously. The latest available statistical data for the Central Asian region in 
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these sources is dated 2012–2013; however, given that there has been no energy production 
boom, technological development leap, or major energy crises since then, those statistics mostly 
reflect the current situation.  
 Since Central Asian governments have not adopted energy strategies highlighting energy 
security policy priorities, in an attempt to determine state actors’ priority areas in the energy 
sector development, I have analyzed information provided in a number of governmental portals 
and state agencies’ official websites, including:  
• Kazakhstan—(former) Ministry of Oil and Gas website (www.mgm.kz), (former) 
Ministry of Industry and New Technologies (www.mint.kz), Government of Kazakhstan 
official website (www.government.kz);  
• Kyrgyzstan—Government of Kyrgyz Republic official website (www.gov.kg);  
• Tajikistan—President of the Republic of Tajikistan official website (www.prezident.tj), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan (www.mfa.tj), Ministry of 
Energy and Industry of the Republic of Tajikistan (www.minenergoprom.tj); 
• Turkmenistan—Government of Turkmenistan official website 
(www.turkmenistan.gov.tm); Turkmen state information agency (www.tdh.gov.tm), 
Ministry of Oil Industry and Mineral Resources of Turkmenistan 
(www.minenergo.gov.tm); and 
• Uzbekistan—Government of Uzbekistan official website (www.gov.uz), Uzbekneftegaz 
(www.ung.uz), Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investments and Trade of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan (www.mfer.uz).  
 Semi-structured expert interviews with state officials, representatives of non-
governmental organizations and experts in the areas of energy, economics, policy development, 
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and security from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were used 
for the analysis of the cooperative/conflictive dynamics among Central Asian countries in the 
energy sector. 
 Reports and statistical data provided by the multilateral institutions as well as regional 
programs, including the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 
(www.carecprogram.org), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (www.sectsco.org and 
www.sco-ec.gov), the Eurasian Economic Union (www.evrazes.com and 
www.eurasiancommission.org), the Commonwealth of Independent States (www.e-cis.info and 
www.cis.minsk.by), the World Bank-promoted regional energy governance projects 
(www.worldbank.org), and the Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia 
(www.carecnet.org), intended to improve energy security in Central Asia and promote energy-
led economic development in the region, were particularly useful to studying regional energy 
governance innovations. 
 There were no linguistic limitations to conducting interviews and a systemic literature 
review on the Central Asian region since I am fluent in most of the languages used in the region 
(Uzbek, Tajik, Russian and English). There were, however, some limitations of data gathering. 
Access to some important information was restricted (for example, detailed information 
concerning the current status of pipeline projects, pricing policy, originals of energy export-
import contracts). Asking relevant questions to interviewees and studying reports of regional 
programs in energy sector and secondary literature compensated for insufficient access to certain 
data. This information is used to study cooperative and conflictive dynamics of Central Asian 
energy actors within the framework of the rational game. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 After operating within the common energy system for a long time, Central Asian 
countries seem to have reoriented their energy policies toward establishing independent, both 
separately regulated/administered as well as unconnected, national energy systems, causing 
disintegration of the CAES. Governments of the Central Asian countries have a decisive role in 
almost all areas of domestic and foreign relations, including cooperation in the energy sector, 
and are often blamed for the decreasing level of cooperation, consequently resulting in a lower 
level of energy security in the region. Thus, I offer a rational-actor explanation for the ongoing 
disintegration of the CAES without claiming that there are no other possible explanations. This 
research work studies the extent of a function of the rational pursuit of individual states’ self-
interests (economic and political gains as well as certain energy security concerns) that is 
negatively affecting intraregional cooperation, consequently leading to greater energy insecurity 
in Central Asia. The most important question, however, is whether cooperation in the energy 
sector between regional state actors is currently, and overall, less preferred to individual gains 
that Central Asian countries can hypothetically achieve or if it is simply a problem of 
coordination that is preventing these actors from gaining the highest possible rewards. The 
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, in which actors fail to cooperate because there is high incentive 
for players to cheat in an environment of uncertainty, and the stag-hunt (SH) model, which 
explains the problem of coordination of common strategy to achieve a big payoff, are good 
frameworks through which to map the energy security challenges of the CAES. 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
 Actors behave rationally when they choose the most preferred outcome out of several 
alternatives.1 The PD is a cooperation game, in which the main concern is how to get the players 
to cooperate when there are high incentives to cheat. If an actor has no confidence that the other 
will not cheat or will simply be tempted by the fact that he or she may gain the most by 
defecting, cooperation will most definitely fail.  
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate (R) 2, 2 (S, T) 0, 3 
Defect (T, S) 3, 0 (P) 1, 1 
 
 (2, 2) represents the reward that players can receive for choosing to cooperate. Zero is 
what the player who cooperated while others defected gets. Under the condition that a player 
defects and others do not he or she can get the highest possible payoff of 3. If everyone fails to 
cooperate, players are punished by receiving only some rewards represented by (1, 1) in the 
table. This, however, is less than what they can achieve in cases they both choose not to cheat. 
The formula explaining the PD has to satisfy the following inequalities:  
(S) 0 < (P) 1 < (R) 2 < (T) 3 
 Hypothetically, cooperation should be preferred to defection because the total reward 
players get is higher than any other outcome:  
2+2 > 0+3/3+0/1+1                                                         
1 Stephen Quackenbush, “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory,” International Interactions (2004): 95, 
doi:10.1080/03050620490462595.  
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 Players, however, may still choose to cheat on others, seeking the highest possible 
individual payoff (3) they can get in an environment of uncertainty and lack of trust.2 The 
easiest way to explain the joint defection outcome in PD is to say that no matter what the other 
player does, one is better off defecting. 
 In the PD, players do not take moral considerations into account. Actors do not fear 
possible moral revenge from others for their actions.3 They are, however, concerned about the 
same type of defection by other players (tit-for-tat), which affect their payoff. Defection may not 
always be determined by a strong desire to cheat, but might be instigated by a simple lack of 
knowledge and trust. “If each player is rational and knows that the other is rational, but neither 
knows that the other knows that he is rational, then nobody is cheated, but everybody has an 
interest in acting as if he were being cheated,” argues Cristina Bicchieri.4 Alternatively, to one-
shot tit-for-tat strategy, Pavlov presents the win–stay, lose–shift fundamental behavioural 
mechanism. After a round of mutual defection caused by tit-for-tat, players will most likely 
choose to return to joint cooperation and stick to it.5 Similarly, while the main problem in PD is 
the mistrust among players, if players are rational and playing iterated PD, then according to 
Robert M. Axelrod, cooperation will emerge organically. Encouraging cooperation and 
resolution of conflict depends on four conditions: “avoiding unnecessary conflict by cooperating 
when the other player cooperates, retaliating for unprovoked defection, forgiveness after 
retaliating, and clarity of behaviour, allowing the other player to adapt to one's pattern of 
                                                        
2 Anatol Rapoport, Albert M. Chammah, and Carol J. Orwant, A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1965), 34. 
3 Michael P. Marks, “The Prison as Metaphor: Recasting the ‘Dilemma’ of International Relations,” Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 26, no. 3 (July/August 2001): 363. 
4 Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, The Dynamics of Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 222. 
5 Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund, “A Strategy of Win-stay, Lose-shift That Outperforms Tit-for-Tat in the PD 
Game,” Nature 364 (July 1993): 56, doi:10.1038/364056a0.  
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behaviour.”6 However, since the CAES is still in the process of disintegration, and despite 
several rounds of defection, regional state actors have not shown any sign of cooperative 
dynamics, we can dismiss the PD game as the main device to study the problem of regional 
cooperation in the energy sector.  
The Stag-Hunt Game 
 If the PD (cooperation game) is about a high incentive to cheat and mistrust, which 
results in a lack of cooperation, the SH game is better understood as a coordination game. In 
other words, SH is about getting players to coordinate a common strategy to get the big 
payoff—the stag.7 The SH satisfies the following equation:  
(R) 2 > (T) 1 > (P) 1 > (S) 0 
 If a stag appears right in the beginning of hunting, hunters would most definitely go after 
it and enjoy the highest possible gains. But the stag rarely appears in the beginning of hunting, 
which requires certain patience from all hunters. Waiting for a stag to show up may take some 
time testing hunters’ true commitment to the common cause and trust among each other. The 
most challenging part of prolonged stag hunting is to make sure that hunters would not defect 
when a hare emerges from the bush. If any of the hunters shoots the hare, the noise would scare 
the stag in the area. The hunter that chooses to defect can have sufficient meat today, but would 
get hungry again tomorrow, like the others.8  
                                                        
6 Robert M. Axelrod and St. D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), in Curtis 
S. Signorino, “Simulating International Cooperation Under Uncertainty,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 
1 (March 1996): 154. 
7 Robert Kelly, “The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic ‘Stag-Hunt’ (1): N. Korea is the Stag,” Asian Security 
Blog, April 26, 2010, accessed January 29, 2014, https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2010/04/29/the-six-party-
talks-as-a-game-theoretic-Stag-hunt-2-china-likes-the-rabbit-too-much/.  
8 Walter C Clemens, Dynamics of International Relations: Conflict and Mutual Gain in an Era of Global 
Interdependence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 211. 
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 The dilemma in the SH game is whether to go after the smaller hare with promising 
chances of catching it, or risk ending up with nothing in order to increase the chance of catching 
the stag.9 A hunter who chooses to go for a stag takes a risk that others may choose not to. A 
hunter that goes for a hare runs no such risk, because his payoff does not depend on others. But 
he sacrifices the potential gains in case of a successful SH.10 In this regard, players have to make 
a difficult choice of whether to achieve selfish gains immediately with lower risks, or collective 
benefits in the long term running some risk of losing everything. 11  There should be two 
conditions that would encourage hunters to go for a stag: guarantee that others would not defect; 
and the fact that hunters gain more by hunting a stag than if they separately capture all possible 
hares.  
 Stag (cooperate) Hare (defect) 
Stag (cooperate) (R) 2, 2 (S, T) 0, 1 
Hare (defect) (T, S) 1, 0 (P) 1, 1 
 
 In the PD game, achieving cooperation with fewer players may seem to have a greater 
chance of realization, because there is no need to try to calculate the intentions of many actors in 
an environment of uncertainty. While in the PD the larger the group, the more difficult it is to 
achieve cooperation, conversely in the SH it would be quite challenging to hunt a stag with two 
participants. A higher number of participants increase the chance to hunt a stag. Differently 
                                                        
9 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 152. 
10 Brian Skyrms and U. C. Irvine, “The Stag Hunt,” Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, 
March 2001, accessed February 6, 2014, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. 
11 Pushpesh Pant, International Relations in 21st Century (India: Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 2011), 35.  
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from the PD, in the SH there is a cooperative equilibrium where if others cooperate the player 
has to do his or her part as well. 12  Robert Pahre believes that one of the most effective 
mechanisms for sustaining multilateralism is asymmetric enforcement. Large enforcers of small 
cheaters will provide basis for multilateral cooperation.13 An asymmetrical power balance might 
be an important instrument to sustain multilateral cooperative dynamics, but does not 
necessarily imply that the interests of all parties are equally secured. Within such relationships, 
less powerful members are vulnerable to unilateral manipulation from dominant players. 
 Players may choose selfish gains when they could clearly be better off within collective 
benefits’ distribution, because players prioritize immediate short-term benefits against achieving 
long-term gains.14 Stephen J. Majeski and Shane Fricks argue that the role of communication 
between states and its effect on players’ decision to cooperate should not be underestimated. 
States cooperate more and defect less when they are engaged in communication. Players fail to 
cooperate because they know little about the others and thus fear them. Communication is a 
good tool to alleviate that fear. There are two forms of communication. The first form consists 
of signals. Signals are costly and directly affect the payoffs. In the energy sector, the cost of 
signals may vary from certain payments necessary to establish a well-functioning energy system 
to the costs associated with resource wars. The second form of communication is cheap talks. 
Cheap talks do not bear any cost, but also do not necessarily affect the outcomes of interaction.15 
Communication provides parties with more information and the possibility to better calculate 
expected choices. Communication can show players that there is little to fear about others and                                                         
12 Jorge M. Pacheco et al., “Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-Person Stag Hunt 
Dilemmas,” Biological Sciences 276, no. 1655 (January 2009): 315, doi:10.1007/978-3-0348-0122-5_7. 
13 Robert Pahre, “Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated PD,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 
1994): 339. 
14 Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated PD,” in The Dynamics of Norms by Cristina 
Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey, and Brian Skyrms, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 222. 
15 Stephen J. Majeski and Shane Fricks, “Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 627, doi:10.1177/0022002795039004002.  
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that it is a mistake to cheat on each other, thus encouraging greater cooperation, which can bring 
higher payoffs.16 
 This research examines the factors affecting the extent of multilateral cooperation in the 
energy sector among Central Asian countries and with external customers, as well as the problem 
of miscommunication that prevents state actors from developing a better coordinated strategy to 








                                                        
16 Majeski and Fricks, “Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations,” 628. 
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CHAPTER I. Literature Review: Defining Energy Security, Energy Security Challenges 
and Solutions 
Evolution of the Energy Security Concept  
 A large amount of work has been conducted on energy security within the framework of 
national security, economic gains, international politics, energy interdependence and the 
diversification of energy sources/energy export routes. Various scholars have examined the 
concept from different angles, but they have failed to produce a universal definition of energy 
security.1 
 One group of scholars argues that energy security is constructed around the recognition 
that oil, gas, and their renewable counterparts need to be considered first and foremost as 
commodities. Thus, energy export/import relations are to be exercised through market-based 
transactions.2 Others emphasize the linkage between energy security, international politics, and 
national security.3 State actors are usually guided by a particular type of logic, suggesting that 
they cannot trust energy security to market forces alone. Thus, state actors often interpret threats 
to energy security as threats to national security.4 For instance, in choosing routes to export 
energy, states often consider the political implications of various route options.5 
 There have been two major shifts in the literature in defining the concept of energy 
                                                        
1 Felix Ciuta, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?” Security Dialogue, vol. 41, no. 2 
(2010): 126, doi:10.1177/0967010610361596. 
2 Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte, “From Energy Security to Global Energy Governance,” Journal of 
Energy Security (2010), energy-governance&catid=103:energysecurityissuecontent&Itemid=358.  
3 Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource 
Management (London: Routledge, 2009); Filippos Proedrou, EU Energy Security in the Gas Sector Evolving 
Dynamics, Policy Dilemmas and Prospects (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Central 
Asian Security The New International Context (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001); Sascha 
Müller-Kraenner, Energy Security: Re-Measuring the World (London: Earthscan, 2008). 
4 Moran and Russell, Energy Security and Global Politics, 2. 
5 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
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security. The first shift is characterized by broadening sources vital to providing energy security. 
The evaluation of energy security is no longer limited to the security of oil and gas supplies as 
well as diversification of energy transporting routes and energy markets. Increasing the share of 
alternative energy sources such as wind, solar, nuclear, and hydro power in the overall energy 
production balance has become an important aspect of energy security to ensure the long-term 
security of energy supplies.6 Having feared depletion of hydrocarbons and environmental risks 
associated with excessive usage of fossil fuels forced energy actors to develop renewable energy 
sources (RES) in the overall energy consumption.7 Employment of new technologies to increase 
efficiency of energy production, storage, and transportation can contribute as much as increasing 
the production of fossil fuels.8  
 The second shift is about expanding the range of actors whose energy security concerns 
must be considered. Conventional understanding of energy security emphasizes the importance 
of energy (mainly oil and gas) supplies for importing countries. As a result, energy security has 
been associated with energy self-sufficiency and the security of energy supplies. When a 
country begins importing a large amount of oil and gas, it becomes vulnerable to potential 
energy sanctions. This compromises its energy security, understood as the security of energy 
supplies.9 “[C]onventional energy security seeks to assure supply while assuming that demand is 
                                                        
6 Christian Winzer, “Conceptualizing Energy Security,” Energy Policy 46 (2012); Benjamin K. Sovacool, “The 
Methodological Challenges of Creating a Comprehensive Energy Security Index,” Energy Policy 48 (2012); 
David V. Hippel et al., “Energy Security and Sustainability in Northeast Asia,” Energy Policy 39, no. 11 (2011), 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.001. 
7 Hippel, “Energy security and Sustainability in Northeast Asia”; Vlado Vivoda, “Evaluating Energy Security in the 
Asia-Pacific Region: A Novel Methodological Approach,” Energy Policy 38 (2010), 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.028; Winzer, “Conceptualizing Energy Security”; Sovacool, “The Methodological 
Challenges.”  
8 International Energy Agency, Energy Efficiency Governance: Handbook (Paris: International Energy Agency, 
2010): 226, accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/gov_handbook-
1.pdf. 
9 Michael Wesley, Energy Security in Asia (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 43. 
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given [...].”10 
 Recent studies on energy security have shifted the definition of energy security from a 
sole focus on the importers’ perspective to the relationship between energy importers and 
exporters, thus emphasizing the vulnerability of the latter in energy export/import relations. The 
main line of argument is that “exporters worry about energy demand the way energy importers 
worry about energy supply.”11 Energy security, from the exporters’ perspective, is defined as the 
security of demand to generate economic growth and to maintain social stability,12 which can be 
threatened by a variety of factors, such as resource wars or economic sanctions imposed by 
importing states.13 
 The most recent approach to energy security places individuals’ energy needs at the 
centre of interest because an abundance of energy resources in a country does not necessarily 
mean that individuals are continuously provided with sufficient energy.14 The human dimension 
of energy security, or the so-called “energy services security,” places individuals at the centre of 
interest in designing energy policy and emphasizes individuals’ access to energy resources in 
sufficient volume at an affordable price.15 
Energy Security Threats 
 While some associate the availability of energy with massive deposits of natural 
resources, what happens above ground is more likely to impact the level of energy security than                                                         
10 Vivoda, “Evaluating Energy Security.”  
11 Gawdat Bahgat, Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley, 2011), 
226. 
12 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: Penguin Press, 
2011), 267. 
13 Allison and Jonson, Central Asian Security. 
14 Shaffer, Energy Politics, 91; Stefan Buzar, Energy Poverty in Eastern Europe: Hidden Geographies of 
Deprivation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007). 
15 Anas F. Alhaji, “What Is Energy Security? Definitions and Concepts (Part 3/5),” Middle East Economic 
Survey 50, no. 45 (2007), accessed September 20, 2011, http://archives.mees.com/issues/213/articles/8255. 
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what is available underground.16 Natural resources lying underground have no intrinsic value to 
ensure availability of energy for both economic and population needs. Energy resources acquire 
such value when they are extracted and transported to energy markets.17 However, the list of 
factors that can threaten the security of energy supply is quite inclusive: “internal instability, 
civil wars, ethnic violence that can disturb energy production; terroristic attacks on energy 
infrastructure; politically motivated suspension of oil and gas supply; economic sanctions 
against energy producing countries; war between energy producers; territorial disputes that can 
significantly slow down cooperation among parties in the energy sector and so on.”18 The list 
can be extended to underinvestment in the development of RES, improving efficiency of energy 
production, transportation and consumption facilities, as well as non-market mechanisms 
regulating the energy sector. 
Energy Infrastructure Insecurity 
 Energy security threats in relation to infrastructure vary depending on energy 
transportation means. For a landlocked region, pipelines are the most cost-efficient way of 
transporting resources. However, oil and gas pipelines often run over long distances through 
sparsely populated and therefore only poorly guarded territory. Once damage has been done, it 
often takes considerable time until the status quo is restored. 19  Some scholars argue that 
terrorists have little incentive to attack energy supply infrastructure. Because attacks can be 
costly but very limited in terms of casualties, striking energy infrastructure possesses a relatively 
low symbolic meaning across terrorist ideologies and attacks on energy transmission 
                                                        
16 Bahgat, Energy Security, 16. 
17 George Joffe, “Threats to Energy Security,” Center for International Studies University of Cambridge (n.d.), 12. 
18 Bahgat, Energy Security, 15. 
19 Muller-Kraenner, Energy Security, 23. 
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infrastructure can diminish the support of a terrorist group by the wider population.20 Others 
believe that since energy infrastructures are often strategically important for sustaining political 
regimes, they are quite vulnerable to terrorist or insurgent attacks.  
Militarization of Energy Resources 
 Pipeline infrastructure projects link states and reflect relations. In choosing routes to 
export energy, states naturally consider the political ramifications of various route options. 
Brenda Shaffer lists 19 points in which energy and international politics interlink. The main 
point is that energy and politics are inseparable and they affect each other all the time. Among 
many aspects of the energy-politics nexus, she highlights “peace pipelines,” interdependence 
between supplier and consumer, the power of transit countries to affect energy relations, 
resource wars, the physical vulnerability of the energy trade, and the threat of climate change.21 
Daniel Moran and James A. Russell argue that energy security is central to national security and 
that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter.22 Scholars 
claim that the militarization of energy—resource management such as the direct seizure of 
energy assets by military means, destruction of energy assets to deny their use to rivals, military 
protection of, or attacks upon the energy production and transportation infrastructure, including 
oil fields, refineries, pipelines, and so on—may occur due to national security reasons.23 A 
legacy of suspicion, mistrust, tensions among ethnic groups and political parochialism can 
escalate a conflict over the control of and access to natural resources.24                                                         
20 Peter Toft, Arash Duero and Arunas Bieliauskas, “Terrorist Targeting and Energy Security,” Energy Policy 38, 
no. 8 (2010): 4416, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.070. 
21 Shaffer, Energy Politics, 6.  
22 Moran and Russell, Energy Security and Global Politics, 2. 
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 Charles K Ebinger, Energy and Security in South Asia Cooperation or Conflict? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2011), ix. 
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 Despite Saddam Hussein’s promise not to take aggressive actions against Kuwait, which 
started drilling too much oil, causing the oil price to go down, he started a war against Kuwait in 
1990.25 Iraqi soldiers destroyed many oil fields in Kuwait to destabilize the export system of the 
country. The logic of war in energy security implies that “energy is a security issue because it is 
either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict.” 26  From the geopolitical perspective, 
consumer states may decide to intervene to ensure the security of supply if conditions inside 
producing countries threaten the supply flows.27 There have been a few such cases in the past: 
the 1951–1953 crisis in Iran, the 1991 intervention over Kuwait, and the 2003 intervention in 
Iraq.28  
The Energy Weapon 
 Although hypothetically both importers and exporters are interested in stable and reliable 
energy markets, this stability can sometimes be sacrificed for purposes other than to ensure 
energy security. While states usually refrain from engaging in war over resources, energy actors 
often employ less radical means to pursue their national interests to get access to energy or to 
use energy leverage to achieve goals in other areas of activity. Economic sanctions against Iran 
and gas export disruptions from Turkmenistan to Russia show that both importing countries and 
exporting can be exposed to the threat of “energy weapon.”29 Oil and gas markets in which 
pipelines are the main means of transportation may seem to be less vulnerable to the 
manipulation of both price and production, because export/import relations are based on long-
                                                        
25 Yergin, The Quest, 9. 
26 Ciuta, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security,” 129. 
27 Joffe, “Threats to Energy Security,” 9. 
28 Ibid., 17. 
29 Shaffer, Energy Politics, 1. 
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term contracts.30 Yet such agreements are sometimes incapable of securing the energy markets 
and stable supply relations from short-term energy crises. Since there is no universal regulatory 
mechanism, and it is difficult to come to agreement concerning profit and rent-sharing, price 
manipulation may take place in the relationships between parties, especially if they are 
asymmetrically dependent on each other.31  
Increasing Export at the Expense of Domestic Consumption 
 Building energy infrastructure requires significant upfront investments. With direct 
interest in importing energy, consumers often take part in projects designed to extract and 
transport resources. Once invested, consuming states seek to ensure that their investments are 
protected and they receive the expected volume of resources. 32 There is, however, often a 
conflict of interests in which, on the one hand, investors (customers) are interested in acquiring 
energy while, on the other hand, it may affect availability of energy for domestic needs if the 
overall production capacity is limited. If they are tempted by revenues from exporting resources, 
energy producers may increase the volume of export, even at the expense of domestic 
consumption.  
The Problem of Sustainability of Energy Sectors 
 Some challenges are not perceived by state actors as a threat per se right now, but would 
most likely have a negative effect on energy security in the long run. Very often, state actors’ 
perception of energy security is limited to ensuring the highest possible price for exporters’ oil 
and gas and securing continuous supplies of hydrocarbons for importing countries through the                                                         
30 Joffe, “Threats to Energy Security,” 8. 
31 Paul Stevens, Transit Troubles: Pipelines As a Source of Conflict (London: Chatham House, 2009). 
32 Shaffer, Energy Politics, 52. 
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diversification of energy supply routes.33 The reason for such a limited understanding of energy 
security is that states are interested in promoting one aspect of energy security more than 
others.34 However, it is impossible to address the complex set of energy security issues by 
having just one part of it in mind.35 Equating energy security to the stability of energy supplies 
would mean that in the best-case scenario, oil and gas supplies security is ensured. Long-term 
energy security, however, requires the development of alternative energy sources. 
Lack of Energy Security Policy 
 For exporting countries, moving energy out to external markets does not contribute to 
their energy security in terms of availability of resources for domestic consumption. Energy 
sectors dominated by market mechanisms can naturally eliminate the difference between 
domestic and external energy prices, thus increasing the attractiveness of exporters’ internal 
markets. However, the development of energy sectors extensively controlled and subsidized by 
state actors requires government policies that are specifically adopted to ensure energy security. 
In this case, lack of attention by state actors toward developing alternative energy sources and 
inability to coordinate their policies with other energy actors to increase efficiency of energy 
production and transportation by employing new technologies significantly weakens the security 
of the energy system. The development of the energy sector in various directions, however, 
requires clearly defined but also quite flexible (responsive to emerging energy security threats) 
energy security policy/strategy. According to Vivoda, “if a state does not have a clearly stated 
energy security policy, which addresses in detail, the traditional and new energy security 
                                                        
33 Gawdat Bahgat, “Central Asia and Energy Security,” Asian Affairs 38, no. 1 (2006), 
doi:10.1080/03068370500456819. 
34 Shaffer, Energy Politics, 93. 
35 Hippel, “Energy Security and Sustainability”; Sovacool, “The Methodological Challenges.” 
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challenges, this allows that this state may not have the capacity and/or commitment to [timely 
and adequately] ensure energy security.”36 
System-level Energy Security and Asymmetrical Interdependence  
 There are indeed many factors affecting energy security at the local, state, and 
international levels. What is equally important, however, is that threats at one particular level 
can and usually do affect energy security at the other. Consequently, as Barry Buzan rightfully 
puts it, [energy] security at the local level is closely interlinked to security at the state and 
international system levels and the other way around.37 
 At the international level, energy security threats usually emerge as a result of interstate 
relations, in which they interact with each other, and impact their overall security.38 Daniel 
Yergin considers energy security as a system “composed of the national policies and 
international institutions that are designed to respond in a coordinated way to energy supply 
disruptions.”39 The ways states interact with each other often depends on changes in the regional 
balance of power or as a result of change in historical amity and enmity patterns. Most of the 
projects/initiatives in the energy sector do not change the distribution of power or enmity 
patterns retaining the status quo in relations. Some projects, however, may cause tensions, 
leading to the break up of the existing security complex. There are also cases when new energy 
actors move into the complex (external transformation) and significantly change the existing 
                                                        
36 Vivoda, “Evaluating Energy Security,” 5259. 
37 Barry Buzan, “Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations,” Journal 
of Peace Research 21, no.2 (1984): 121. 
38 Yergin, The Quest, 264. 
39 Ibid., 267. 
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power balance (overlay). 40  Many scholars argue that mutually beneficial power balance in 
energy supply relations is maintained when engaging parties are interdependent.  
 Importing states are interested in getting access to energy resources. Exporters are driven 
by the desire to generate revenues from moving energy out to external markets. The role of a so- 
called “good transit country,” which tends to produce predictable conditions for the most cost- 
efficient transportation of energy to consumers with minimal disruptions and has internal 
security and stable government, is also crucial.41 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen argue that 
interdependence between producers and transit countries may produce incentives to avoid 
conflicts and compel states to engage in more intensive forms of cooperation.42 
 However, if relationships are not based on confidence, then high interdependence may be 
seen as a negative factor. Mutually dependent states are rarely equally or symmetrically 
dependent on each other. Taking into account the fact that the less dependent state in energy-
supply relations is the one for which the termination or drastic alteration of the relationship in 
supply chain costs least, it may use its power to manipulate the relationships to achieve leverage 
not only in the specific issue area (energy sector), but also in various areas of general interaction 
affected by spillover effects (broader political and economic spheres). According to Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “an unequal distribution of gains and expenses lies at the heart of 
asymmetrical interdependence,” which can incentivize or force least-privileged actors to defect, 
causing the conflict.43 Asymmetrical interdependence can be as dangerous as dependence itself. 
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 The key aspect of asymmetrical interdependence is the power capacity of one country to 
direct the decisions and actions of another state or states.44 However, sometimes it is not actual 
dependence, but the overall relationships among actors that matter the most. The state with 
friendly relations to another state might not consider 50 percent energy dependency as a security 
challenge and would further develop joint cooperation, while two states with relatively opposed 
relations might perceive even 10 percent dependency as a serious obstacle to developing further 
relations. Moreover, interacting parties often try to minimize their dependence on others and at 
the same time increase others’ dependence on them.45 
 An issue of interdependence that generates conflicts is highly sensitive when it comes 
to pipeline transit infrastructure. Energy transit infrastructure is a very complex network of 
supply system to the end-user. Transit pipelines have a tendency to produce long- or short-term 
conflicts or tensions in the relations between producer and transit country as a result of gas 
transit disruptions.46 The fact that a pipeline has to cross the territory of a sovereign country or 
countries, which in practice has the capacity, although not the right, to unilaterally abrogate any 
agreement on energy supply, makes the situation quite complicated.  
How to Achieve Energy Security? 
 There is no universal definition of energy security. Thus, the extent and type of energy 
security threats vary from region to region. The measures needed to address those challenges 
also vary. While some scholars emphasize diversification of energy sources and suppliers, 
building strategic storage reserves, establishing country/region-wide energy infrastructure and                                                         
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flexibility to shift fuels,47 others expand the list to include the availability of high-quality and 
timely information sharing, collaboration among energy actors, investment flows, research, and 
development.48 For a landlocked region, in which energy security is dependent on pipeline and 
electricity transmission infrastructure, diversification of dependence between energy actors is 
often perceived as the best way to ensure stability and reliability of energy supplies.  
Interdependence through Diversification 
 A large amount of work has been done on energy security issues and the diversification 
of consumers’ energy dependency within the framework of national security, economic gains, 
international politics, energy interdependence, and military power.49 Shaffer argues that energy 
security can be provided when suppliers and consumers are interdependent in the supply 
relations. 50  The extent to which each side possesses alternative supply or market options, 
including transport infrastructure, determines the extent of interdependence in energy 
relations. 51  Diversification of energy export routes ensures alternative ways of transporting 
energy for consumers (decreases the effect of energy supply disruptions by one actor) and 
alternative markets for energy producers to sell energy at world prices.52 There are a number of 
different factors that may ensure the success of such diversification, including: geography 
(distance between exporting and importing countries, security/vulnerability of transport routes), 
political relations, availability of energy resources and transport infrastructure, refining capacity,                                                         
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policy (commitment to implement), and resources (capacity and willingness to pay the price to 
secure access to alternative energy).53   
 There are other techniques to decrease asymmetry in interdependence and prevent energy 
supply disruptions. One of the possibilities is to build strategic reserves. Strategic petroleum 
reserves can serve as insurance from very short-term supply disruptions for energy-importing 
countries.54 Such reserves do not solve the problem of prolonged supply disruptions. Another 
possibility is to bind importers and exporters with a formal agreement.55 However, sometimes 
energy exporters and importers, as well as transit countries, are criticized for using energy as a 
“weapon” by breaking the terms of contract. Regional energy relations are very often interest-
driven and lack an effective enforcement mechanism to respect the contracts. That is why, as 
Shaffer puts it right, “one of the major components of the cost of a project can be compensating 
for the perceived risk: regime’s political orientation, how likely it is to respect signed contracts, 
its propensity to be involved in regional conflict, etc.”56  
Market Mechanisms 
 State actors often overemphasize the relationships between energy security and national 
security. They tend to perceive energy resources as a strategic commodity and are willing to use 
energy as leverage for purposes other than that to ensure stable and reliable supplies of resources 
for economic and population needs. Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin, however, argue that 
energy security should be constructed around recognition that oil, gas, and their renewable 
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counterparts need to be considered first and foremost as commodities.57 So, for the consumers to 
access energy resources at fair prices, energy exporters should also exercise their price 
bargaining power through market-based transactions.58  
 Market mechanisms can provide effective instruments to deal with energy insecurity.59 
Many energy security experts consider market integration to be the most effective way to ensure 
energy security. 60  Among the major advantages of market mechanisms are innovation, 
flexibility and cost-effectiveness, all of which government agencies often ignore.61 Non-market 
mechanisms can also be employed and sometimes might be a necessary condition to address 
energy security challenges, but only after market mechanisms fail. Governments can take a 
leading role in addressing suddenly emerging energy security challenges; however, market 
mechanisms come first, not the other way around. Long-term energy security can be ensured 
through proper functioning of market mechanisms in combination with government regulatory 
instruments operating within a free market.62 It is quite difficult to establish well-functioning 
market mechanisms in an environment dominated by unaccountable and non-transparent 
government institutions.63  
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 Taking into account the evolving nature of energy security threats, it has become difficult 
for governments alone to adequately address energy security problems. 64  In some cases, 
approaching a whole set of energy security challenges might not be in the short-term interests of 
state actors. A governance approach, on the other hand, provides a mechanism/platform to 
coordinate state policies to make sure that states take into account the interests of other actors 
and develop those aspects of energy security that otherwise would barely receive appropriate 
attention. 65  In this research work, governance is defined as “the coordinated, polycentric 
management of issues purposefully directed toward particular outcomes.”66 While there can be 
different political (power dynamics, identity and ideology, internal and external threats, 
domestic politics, leadership) as well as economic (high level of economic interdependence, 
trade, the complementarity of economies and policies, a desire to stimulate trade and attract 
investments through creation of a larger market) factors driving regionalism, 67  governance 
mechanisms are an important instrument to sustain cooperative dynamics.  
 One of the key elements of governance innovations at all levels (local, national, regional 
and global) of interaction is the ability to facilitate persuasion rather than coercion as a means of 
influence.68 In this sense, the idea of governance is about moving beyond the state that usually 
uses coercion. 69  According to Michele Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley, non-state actors share 
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responsibility with the state for defining problems and implementing solutions.70 The multilevel 
governance system rejects the top-down approach. If government uses its formal authority 
backed by an enforcement mechanism, governance actors’ activities are “backed by shared goals 
that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities.”71  
 As a process, achieving well-functioning governance may take time and refinement.72 
The evolving nature of energy governance can clearly be observed along the lines of: “the 
timescale of technological innovation, the timescale of fossil fuel resource depletion and the 
timescale of the harmful climate change.”73 The transition to a more sustainable and governance 
regulation-based energy sector is often associated with collective visioning exercises, some 
collaborative and experimental projects, as well as initiatives promoting networking, innovation 
in technologies and practices, can apply more traditional policy instruments.74  
 From the actor-centric perspective, governance innovation is about pursuing collective 
goals in which the state (or government) is not necessarily the only or most important actor.75 If 
for the most part of the twentieth century, the state has been the building block of the 
international system,76 now we quite often observe the retreat of the state.77 Global and regional, 
as well as to certain extent local and national, affairs shifted from a statist toward a polycentric 
mode of regulation. In this sense, governance implies coordinated actions of more than one 
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authority.78 Polycentrism disperses regulation across multiple sub-state, state, supra-state and 
non-governmental institutions.79 Within the governance concept international organizations,80 
civil society, 81  non-governmental organizations (NGO), 82  epistemic communities, 83  private 
transnational institutions,84 transnational (capitalist) class,85 networks86 and many other actors 
are all considered to be the drivers of change.  
 Actors quite often establish certain institutions to achieve an outcome for which a 
governance mechanism is designed. These institutions may serve either as an arena/platform for 
dealing with issues or as an actor if they have motivation and organizational capacity to 
intervene87 and introduce innovations in energy sector development.88 At the international level, 
particularly in the energy sector, such institutions are often formed to improve their position to 
reduce the risk of suffering competitive disadvantages in the regional and global energy 
markets.89 They also play an important role in coordinating energy policies between energy-
producing, consuming, and transit states. 90  Oraorn Poocharoen and Benjamin K. Sovacool 
suggest five criteria for the effectiveness of governance mechanisms: “clarity of roles and                                                         
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objectives among members; having strong, independent, continual sources of funding; 
institutional formality (having a permanent secretariat, budget, full time staff, etc.); efficacy, 
which is the ability to accomplish its mission and goals at the least possible cost; and level of 
interdependency among members.”91 
 Therefore, there are three important pillars upon which governance innovation is based:  
• First, diversity and proliferation of governors—international governmental 
organization,92 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), governments, 
state agencies, private energy companies, civil society, epistemic communities,93 
networks as actors,94 etc.;  
• Second, cooperation among those actors on different levels of interaction—
local/municipal levels,95 intergovernmental, or supra-national levels;96 
• Third, different forms of interaction—formal intergovernmental arrangements,97 
informal networks,98 gatherings of leading economic, political, and cultural leaders.99 
 It is difficult to come up with a single universal formula for ensuring energy sectors’ 
sustainability through energy governance mechanisms, because there are many ways of making                                                         
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progress in this direction and each depends on the particular characteristics of a 
country/region.100 The following chapter presents the analysis of the main characteristics of the 
Central Asian countries’ energy sectors, the level of energy insecurity and energy policy areas 
that the authorities are currently prioritizing.  
Studies of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia 
 There are a number of studies that approach the issue of regional cooperation in Central 
Asia from different perspectives. Some of these studies explain why regionalism (or regional 
cooperation) occurs in one area (for example, the environment or security traditionally 
conceived) but largely neglected in another (for example, economics). Others explore the impact 
of domestic politics (e.g., patrimonialism, with a particular focus on rent seeking) on regional 
cooperative dynamics. Kathleen Collins, for instance, demonstrates a direct relationship between 
patrimonialism and regionalism in Central Asia. Ruling elites of the Central Asian countries, 
being primarily concerned about regime survival and personal enrichment, successfully promote 
cooperation in the security area because this bolsters their rule. At the same time, while paying 
lip service to economic regionalism, these same elites in practice resist regional economic 
integration fearing the liberalization would undermine their ability to extract personal benefits.101 
While some patrimonial regimes (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) proclaim greater 
openness to regional economic cooperation than others (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Collins 
argues that economic regionalism has been limited in all Central Asian states.102 In this regard, 
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Central Asian state leaders would support any sort of regionalism initiative only as long as it 
contributed to sustaining their regimes and their ability to extract rents.103 
 Walter Mattli, in The Logic of Regional Integration, suggests two primary conditions 
necessary for regional integration: (a) demand from domestic businesses; and, (b) a willingness 
of ruling elites to supply it.104 Like Collins, Erika Weinthal argues that while regional economic 
integration might yield mutually beneficial trading arrangements in Central Asia, corrupt 
governments and authoritarian regimes, which mainly rely on external rents, may not have 
adequate incentive to promote it.105 Timothy Frye and Edward D. Mansfield demonstrate a clear 
link between regime type and regional-level trade liberalization by arguing that trade 
liberalization usually takes place in democratic states.106 Democratization processes, however, 
are developing rather slowly in Central Asia. In fact, patrimonialism in Central Asian countries 
has strengthened in the post-Soviet period. As a result, even powerful external actors now take 
into account the local rules designed to promote elites’ rent-seeking interests.107 As a result, 
ruling elites, being concerned about short-term maximization of their personal gains, promote 
policies (including those that imply a certain level of integration) only if it serves their political 
and financial interests.108  
 Weinthal, in her book on State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking 
Domestic and International Politics in Central Asia, attempts to explain why Central Asian 
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countries succeeded in developing cooperative dynamics to some extent in the area where it was 
least expected.109 She argues that despite the fact that the Central Asian region was prone to 
conflict in the post-Soviet era, owing to transboundary water disputes and ethnic conflicts, state 
actors engaged in regional environmental cooperation, which contributed to sustaining stability. 
Weinthal provides a framework to explain why states would want to establish regional 
institutions. Weinthal’s framework embodies a two-level institution building approach, 
according to which domestic institutional reforms are linked to the regional cooperation, and 
provides a role for international organizations, bilateral aid organization, and non-governmental 
organizations as primary actors promoting regional initiatives.110 These third party actors helped 
Central Asian states maintain stability in the transformation period and allowed corrupt 
governments to retain power, but ultimately failed to produce meaningful environmental 
protection. 111  In essence, regional state actors engaged in environmental cooperation in an 
attempt to promote their political interests indirectly. In an environment lacking transparency and 
accountability, this was not a difficult task to accomplish.112  
 One difficulty with this research, however, is that it treats cooperation and non-
cooperation as a binary. In reality, Central Asian states do cooperate; they merely cooperate less 
than they might. Moreover, when they do cooperate, they often do so in ways that do not look 
like particularly high-quality cooperation from a Western liberal governance perspective. 
Behind-the-scenes, off the books, or informal trading arrangements are common. And yet these 
satisfy the core requirement of cooperation, which is to accept a short-term cost in pursuit of                                                         
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long-term gain.  Such “grey-zone” cooperation can be thought of as taking place on a sliding 
scale. When we look closely at the Central Asian energy system, we see various shades of 
grey—which raises the question of whether different forms or levels of cooperation might not be 
possible that would more closely approximate Pareto-optimality. By examining the detailed 
interaction of domestic energy markets, the intra-Central Asian energy market, and external 
energy markets, I argue that the answer is yes. A governance perspective on the problem makes 
this easier to see than would a simple binary “cooperation problem” approach of the kind most 
commonly found in the existing literature. 
 Undoubtedly, rent-seeking elites are often key to the analysis of policy choices in the 
energy sectorHowever, the fact that there is an element of rent seeking in all levels of interaction 
in the energy sector does not imply the absence of other concerns. Put another way, rent-seeking 
alone does not necessarily explain why governments chose a particular type of interaction over 
others. While acknowledging the seriousness of the problem of personalistic interests of Central 
Asian elites, I present a comprehensive analysis of factors affecting decision-making of the 
Central Asian states.  
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CHAPTER II. Major Energy Security Concerns and Energy (Security) Policy Priorities of 
the Central Asian Countries 
 Central Asian countries’ energy sectors were initially designed to operate within a unified 
energy system managed from Tashkent and controlled by Moscow. After gaining independence, 
Central Asian leaders reached a common understanding regarding the benefits of sustaining 
close regional energy cooperation. These same leaders, however, later started pursuing policies 
that distance countries from each other, leading to the disintegration of the CAES. The 
breakdown of an interdependent system into separate entities (national energy systems) has, to a 
different extent, affected the level of energy security in all five countries. In this regard, 
escalating energy insecurities can only be addressed through increasing intra-Central Asian 
energy trade and greater regional cooperation. 
 There are several factors suggesting that studying the energy security problems emerging 
as a result of CAES ongoing disintegration and exploring the compatibility of the Central Asian 
states’ energy security policies to sustain regional energy cooperation are both timely and 
important. The World Bank has released the assessment results for the Rogun HPP, according to 
which 335m high dam is found economically the most efficient with acceptable environmental 
and social impacts. Tajikistan’s desire to build the tallest dam in the world was approved by the 
World Bank expert panel, yet objection by the Uzbek government may further escalate the 
conflict over the water-energy balance and negatively impact the level of energy security in 
Central Asia. Decreasing levels of water in reservoirs due to overuse for electricity production 
over the last couple of years affects future production volume in upstream Central Asian states, 
preventing people from simply meeting their basic human needs. With relatively limited oil and 
gas extraction capacities, Central Asian downstream countries’ attempt to increase the volume of 
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export affects sufficiency of hydrocarbon supplies for domestic and intraregional consumption. 
Transition from subsidized to market prices while ensuring affordability of energy resources 
through policy initiatives turned out to be a difficult, but necessary, task. This chapter studies the 
level of energy insecurity in the region, resource potential that provides some prospects and 
Central Asian countries’ energy security policies affecting regional cooperation. Addressing 
these and some other energy security problems requires greater regional cooperation promoted 
by prioritized energy policies. Before closely studying energy security policy priorities of the 
Central Asian states, the following section defines energy security and security of the CAES.  
Defining Energy Security  
 During the Soviet era, the stability and reliability of energy supply flows in Central Asia 
were ensured by: first, instructions coming from a single political centre (Moscow); and, second, 
the resource-sharing mechanism, in which Central Asian upstream countries released water and 
supplied hydroelectricity in summertime, while downstream neighbours channelled fuel and 
thermal electricity in winter. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the 
infrastructure that the Central Asian states needed to transport energy out of the region, creating 
excessive dependence on the Russian pipeline network and energy market. In the 1990s, the 
Central Asian states continued to barter energy with each other and Russia, in almost the same 
way as they had in the unified Soviet energy system. However, regional energy exporters’ 
dissatisfaction with the terms of the energy trade dictated by Russia and the willingness of other 
external customers to invest in the construction of pipeline networks to transport energy while 
avoiding Russia transformed the relationships among state actors within the CAES. As a result, 
two interlinked levels of relationships emerged that affect the security of the CAES: first, energy 
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supply relations within the Central Asian region; and second, energy export/import between 
Central Asian producers and external customers. 
 In this particular research work, energy security is defined as a condition states enjoy 
when they can be confident that they will have adequate and sustainable energy supplies for 
population and economic needs for the foreseeable future. Adequate energy supplies indicate 
that states have enough energy resources to meet their needs. Sustainability of energy supplies 
implies that the present needs are met without compromising energy supplies for future 
generations. Sustainability of energy can be promoted by increasing the share of RES 
(hydroelectricity, wind energy, solar energy, etc.) in the overall energy balance and improving 
energy efficiency by introducing new technologies.  
 The CAES is a framework/complex system within which various actors interact and 
affect each other’s energy security. Given the above-mentioned definition of energy security, the 
security of the CAES is the condition in which all Central Asian states enjoy sufficiency and 
sustainability of energy supplies (for both population and economy needs) simultaneously. The 
system entails balancing among the energy interests of all. Reaching consensus is difficult, but 
necessary if the end goal is to make sure that everyone is enjoying energy security.  





(Preferred) KAZ KGZ TJK TKM UZB 
Energy supply (a) Fraction of primary energy as imports  Low Low High High Low Low 
(b) Diversification (by fuel type) High Low Low Low Low Low 
(c) Diversification (by source) High Med Low Low Low Med 
(d) Diversification (by transport routes) High Med Low Low Low Med 
(e) Diversification of electricity generation 
(by fuel type) 
High Low Low Low Low Med                                                         
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Energy Policy, Vol. 38 (2010), 5261—Energy security criteria were modified to capture main attributes of the 






(Preferred) KAZ KGZ TJK TKM UZB 
(f) Quality of electricity transmission and 
energy transportation networks 
High Low Low Low Low Low 
(g) Stocks (i.e. strategic petroleum reserves) 
as a fraction of imports  
High Med Low Low Low Low 
(h) Refining/fuel processing capacity as a 
fraction of primary energy consumption  
High Med Low Low Med Med 
(i) Reliance on market/non-market 
mechanisms to secure energy imports or 
export markets 
Market N/M N/M N/M N/M N/M 
Demand 
management 
(a) Evidence of fossil fuel demand reduction 
(through conservation/substitution) as a 
result of policy initiatives 
Yes No No No No No 
(b) Exposure to demand-side risks:        
• Demand surges—periods of peak 
demand in response to extreme 
conditions  
Low Low Med Med Low Med 
• Increasing export at the expense of 
domestic (intra-Central Asian) 
consumption 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Efficiency (a) Energy efficiency (Gross domestic 
product (GDP) per unit of energy use 
(PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent)) 
Low Med High High Low Med 
Economic (a) Total fuel costs/GDP 













(c) Fuel exports (% of GDP) High High Low Med High Med 
Environmental (a) Reliance on fossil fuels as a fraction of 
primary energy consumption 
Low High High Med High High 
(b) Carbon Dioxide Emissions Low High Low Low High Med 
Human security (a) Fraction of population with access to 
basic energy services (i.e. electricity) 
High High High High High High 
Military-
Security 
(a) Exposure of critical energy infrastructure 
to energy related military/security risks 
(i.e. terrorism, conflict over resources, 
etc.)—conflict may occur over water, but 
not energy 




(a) Exposure to social or cultural energy-
related risks (i.e. NIMBYism, energy 
sector labor unrest) 
Low High Low Low Low Low 
(b) Exposure to political energy-related risks:        
• Strong oil or gas lobby  Low High High High High High 
• Disagreements among leaders Low Med Low High Low High 
Technological (a) Diversification for key energy-related 
industries (i.e. power generation) by 
technology type 
High Low Low Low Med Low 
International (a) Commitment to regional and other 
international cooperation on energy-
related issues (i.e. to increased regional 
energy security cooperation or energy 
related international agreements) 





(a) Existence of energy security strategy Yes No No No No No 
(b) Transparency of energy security policy High Med Med Low Low Low 
(c) Regular policy reviews Yes No No No No No 






(Preferred) KAZ KGZ TJK TKM UZB 
(e) Demand management issues prioritized 
in policy 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
(f) Efficiency issues prioritized in policy Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(g) Economic issues prioritized in policy Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(h) Environmental issues prioritized in policy Yes Yes No No No No 
(i) Human security issues prioritized in 
policy 
Yes No Yes Yes No No 
(j) Military/security issues addressed in 
policy 
Yes No No No No Yes 
(k) Socio-cultural and political issues 
prioritized in policy 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
(l) Technological issues addressed in policy Yes Yes No No Yes No 
(m) International cooperation issues 
addressed in policy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The Level of Energy Insecurity in Central Asia  
 Overall, the Central Asian region does not enjoy energy security. Initially, the energy 
sectors of the Central Asian countries were designed to operate within a unified energy system. 
Resource-sharing mechanism was based on rational use of energy, with each state contributing 
different types of sources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—hydro power, Kazakhstan—oil and coal, 
Turkmenistan—gas, and Uzbekistan—oil and gas) to the energy consumption balance of the 
CAES (Table 2). High dependence on a particular source of energy was not an issue within the 
CAES, which operated irrespective of political (administrative) and economic borders. Central 
Asian energy sectors contributed different sources and formed a complete energy system capable 
of meeting the energy needs of all countries simultaneously (Table 3). The disintegration process 
of the CAES, however, affected the short- and medium-term availability of gas and thermal 
electricity to upstream countries and hydroelectricity supplies to downstream states.  
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Table 2: Production by Source (Balances for 2012 in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent 
(ktoe) on a net calorific value basis)2 
 
Table 3: Diversification of Electricity and Heat Generation (by Fuel Type) for 20123 
                                                        
2 International Energy Agency, Statistics: Balances for 2012 in Thousand Tons of Oil Equivalent (ktoe) on a Net 
Calorific Value Basis (Paris: International Energy Agency, n.d), accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=KAZAKHstAN&product=balances&year=2012.  
3 International Energy Agency, Electricity and Heat for 2012 (Paris: International Energy Agency, n.d), accessed 
January 15, 2015, 
http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?year=2012&country=KAZAKHstAN&product=ElectricityandH
eat. 








GWh TJ GWh TJ GWh TJ GWh TJ 
Coal 69421 413425 728 11484 0 0 0 0 2145 4767 
Oil 735 4656 180 0 0 0 0 0 383 851 
Gas 13411 0 81 2050 74 405 17750 8567 38762 95257 
Biofuels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Waste 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hydro 7637 0 14179 0 16900 0 0 0 11210 0 
Geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solar PV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solar thermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
production 
91207 418081 15168 13534 16974 405 17750 8567 52500 100875 
Production Coal and Peat Crude oil Natural gas Hydro Biofuels and waste Total 
Kazakhstan 52763 82608 28550 657 59 164638 
Kyrgyzstan 422 79 24 1219 4 1749 
Tajikistan 180 30 9 1453 0 1672 
Turkmenistan 0 11805 56223 0 0 68028 
Uzbekistan 1354 3338 51088 964 4 56748 
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 The landlocked geographical status of the region limits state actors’ ability to diversify 
their export/import dependence. The interdependence that the CAES entails put regional 
importers in a position where they are vulnerable to frequent energy supply disruptions caused 
by the process of the disintegration of the system. 
 Central Asian energy sectors are highly energy intensive. Fossil fuel-based regional 
energy sectors are environmentally damaging (Table 4). So far, no policy initiative has 
succeeded in reducing fossil fuel demand in Central Asian countries. Only Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan have, to some extent, decreased fossil fuel consumption for the last several years. 
However, it was not the result of an effective policy initiative, but rather fossil fuel supply cuts 
from neighbouring states, which caused severe energy shortages in these countries (Table 5). 
Table 4: Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Total Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions from the 
Consumption of Energy 
(Million Tonnes) for 20124 
224.220 9.278 2.973 64.979 123.170 
CO2 Emissions (tonnes of 
carbon dioxide per 
person), 20115 
12 1.6 0.4 11 4.2 
 
Table 5: Reliance on Fossil Fuel as a Fraction of Primary Energy Consumption, 20116 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Percent 98.9 68.4 42.9 n/a 98.2                                                         
4 US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Statistics: Total Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption 
of Energy (Million Metric Tons), (Washington, DC: US EIA, n.d), accessed January 10, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=KZ,KG,TI,TX,UZ,&syid=2012
&eyid=2012&unit=MMTCD. 
5 US EIA, Statistics: Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption of Energy (Metric Tons of 
Carbon Dioxide per Person) (Washington, DC: US EIA, n.d), accessed January 4, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=45&aid=8&cid=KZ,KG,TI,TX,UZ,&syid=2007
&eyid=2011&unit=MMTCD. 
6 World Bank, Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption (% of Total) (Washington, DC: World Bank, n.d),The World Bank 
Data, accessed January 15, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.COMM.FO.ZS/countries. 
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 The energy sectors of Central Asian countries are also highly subsidized (Table 6 and 7). 
Subsidizing keeps prices for energy low enough to make it affordable to the population and 
industries (Table 8). Low energy prices and a long legacy of the Soviet period (during which 
saving energy was not a priority), however, turned out to be discouraging factors for using 
energy efficiently. Moreover, outdated energy production facilities (Table 9) and lack of 
investment in maintaining energy infrastructure cause considerable energy losses (Table 10) and 
negatively impact the availability of energy resources in Central Asia. 
Table 6: Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidy Rates as a Proportion of the Full Cost of Supply, 
20137 
 Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Average subsidization rate (%) 32.8% 65.7% 58.7% 
Subsidy (US$/person) 358.6 1593.4 406.1 
Total subsidy as share of GDP 2.8% 20.6% 21.7  
Table 7: Fuel Subsidy (US$ billion, real 2013) 
 Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Fuel 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Oil 2.5 1.7 2.1 3.6 3.8 3.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 
Gas 0.9 0.8 0.8 4.3 4.4 4.2 9.1 9.8 9.7 
Coal 3.2 2.8 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electricity 2.5 2.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.7 2.4 1.9  
Table 8: Pump Price for gasoline (US$ per L)8 
 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Kazakhstan 0.52 0.70 0.83 0.71 1.01 
Kyrgyzstan 0.48 0.64 0.80 0.85 0.89 
Tajikistan 0.67 0.80 1.03 1.02 1.45 
Turkmenistan 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Uzbekistan 0.35 0.85 1.35 0.92 1.02 
                                                        
7 International Energy Agency, Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidy Rates as a Proportion of the Full Cost of Supply, 
2013 (Paris: International Energy Agency, n.d), accessed June 15, 2015, http://www.iea.org/subsidy/index.html. 
8 World Bank Group, Pump Price for Gasoline (US$ Per Liter) (Washington, DC: World Bank, n.d), accessed 
January 15, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EP.PMP.SGAS.CD?display=default. 
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Table 9: Age of Installed Generation Assets9 
 Up to 10 years 11 to 20 years 21 to 30 years Over 30 years 
Kazakhstan 11% 11% 33% 44% 
Kyrgyzstan 4% 9% 23% 64% 
Tajikistan 14% 0% 12% 74% 
Uzbekistan 7% 5% 13% 75% 
Table 10:  Electricity Transmission and Distribution Losses (Percent of Output)10 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
2011 7.4 21.8 16.7 12.7 8.8 
  
 Exchange of energy resources ensured the stability and reliability of energy supplies 
within the CAES. While Central Asian countries’ desire to establish and strengthen their national 
energy systems is understandable, it requires a gradual transition from current interdependence 
into independently operated and self-sufficient energy systems. In other words, the pace of 
decreasing intraregional energy trade should be symmetrical to increasing energy production and 
extending energy supply networks in each country. Central Asian countries’ energy policies, 
however, prioritize establishing independent energy systems, while underestimating the 
importance of intraregional energy trade to ensure energy security along the above-mentioned 
transition. 
 While none of the Central Asian states has adopted a document clearly determining 
energy policy priority areas or energy security strategies, based on the analysis of various official 
documents, state programs, governmental information agencies as well as interviews with 
experts and state officials, I have highlighted areas of the energy sector development that are 
currently being prioritized in Central Asian countries’ energy policies. The following sections of                                                         
9 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Consultant, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation: Power 
Sector Regional Master Plan (Metro Manila: Asian Development Bank, Report no. 43549, 2012), accessed 
January 15, 2015, http://adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2010/43549-01-reg-tar.pdf. 
10 World Bank Group, Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (Percent of Output) (Washington, DC: 




the dissertation point out the major flaws of these policies and highlight their limited contribution 
to improving the level of energy security in the region.  
Energy Policy Priorities of the Central Asian States 
 The current energy policies of the Central Asian countries prioritize establishing and 
strengthening national energy systems by increasing energy production capacity as well as 
building countrywide energy transportation networks. Government officials also claim to be 
interested in attracting investment to improve energy efficiency and develop RES. The chapter 
emphasizes that the development of energy sectors in these directions can improve the level of 
energy security only in combination with restoring intra-Central Asian energy trade, which may 
take the form of both long-term formal trading arrangements or swap, barter, and other exchange 
type mechanisms. But the analysis of competing energy policies of the Central Asian states 
shows that intraregional energy trade is currently not prioritized. Lack of intra-Central Asian 
energy trade may not be very surprising given what we know about the lack of regional 
cooperation in general. It is, nonetheless, important to analyze measures prioritized by the 
Central Asian governments to improve the level of energy security in their respective countries 
and the practical affect these measures can possibly have, because such analysis is helpful to 
understand irrationality behind establishing independent energy systems. 
Kazakhstan’s Energy Sector 
 Kazakhstan is a major electricity producer and a consumer in Central Asia. Its peak 
annual consumption amounted to 104.7 billion kWh in 1990. Even though annual electricity 
consumption decreased to 50.7 billion kWh per year in 1999, the consumption rate had been 
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increasing for around 5 percent throughout the 2000s.11 Due to its vast territory and lack of 
countrywide electric power transmission infrastructure, Kazakhstan has been securing adequate 
electricity supply through cooperation with neighbouring countries.  
 Kazakhstan’s electric power grids operate in parallel with both Russian and the unified 
Central Asian electric power systems. It is divided into three zones: northern zone (Akmola, 
Aktube, Kostanay, Pavlodar, North-Kazakhstan, East-Kazakhstan, Karaganda); southern zone 
(Almaty, Zhambyl, Kyzylorda, south–Kazakhstan); and western zone (Atyrau, Mangystau, and 
West–Kazakhstan regions). The southern zone is connected to the electric power grids of 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Northern regions are supplied with electricity from cheap Ekibastus 
coal-fired thermal power plants (TPP). While the northern zone produces 72.7 percent of the 
total electricity in the country, despite significant production capacity there is also growing 
demand for it. The northern zone operates in parallel with Russian electric power grids 
connected via 220–500–1050 kV transmission lines. It is also expected that 500 kV transmission 
line, with the capacity of 1000 MW, will move electricity from coal-rich Ekibastuz to China.12 
The north–south 500 kV transmission line was built in 1998 to cover the peak electricity needs of 
the southern regions of Kazakhstan and to secure itself from unilateral supply cuts from the 
electric power grids of Uzbekistan.13  
 During the years of independence, more than 208 hydrocarbon fields, out of which half 
account for oil, one-third for oil and gas, and the remaining for gas and gas condensate, were 
discovered in Kazakhstan.14 The country is a major oil producer in the region. Even without the                                                         
11 Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Neftyanaya Promishlennost (Oil Industry) (Astana: 
Mgm.gov.kz, n.d), accessed March 10, 2014, http://mgm.gov.kz/news/42. 
12 Adilet legal portal, O Programme Razvitiya Elektroenergetiki do 2030 Goda (On the Program on Electric Power 
Development Until 2030) (Adilet.zan.kz, 2010), accessed March 1, 2014, http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P990000384_. 
13 Adilet legal portal, “ On the Program on Electric Power Development until 2030.” 
14 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Sostavlenie Ekologo-Energeticheskix 
Reytingov Predpriyatiy Kazaxstana na 2013 (Calculating Ecological and Energy Ratings of Enterprises in 
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3.2 million tonnes of oil that was supposed to be added from exploiting the giant Kashagan field, 
Kazakhstan produced 81.8 million tonnes in 2013. 15  Seventy-three percent of Kazakhstan’s 
hydrocarbon resources is concentrated in the Atyrau district, with 4 percent in Aktyubinsk, 9 
percent in the west of Kazakhstan and 12 percent in Mangistau. Overall, 96 percent of oil 
resources in the country fall to the western region.16 The government is planning to increase the 
volume of oil condensate production from 81.8 million tonnes up to 112 million tonnes by 
2030. 17  In achieving this goal, the role of international energy companies cannot be 
underestimated, since Kazakhstan controls only one-fifth of the overall oil and gas condensate 
extraction in the country.18  
                                                                                                                                                                                  




15 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Calculating Ecological and Energy Ratings 
of Enterprises in Kazakhstan for 2013.” 
16 Rinat Kulmagambetov, “Energiya Kaspiyskogo Shelfa (Energy of the Caspian Shelf),” Kazenergy, June 28, 2013, 
accessed December 1, 2014, http://kazenergy.com/en/component/content/article/47-2011-04-18-15-36-46/9844-
2013-06-28-04-52-45.html. 
17 U. Karabalin, “Voloviy Obyom Dobichi Neftekondensata k 2030 Godu Sostavit Poryadka 112 mln. Ton v God” 
(Gross Production of the Oil Condensate Will Reach 112 mln. tonnes by 2030), (Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 2014), accessed October 5, 2014, http://www.government.kz/index.php/ru/novosti/16672-valovyj-ob-
em-dobychi-neftekondensata-k-2030-godu-sostavit-poryadka-112-mln-tonn-v-god-u-karabalin.html. 
18 Nurlan Zhumagulov, “Fakti i Cifri Neftegazovoy Otrasli Kazaxstana za 2013 God (Facts and Figures of 




Table 11: Oil Sector Development, 201319 
Production companies Shareholders Volume (tonne) Share (%) 
Tengizchevroil Exxon Mobil, KMG, Lukoil 27,105,645 33.1 
Karachaganak Petroleum Operating ENI, BG, KMG, Lukoil 11,657,730 14.3 
Mangistaumunaigas KMG and CNPC 6,076,840 7.4 
CNPC–Aktobemunaigas CNPC 5,863,048 7.2 
Uzenmunaigas KMG 5,207,653 6.4 
Kazgermuani KMG, PetroChina 3,107,002 3.8 
Embamunaigas KMG 2,840,900 3.5 
Petro Kazakhstan Kumkol Resources KMG, PetroChina 2,407,720 2.9 
Karajanbasmunai KMG, CITIC 2,051678 2.5 
Buzachi Operating ltd CNPC, Lukoil 1,990,762 2.4 
Turgai Petroleum KMG, PetroChina, Lukoil 1,655,391 2.0 
Kazakhoil Aktobe KMG and Lukoil 1,150,449 1.4 
Karadukmunai Lukoil, India 959,472 1.2 
 Zhaikmunai Europe 870,547 1.1 
KuatAmlonmunai China 812,948 1.0 
 Sauts–Oil Shymkent 810,022 1.0 
 Kaspiy neft Ordabasy corporation 705,298 0.9 
Kolzhan  673,898 0.8 
Maten Petroleum Private businessmen  547,032 0.7 
Alties Petroleum Int. Great Britain  413,782 0.5 
Others  4,881,485 6.0 
Total  81,789,302 100 
 
 Kazakhstan also possesses significant gas reserves in the amount of around 1.520 and 
1.921 trillion m3 according to different sources. It produced 42.3 billion m3 of gas in 2013, out of 
which 22.8 billion m3 was market gas, which is supplied for domestic consumption and exported 
to external markets. The other half of the gas produced in Kazakhstan is pumped back into oil 
wells to enhance oil production. Karachaganak deposit is the largest contributor (8.5–9 billion m3 
per year) to the gas production in Kazakhstan. Over 90 percent of gas produced in 
Karachaganak, however, is delivered to Orenburg gas processing plant in Russia, more than half 
                                                        
19 Zhumagulov, “Facts and Figures of Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas Industry for 2013.” 
20 British Petroleum Company, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015 (London: British Petroleum Co., 
2015), accessed June 25, 2015, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-
2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf. 
21 Eni, World Oil and Gas Review for 2014 (Rome: Eni spa), September 2014, https://www.eni.com/world-oil-gas-
review-2014/sfogliabile/O-G-2014.pdf. 
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of which is returned back to Kazakhstani customers and the rest remains in Russia.22 Kazakhstan 
consumes only half of the market gas it produces (10.9 billion m3 in 2013); it exports the other 
half due to lack of countrywide gas pipeline infrastructure and imports the same amount from 
neighbouring countries. According to the agreement on swap deliveries of gas between 
Gazprom, Uzbekneftgaz, and KazMunaiGaz on December 27, 2006, gas import is swapped in 
accordance with the export of the Karachaganak gas field in equal price and equal volume. 
Kazakhstan exported 8.6 billion m3 of gas and transited 99.146 billion m3 through its territory in 
2013. It also has the capacity to store around 1 billion m3 in its underground reserves.23 Twenty-
seven percent of gas and condensate resources fall to Atyrau district, 8 percent to Aktyubinsk, 50 
percent to the west of Kazakhstan, and 10 percent to Mangistau.24 The following are the major 
gas producing companies in Kazakhstan. 
Table 12: Gas Sector Development, 201325 
Gas Production Companies 
Volume 
(thousand cubic meters) Share (%) 
Karachaganak Petroleum Operating 17,530,694 41.4 
Tengizchevroil 14,550,857 34.4 
CNPC–Aktobemunaigas 3,479,040 8.2 
Zhaikmunai 1,462,701 3.5 
Kazakhoil Aktobe 565,474 1.3 
Mangistaumunaigas 524,834 1.2 
Kazgermunai 519,588 1.2 
Petro Kazakhstan Kumkoil Resources 417,508 1.0 
Kazmunaigas 405,426 1.0 
KazGPZ 392,005 0.9 
Others 2,446,618 5.8 
Total 42,294,745 100 
                                                         
22 Simon Pirani, “Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and the Constraints on Export,” Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies (2012): 45, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NG_69.pdf. 
23 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Koncepciya Razvitiya Gazovogo Sektora Respubliki Kazaxstan do 
2030 Goda (Gas Sector Development Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan until the Period of 2030), 
Online.zakon.kz, December 5, 2014, http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31641775. 
24 Kulpash Konirova, “Kaspiy Stanet Odnim iz Klyuchevix Regionov Mirovogo Neftyanogo Rinka (Caspian Region 
Will Turn into Key World Oil and Gas Market),” Kazenergy 4, no. 59 (2013), accessed February 5, 2014, 
http://kazenergy.com/en/4-59-2013/11549-2013-10-30-08-47-58.html. 
25 Zhumagulov, “Facts and Ffigures of Kazakhstan’s Ooil and Ggas Iindustry for 2013.” 
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Despite having huge renewable energy potential, the amount of RES in the overall energy 
consumption balance being less than 1 percent remains highly underdeveloped. Kazakhstan has 
declared its plans to invest 2 percent of the GDP in “green modernization” and development of 
renewable sources.26 For instance, the wind potential of the mountain pass to China, the Jungar 
Gates, can potentially provide around 1.3 trillion kWh annually.27 Unfortunately, little progress 
has been achieved so far. 
Kazakhstan: Multi-vector/Diversification Oriented Energy Policy 
 Kazakhstan’s current energy policy is primarily concerned with securing demand for its 
energy and earning revenues to fill the budget from moving energy out to external markets. 
Unstable energy supplies within the CAES over the last several years, however, forced 
Kazakhstan to strengthen its independent and self-sustaining energy system. In a number of 
energy sector development programs, the government of Kazakhstan seems to have been 
focusing on establishing countrywide energy infrastructure as well as the development of RES 
and increasing energy production and transportation efficiency. But the current energy policy 
does not prioritize intra-Central Asian energy cooperation. Even though Kazakhstan’s energy 
policy does not prioritize intra-Central Asian cooperation, the country remains connected to the 
region due to its partial dependence on Uzbek resources, and the fact that it is a major transit 
country for Turkmen and Uzbek gas, as well as an important supplier of energy to Kyrgyzstan. 
                                                        
26 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Calculating Ecological and Energy Ratings 
of Enterprises in Kazakhstan for 2013.” 




Addressing Energy Demand Insecurity 
 Newly explored significant coal, oil, and gas reserves in combination with increasing 
foreign investments in Kazakhstan’s energy sector ensured rapid energy production growth in the 
country. 
Figure 1: Primary Energy Production and Consumption (quadrillion BTU) of Kazakhstan, 
1992–201228 
 
 In the early 1990s, to boost its economic growth by developing its oil and gas potential, 
Kazakhstan opened up its market for international energy companies. Winners of the race for 
Kazakhstani resources were companies such as ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Agip/Eni, Royal 
Dutch Shell, British Group, TotalFinaElf, and Impex. Canadian, Middle Eastern, and Russian 
energy companies followed them. Chinese and Indian extractive and financial corporations 
started playing a more active role in the mid–2000s.  
                                                        


























































 However, Kazakhstan does not enjoy full control over both extraction of its resources and 
transportation of energy to external markets. The fact that the national energy company owns 
only one-fifth of energy resource extraction (see Figure 2) and that the oil supply routes to its 
major European customers (Europe imports 75 percent of Kazakh oil)29 pass through Russia 
alone raise serious concerns among the general population and the government. Perceiving the 
product-sharing agreements (PSAs) signed with international oil giants in the early 1990s as 
unfair, Kazakh authorities have attempted to regain control over the country’s natural resources 
by reversing those agreements and diversify their energy export route dependence.30 
Figure 2: Oil and Gas Condensate Extraction (2012)31 
 
 Increasing oil and gas production capacity over the last decade turned Kazakhstan into a 
major exporter of these resources in the region. Kazakhstan exported 72,077 million tonnes of oil 
and gas condensate through the Atyrau–Samara pipeline (15,375 million tonnes), Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium (28,712 million tonnes), Atasu–Alashankou pipeline (11,828 million 
tonnes), Aktau sea port (6,269 million tonnes), and by railroad (9,034 million tonnes).32 The 
largest volume of oil export is to the European market. However, there is no oil transport                                                         
29 Zhumagulov, “Facts and Figures of Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas Industry for 2013.” 
30 Ariel Cohen, Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence: Energy Policy and the Birth of a Nation (Uppsala: Silk 
Road Studies Program, Institute for Security and Development Policy [distributor], 2008), 119. 
31 Zhumagulov, “Facts and Figures of Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas Industry for 2013.” 
32 Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Oil Industry.” 
25% 
26% 20% 7% 
11% 11% China The US Kazmunaigaz Russia Europe Private companies 
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infrastructure directly connecting Kazakhstan with Europe. The pipelines pass through and are 
controlled by Russia, making Kazakhstan vulnerable to export demand insecurity (threat of the 
unilateral import disruption by a single country that may significantly affect producing state). 
Table 13: Oil Export Structure, 201333 
 
 The behaviour of Kazakhstan reflects governments’ dissatisfaction with previous PSAs, 
which were signed during difficult times for the economy in the 1990s when oil prices were low 
and foreign companies had the advantage. At that time, the Kazakh government was ready to 
sacrifice the right to fully control its natural resources for potential economic gains.34 Simple 
dissatisfaction turned, over time, to governments’ policies to change the terms of contracts. 
Kazakhstan’s parliament, for instance, adopted new laws in 2007 that allow the Kazakh 
government to break natural resource contracts and force negotiations. 35  Kazakhstan used 
                                                        
33 Zhumagulov, “Facts and Figures of Kazakhstan’s Oil and Gas Industry for 2013.” 
34 Bela Rashidova, Head of Economic Studies Department, at Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Personal Interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, August 8, 2013.  
35 Jean A. Garrison and Ahad Abdurahmonov, “Explaining the Central Asian Energy Game: Complex 
Interdependence and How Small states Influence their Big Neighbors,” Asian Perspective 35 (2011): 394. 
Destination Volume (tonnes) Share (%) Price US$ for 1 tonne 
Italy 18,183,502 27 820 
China 11,167,961 16 778 
Netherlands 9,100,386 13 825 
France 5,943,611 9 843 
Austria 4,700,374 7 760 
Switzerland  3,988,283 6 786 
Romania 2,823,244 4 782 
Canada 2,763,105 4 877 
Spain 2,175,411 3 806 
Turkey 1,353,165 2 835 
Portugal  1,137,807 2 820 
Israel 957,561 1 834 
Greece 790,940 1 842 
Great Britain  676,591 1 811 
Croatia  422,003 1 830 
Other countries 1,910,605 3  
Total  68,094,551 100 811 
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environmental claims to renegotiate existing contracts with a number of major oil companies in 
2003. In 2007, disputes over environmental issues helped Kazakhstan to change the framework 
of Eni’s operation of the Kashagan field.36 In addition, “some analysts believe that Kazakhstan 
leaders are using China to increase its leverage in negotiations with Russia.”37  
 Cooperation with leading energy companies and increasing energy export capacity to 
Europe, Russia, and China constitute the core of Kazakhstan’s foreign energy policy. However, 
energy cooperation with Central Asian countries, which was once critical for stable and reliable 
supplies of energy, is not a priority anymore. Kazakhstan’s dependence on neighbouring 
Uzbekistan and, to a limited extent, Kyrgyzstan is expected to decrease in the future.  
 In the long term, Kazakhstan claims that it aims to diversify energy sources; the country’s 
short-term goal is to diversify its energy export routes. This lines up with the Multi-vector 
Foreign Policy adopted by the government. However, moving energy resources out does not 
directly contribute to the energy security of the country. As a landlocked country, Kazakhstan, 
like other regional exporters, has very limited access to global energy markets and is already 
directly connected to two major customers—Russia and China. But the exchange of energy 
resources with neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, at least in the short-term perspective, 
does contribute to the country’s energy security. Kazakhstan consumes only half of its overall 
gas production and exports the other half because it lacks extensive internal gas supply networks 
to transport energy from resource-rich regions to distant population centres. However, the lack of 
extended gas and electricity supply networks does not dramatically impact the overall gas 
consumption in Kazakhstan because gas shortages are compensated by natural gas swap deals. 
Kazakhstan supplies 4.5 billion m3 per year to Russia in the north–west, while it imports                                                         
36 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 32. 
37 Mehmet Ogutcu and Ma Xin, “Geopolitics of Energy: China and the Central Asia,” Insight Turkey 9, no. 4 
(n.d.): 54, http://files.setav.org/uploads/Pdf/ogutcu_ma.pdf. 
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approximately 3.5 billion m3 per year from Uzbekistan in the south and 1 billion m3 per year in 
the north. 38 When Kazakhstan completes the process of establishing its independent energy 
system, it is broader economic and political interests and not energy security that will drive the 
country’s engagement into regional energy dialogues. In any case, the fact that Kazakhstan can 
still benefit from exchanging energy resources with Kyrgyzstan (potentially Tajikistan) and 
Uzbekistan and its important energy transit status will keep it connected to the neighbouring 
Central Asian states. 
Table 14: Kazakhstan—Major Energy Export Items (US$ Million and as Percentage of 
Total Exports)39 
 Crude oil and gas condensate Natural gas 
 US$ million % US$ million % 
1995 7,931 48.9 20 0.4 
2000 4,502 51.1 38 0.4 
2005 17,395 38.5 410 1.5 
2008 41,303 58.0 976 1.4 
2009 26,207 60.7 1,389 3.2 
2010 36,950 61.3 746 1.2 
2011 55,128 62.4 2,236 2.5   Rich in fossil fuel deposits, Kazakhstan succeeded in attracting foreign investment in 
developing its energy potential. Increasing energy production ensured stable and reliable supplies 
of energy to meet its domestic, as well as external, needs. Along with developing oil, gas, and 
coal sectors, the Kazakh government has recently started to claim that it prioritizes sustainability 
of energy supplies through the development of RES and increasing energy efficiency. As part of 
the CAES, Kazakhstan has sometimes suffered from disputes over payment, unauthorized                                                         
38 Naubet Bisenov, “Neighbourly Negotiations,” Energy Global, 2013, accessed June 15, 2014, 
www.energyglobal.com/news/pipelines/articles/Neighbourly_negotiations_an_analysis_ 
of_central_asian_energy_pipelines.aspx. 
39 Central Asia Data Gathering and Analysis Team, “Trade Policies and Major Export Items in Central 
Asia,” Central Asia Regional Data Review, OSCE Academy and NUPI 8 (2013): 8, http://www.osce-
academy.net/upload/GADGAT/CADGAT8.pdf. 
 68 
withdrawal of energy and supply disruptions from neighbouring countries. To reduce its 
dependence on Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in supplying its southern regions, the Kazakh 
government has been promoting energy projects to strengthen the national energy system. 
Securing Energy Supplies to Southern Kazakhstan  
 Kazakhstan has considerable energy production capacity, but still lacks the energy 
transport infrastructure to move resources throughout the country. Within the CAES, southern 
regions have been relying on energy supplies from neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. To 
secure itself from unilateral energy supply cuts from these countries, Kazakhstan has decided to 
strengthen countrywide electric power grids (north–south). 40  While it is disagreements over 
payment and cut-off of supplies from Uzbekistan that mostly affect energy cooperation, in the 
case of Kyrgyzstan, it is the Kyrgyz government’s technical incapability to fully manage its 
electric power system that caused the electricity supply cuts. 
 The northern electric power plants produce more electricity than northern territories 
consume. A transmission line connecting the north and south, which was put in place in 1998, 
ensured the country’s ability to meet peak electricity demand due to extreme weather conditions 
or sudden supply cuts within the Central Asian (Electric) Power System (CAPS).41 The security 
of electricity supplies to southern regions requires complex measures be taken. Electric power 
transmission lines, connecting Southern Kazakhstan with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan within the 
CAPS, are capable of transporting up to 8–9 billion kWh annually in both directions. The 
Zhambyl power plant, which can add 5–7 billion kWh per year, will not only supply domestic 
electricity market but also export electricity to its southern neighbours. According to the 
                                                        
40 Dinara Nurusheva, Vice-President Kazakhstan Center for Humanitarian and Political Trends, Personal interview, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, April 20, 2014. 
41 Adilet legal portal, “On the Program on Electric Power Development until 2030.” 
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estimated figures of the (former) Ministry of Industry and New Technologies of Kazakhstan, the 
volume of electricity consumption will increase up to 170 billion kWh annually by 2030.42 To 
meet the growing electricity demand of the south, Moynak HPP—with a capacity of 300 MW—
was connected to electric power transmission lines and 2x660 MW Balkhash TPPs are expected 
to start supplying electricity in 2017.43 Sixty percent of hydro-power potential is concentrated in 
the mountainous south-eastern region, which has the capacity to produce 8 billion kWh annually 
that can contribute to the sustainability of Kazakhstan’s electric power sector.44 Until all these 
projects are implemented, intra-Central Asian electricity trade is the most secure way to ensure a 
sufficient amount of electricity supplies to the southern regions of the country. 
 Kazakhstan consumes only half of its produced gas and exports the other half, because it 
lacks extensive internal gas supply networks to transport it within the country. Gas shortages in 
some areas are compensated by swap deals with Russia and Uzbekistan. Frequent unilateral gas 
supply disruptions and disputes over the price with Uzbekistan, however, forced Kazakhstan to 
look for alternatives to reduce its dependence. The most optimal alternative was to build a 
pipeline connecting the gas-producing regions of Western Kazakhstan and Kyzylorda with the 
major gas-consuming regions Shymkent and Almaty. The Beineu–Bozoy–Shymkent pipeline is 
designed to provide such connections. The government believes that once implemented, this 
project is expected to ensure full gasification of 13 regions out of 16 by 2030 and increase the 
                                                        
42 Adilet legal portal, “On the Program on Electric Power Development until 2030.” 
43 Commonwealth of Independent States, O Razvitii Sotrudnichestva Gosudarstv–Uchastnikov SNG v Sfere 
Elektroenergetiki. Problemi i Perspektivi (On the Development of Cooperation of CIS Member States in the Field of 
Energy. Problems and Perspectives), (CIS Internet Portal, 2013), accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.e-
cis.info/page.php?id=23654. 
44 Ministry of Industry and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Malie Gidroelektrostancii (Small 
Hydropower Plants) (Astana: Mint.gov.kz, n.d), accessed March 15, 2013, 
http://www.mint.gov.kz/index.php?id=203&lang=ru.  
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volume of household consumption from 10.9 to 18 billion m3. 45  The first section of the 
pipeline—Bozoy–Shymkent was launched in September 2013. The second section is expected to 
be completed by the end of 2015.  The main problem with this plan, however, is that if all goes 
according to plan, it will take another 15 years to significantly increase household gas 
consumption in southern Kazakhstan using its own resources. Besides, the Beineu–Bozoy–
Shymkent gas pipeline, capable of supplying its gas to southern regions, is also expected to fill 
the Central Asia–China gas pipeline (CAGP), in which China has not only taken part, but also 
covered most of the construction expenses. Chinese interests in moving gas out of the region 
may overshadow Kazakhstan’s desire to supply a sufficient amount of gas to its southern 
regions. 
Addressing Energy Inefficiency 
 Kazakhstan’s economy is energy intensive. The subsidized energy sector does not 
provide incentive for industry and the population to efficiently use energy resources. President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev has remarked, “in Kazakhstan nobody saves anything, because electricity, 
heat and gas flow cheaply.”46 Currently, 50 enterprises consume 40 percent of all energy.47 Since 
there is the potential to decrease energy consumption by these enterprises by 30–40 percent,48 
the government has decided to promote energy efficiency initiatives. Energy efficiency reforms, 
especially in the industrial sector, require considerable investments that can hardly be pulled out 
                                                        
45 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Koncepciya Razvitiya Gazovogo Sektora Respubliki Kazaxstan do 
2030 Goda (Gas Sector Development Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan until the period of 2030), 
Online.zakon.kz, December 5, 2014, http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31641775. 
46 International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Decay and Decline (Asia Report 201, 2011), 34. 
47 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 50 Enterprises Consume 40 Percent of All Energy in Kazakhstan 
(Astana: Government.kz, 2014), accessed October 1, 2014, http://ru.government.kz/index.php/en/novosti/17316-50-
enterprises-consume-40-percent-of-all-energy-in-kazakhstan.html. 
48 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “50 Enterprises Consume 40 Percent.” 
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of the budget in the short-term. Since 80 percent of electricity is generated by coal-fired TPPs, it 
is also important to introduce clean coal technologies or develop renewable energy sector.  
An Image of “Green Energy” Advocate 
 Kazakhstan is the only country in the region that has adopted a long-term strategy—
“Kazakhstan–2050”—with a particular focus on diversification of energy sources in the overall 
energy consumption. Among 10 global challenges of the twenty-first century, Kazakhstan 
highlighted three related to resources: deficit of water (fourth challenge); global energy security 
(fifth challenge); and decreasing amount of fossil fuels (sixth challenge).49 However, very few 
experts dare to predict how Kazakhstan’s energy sector will look 35 years from now and most of 
them are sceptical about its ability to achieve set goals such as increasing RES up to 50 percent 
of the total energy consumption by 2050.50 Currently, 80 percent of electricity is still generated 
by coal-fired TPPs, while the share of RES is less than 1 percent.51 
 The renewable energy potential of the country is high (wind power—1.3 trillion kWh per 
year in the Jungar Gates alone; and, solar power—annually 340 billion tons of reference fuel).52 
Nursultan Nazarbaev, the President of Kazakhstan, has been the main advocate for green energy 
development in Central Asia. 53  However, his latest statement left everyone quite confused. 
During the XI Forum of Interregional Cooperation, Nazarbaev claimed “personally, I do not 
believe in alternative energy, including wind and solar energy. Oil and gas is our biggest                                                         
49 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Strategy “Kazakhstan–2050”: New Political Course of the 
Established State (Astana: address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, 2012), 
accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.mod.gov.kz/mod- en/index.php/address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-
kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-nnazarbayev-strategy- kazakhstan-2050-new-political-course-of-the-established-
state. 
50 Rashidova, Personal Interview. 
51 International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Country Profile—Kazakhstan (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 
n.d), accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.irena.org/REmaps/countryprofiles/asia/Kazakhstan.pdf. 
52 “Sound Logic Behind Renewable Expansion” Invest in Kazakhstan 2013, 82.  
53 “Kazaxstanu Nujen Institute po Voprosam ‘Zelenoy’ Energetiki (Kazakhstan Needs an Institute on ‘Green’ 
Energy Issues),” Kazenergy, October 11, 2013, accessed March 5, 2014, http://kazenergy.com/ru/press/2011-04-21-
10-24-20/11309------qq--.html.  
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advantage and there should not be a fear of us being a resource-country. It is good that we have 
these resources, which we will be exporting and generating revenues.”54 It became obvious that 
the government does not see any urgency in developing RES in Kazakhstan, except for 
improving its image.55 In this sense, the question of whether Kazakhstan is an example for other 
Central Asian states to follow in terms of RES development remains open. 
 One of the major challenges along the way toward developing RES in Kazakhstan is the 
tactic that energy-purchasing companies use. These companies are forced by the government to 
purchase electricity produced using new technologies at a higher price to keep the incentive to 
develop RES. Having contradicted those companies economic interests, most of the RES projects 
are being compromised by these companies. Thus, achieving the goal of 50 percent RES in the 
overall energy balance by 2050 seems problematic, argues Almaz Akhmetov.56 
Energy Sector of Kyrgyzstan 
 Kyrgyzstan has the potential to produce annually up to 142.5 billion kWh of 
hydroelectricity, which places it third after Russia and Tajikistan among post-Soviet countries.57 
That is why hydro power is considered a priority direction in the development of Kyrgyzstan’s 
energy sector. The share of hydroelectricity in the overall electricity production of Kyrgyzstan 
                                                        
54 S. Pashkova, “Prezident Kazaxstana Priznalsya, Chto Ne Verit v Alternativnuyu Energetiku (President of 
Kazakhstan Admitted that He Does not Believe in Alternative Energy),” Vlast.kz, September 2014, accessed 
December 1, 2014, 
http://vlast.kz/article/prezident_kazahstana_priznalsja_chto_ne_verit_v_alternativnuju_jenergetiku-
7678.html#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=%D1%84%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%B4&gsc.sort=. 
55 Daniyar Kosnazarov, Head of the Department for Central Asia and Caucasus Studies, The Library of the First 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – The Leader of the Nation, Personal Interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 
March 18, 2014. 
56 Almaz Akhmetov, Expert at Regional Environmental Center of Central Asia, Skype Interview, July 26, 2013 
57 Regional Economic Cooperation in Central Asia, “Electric Energy,” Final Report RETA 5818 (2000): 14, 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/19688087/Electric-Energy#top. 
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accounted for 60–65 percent in 1990, but reached 90 percent in 1998.58 Currently, 90 percent of 
electricity in Kyrgyzstan is generated by HPPs and only 10 percent by TPPs in the Osh region. 
Ninety percent of hydroelectricity is generated by a set of cascades on the Naryn Trans-boundary 
River, which nourishes Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.59  
 During the Soviet period, major hydro-power development projects were designed 
mainly by the Tashhydroproject Institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The Upper Naryn cascade 
consists of eight HPPs: Oruktam–1, Oruktam–2, Ekinaryn, Dzhanikel, Akbulun, Naryn–1, 
Naryn–2, and Naryn–3. The process of utilizing the hydro-power potential of the Naryn River 
started in the 1950s. The general plan of Naryn–1 HPP was developed in the Tashhydroproject 
Institute in 1992. The middle Naryn cascade consists of three stations: Kambarata–1, 
Kambarata–2, and Kambarata–3 HPPs.60 
 Currently, the largest amount of electricity production comes to the HPP cascade in the 
Toktogul reservoir. Toktogul HPP has a capacity of 1200 MW and covers one-third of the total 
installed power capacity of 3786 МW. However, the last time Toktogul was filled (19.5 billion 
m3), allowing the Kyrgyz government to export a significant volume of electricity to 
neighbouring Kazakhstan was 2010.61 The water level in Toktogul is currently dropping. It was 
expected that it would drop below the electricity production level (7 billion m3) by April 2015. 
The water level in the dam has indeed reached a critically low level. Taking into account the fact 
                                                        
58 U. A. Mateev and G. B. Anderson, “Energetika Kirgizskoy Respubliki i Puti Ee Razvitiya (Energy Sector of 
Kyrgyz Republic and Its Development Paths),” REFORMA, February 1999, accessed February 1, 2014, 
http://journals.manas.edu.kg/reforma/oldarchives/1999-2-2/8_1540-3762-1-PB.pdf. 
59 Ernest Karibekov, “Est li Rinok Elektroenergii v Kirgizstane, Chast 1 (Is There an Energy Market in Kyrgyzstan, 
Part 1),” Analitika, January 17, 2014, accessed September 1, 2014, http://analitika.akipress.org/news:4952. 
60 Electric Power Stations, Elektricheskie Stancii (Electric Power Stations), (Bishkek, n.d), accessed 
January 27, 2015, http://www.energo-es.kg/?page=articles&read=18. 
61 Vladimir V. Kouzmitch, “Strengthening Cooperation of Central-Asian Countries in Using Advanced 
Technologies in Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Sources,” Project of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2013, 31, accessed may 15, 2015, 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pdfs/gee21/projects/AdvTech_IncreasingCooperation.pdf. 
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that it takes up to 9 billion m3 to use its full power generation capacity, the water level in the 
reservoir should not decrease below 15 billion m3.62  
 There is a huge potential to increase hydroelectricity production in Kyrgyzstan. 
Technically and economically, the most promising projects considered by the government are 
Kambarata–1 and –2 HPPs, which were developed by Tashhydroproject Institute back in 1980s. 
Construction of the Kambarata–2 project started in 1986 and stopped after the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. The construction process was restarted in 2003 and the first electric power 
generating aggregate with a capacity of 120 MW started operating in 2010. The governments of 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed an agreement on building Kambarata–1 HPP on February 3, 
2009.63 The Kyrgyz government highlights that there is a possibility to build 7 more cascades 
with 33 hydro-power stations on the Naryn River. This set of HPPs will have a capacity of 6450 
MW, capable of generating 22 billion kWh of electricity annually.64  
 However, Kyrgyzstan’s electric power sector consists almost completely of water run-of-
river type HPPs,65 which can generate electricity mostly in the summertime. To meet its winter 
electricity needs, the Kyrgyz government has to either develop its own limited fossil fuel 
potential and build TPPs or secure stable thermal electricity import from neighbouring states. 
Construction of the Kara–Keche coal-fired TPP is considered to be one of the most promising 
projects to ensure electricity supplies to the northern parts of the country. Kara–Keche coal-fired 
TPP is located 50 km from Chaek, Naryn region. Kara–Keche TPP’s technical and economic                                                         
62 “Toktogulskaya GES Mojet Ostanovitsya k Vesne 2015 Goda (Toktogul HPP Can Stop Operating by Spring 
2015),” October 2014, accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.stanradar.com/news/full/12811-toktogulskaja-ges-
mozhet-ostanovitsja-k-vesne-2015-goda.html. 
63 Electric Power Stations,  Elektricheskie Stancii: Kambarata-1 (Electric Power Stations: Kambarata-1) (Bishkek: 
Electric Power Stations, 2014), accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.energo-es.kg/?page=article&read=43. 
64 Electric Power Stations, Investicionnie Proekti (Investment Projects) (Bishkek: Electric Power Stations, n.d), 
accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.energo-es.kg/?page=articles&read=6. 
65 Water run-of-river type HPP does not require the use of a dam and generates electricity by channeling a portion of 
a river through a canal or penstock. See “Types of Hydropower Plants,” Energy.gov, 
http://energy.gov/eere/water/types-hydropower-plants. 
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feasibility was studied back in 1979–1983 and, according to some estimates, has a higher 
electricity production coefficient than any other hydro-power generating facility.66 
 Kyrgyzstan is short on funds and is counting on foreign investors to contribute to the 
development of the country’s hydro-power potential. Russian RusHydro is engaged in the 
construction of the Upper Naryn cascade and building of Kambarata–1. The Chinese company 
SINOHYDROLtd cooperates with the Kyrgyz government on the construction of the Susamir–
Kokomeren HPP (which has a capacity of 1305 MW). The Asian Development Bank is assisting 
in the modernization of the Toktogul HPP (which has a capacity of 1200 MW).67 
Table 15: Major Hydro-power and Thermal Power Plants of Kyrgyzstan68 
                                                         
66 Joormat Otorbaev, “Problemi i Potencial Razvitiya Elektroenergetiki v Kirgizskoy Respubliki (Problems and 
Perspectives for the Development of Power Sector in Kyrgyzstan),” (Government of Kyrgyz Republic, 2014), 
accessed December 4, 2014, http://www.gov.kg/?p=41665&lang=ru. 
67 Electric Power Stations, Sotrudnichestvo s Zarubejnimi Partnerami (Cooperation with Foreign Partners), 
(Bishkek: Electric Power Stations, n.d), accessed December 3, 2014, http://www.energo-
es.kg/?page=articles&read=7. 
68 Electric Power Stations, “Electric Power Stations.” 












Susamir–Kokomeren HPPs cascade  
Karakol HPP 2 33 104 257,84 2015-2017 
Kokomeren – 1 
HPP 
4 360 904 1607,8 2014-2017 
Kokomeren – 2 
HPP 
4 912 2412 1478,1 2014-2021 
Upper Naryn HPPs cascade  
Akbulun HPP 2 100 372 137 2017-2019 
Naryn–1 HPP 4 62 227 85 2014-2016 
Naryn–2 HPP 2 60 235 82 2015-2017 
Naryn–3 HPP 2 60 254 82 2017-2019 
Middle Naryn HPP cascade  
Kambarata–1 HPP 4 1600 5164 2568 2015-2021 




Kara–Keche TPP 4 1400 9600 2183 2014-2022 
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Kyrgyzstan: Mitigating Energy Crisis 
 Unlike oil- and gas-rich Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan only enjoys significant hydro-power 
potential, which is yet to be fully developed. With seasonal electricity production variations and 
an underdeveloped fossil fuel sector, it is the coordinated operation of the CAPS and import of 
gas and oil products from Central Asian downstream countries that ensured Kyrgyzstan’s energy 
security. Thus, Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CAPS and decreasing gas import has 
negatively affected the level of energy security in the country. As a consequence, the Kyrgyz 
government was forced to prioritize mitigating the energy crisis by equally distributing available 
energy resources and reliance on Kazakhstan and Russia to meet its winter energy demands. 
Currently, energy production capacity does not allow Kyrgyzstan to meet its energy needs all 
year round on its own. Thus, ensuring stable and reliable import of natural gas and thermal 
electricity from the neighbouring states remains an important aspect of Kyrgyzstan’s energy 
policy.  
Energy Crisis 
 Hydro power is the main source of electricity production in the country. Kyrgyzstan’s 
electric power sector is dependent on run-of-river type HPPs constructed along the Naryn River. 
The largest hydroelectricity-producing facility is Toktogul. Toktogul may not have the largest 
HPP in terms of power production capacity (1200 MW) in Central Asia, but it is the only 
reservoir capable of accumulating enough water to produce electricity in both the summer and 
winter months. The biggest reservoirs in Central Asia are Toktogul (19.5 km³) in Kyrgyzstan, 
and Nurek (10.5 km³) and Kairakum (4.16 km³) in Tajikistan.69 However, overuse of water in 
                                                        
69 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Aral Sea Transboundary River Basin,” Aquastat 
website, 2012, 11, accessed May 1, 2015, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/aral-sea/index.stm. 
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Toktogul to produce electricity in 2013–2014 and the reduced water flow from the mountains 
relative to previous years has resulted in a water level drop in the reservoir and affected near-
future prospects for increasing electricity production. The level of water release to downstream 
countries during that period remained within the range of previously agreed quotas. It is unclear 
though how the water drop will affect the volume of water release in the years ahead. Kyrgyzstan 
produced 14 billion kWh in 2014 and consumed it all. It is expected that the country will only 
produce 11.6 billion kWh in 2015, while the consumption needs will amount to 15.8 billion kWh 
in 2015.70  
 The production of primary energy resources in the country has never met its consumption 
level, which implies that any further drop of energy production will worsen the energy crisis.  
Figure 3: Primary Energy Production and Consumption (quadrillion BTU) of 
Kyrgyzstan71 
                                                          
70 Otorbaev, “Problems and Perspectives for the Development of Power.”  


























































 The decreasing gas supply from neighbouring countries also severely affected 
Kyrgyzstan’s energy security. Kyrgyzstan possesses less than 10 billion m3 of proven gas 
reserves.72 Having produced 30 million m3 of gas, it imported the remaining 270 million m3 in 
2013.73 Kyrgyzstan imports 90 percent of its domestically consumed energy from Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan.74 Despite the fact that gas supply from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan decreased 
from 800 million m3 in 2000 to 280 million m3 in 2013, Uzbek gas still remains the main source 
of gas imports.75  
Ensuring Human Energy Security 
 Having experienced two civil uprisings, the government of Kyrgyzstan is particularly 
concerned about the social and political instability that a shortage of electricity may lead to. 
Kyrgyzstan consumes on average 22–23 million kWh of electricity during warm summer days 
and 70 million kWh during cold winter days and most of it goes to household consumption. 
Kyrgyz households consumed 4.2 billion kWh of electricity, which accounted for 30 percent of 
the overall production, in 1999. The level of electricity consumption by the household sector 
reached 7.2 billion kWh, constituting 63 percent of the overall electricity production in the 
country, in 2012. 76  Due to a significant water drop in the reservoirs, the government of 
Kyrgyzstan was forced to limit electricity consumption by 30 percent of the total consumption 
volume in the previous year from October 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015.77 This implies that an 
                                                        
72 British Petroleum Company, BP Statistical Review. 
73 Eni, World Oil and Gas Review for 2014. 
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75 Otorbaev, “Problems and Perspectives for the Development of Power.” 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ivan Donis, “S 1 Oktyabrya v Kirgizii Vvodyatsya Veernie Otklyucheniya Sveta (Kyrgyzstan is Introducing 
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inability to produce sufficient electricity does not only hit the economy, but also affects the 
country’s ability to meet basic human needs. 
Reliance on Support from Russia and Kazakhstan  
 With a very strong Russian lobby and relatively good relationships with Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz government is now counting on these two actors to secure stable and adequate supplies 
of energy, especially in winter. The Russian lobby forced the Kyrgyz government to repeal the 
law prohibiting bailing out strategic facilities of the country. As a result, Russia ratified an 
agreement with the Kyrgyz government, according to which the entire gas sector of Kyrgyzstan 
(including the national company Kyrgyzgaz, gas pipelines, gas-distributing stations, and 
underground gas storage facilities) was sold to Gazprom for US$1 in return for forgiveness of 
state debts. 78 Most importantly, however, Kyrgyz government was counting on Gazprom to 
serve as a middleman between importing Kyrgyzstan and exporting Uzbekistan to ensure stable 
gas supplies. Critics of the deal fear excessive political leverage over the country that selling 
Kyrgyzgaz gives to Russia. “Kyrgyzstan needs gas, not Kyrgyzgaz” said in one of his speeches 
Melis Erzhigitov, a spokesman for Prime Minister Zhantoro Satybaldiyev, as a reply to the 
criticism in 2013. He also added “Gazprom will provide the country with an uninterrupted 
supply of gas and maybe even for a cheaper price.”79 Aleksey Miller, a Gazprom chairman, 
describing the deal promised that the company “[now] guarantees a stable gas supply” to 
Kyrgyzstan.80  
                                                        
78 “Uzbekistan Prekratil Podachu Prirodnogo Gaza na Yug Kirgizii (Uzbekistan Stopped Gas Supply to Southern 
Kyrgyzstan),” Kazenergy, July 18, 2013, accessed November 5, 2014, http://kazenergy.com/ru/press/2011-04-21-
10-41-35/10102-2013-07-17-20-23-18.html. 
79 Asel Kalybekova, “Kyrgyzstan: Is Gazprom Deal a Blessing or Curse for Bishkek?” Eurasianet.org, July 31, 
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 Kyrgyzstan is receiving certain preferences. Kazakhstan agreed to export 1.4 billion kWh 
of electricity to Kyrgyzstan generated in Zhambyl TPP in 2014. This electricity was produced 
from 330 million m3 of imported Uzbek gas, which was supplied by Gazprom, the Russian gas 
company, in 2014.81 While Uztransgaz exported gas to Kyrgyzstan for US$290 per 1,000 m3 in 
2013, the prices for Kazakh and Russian gas were lower, US$224 per 1,000 m3 and US$160 per 
1,000 m3, respectively.82 On September 20, 2012, the governments of Russia and Kyrgyzstan 
signed an agreement on the building and exploitation of the Upper Naryn cascade HPPs (Akblun 
HPP, Naryn HPP–1, Naryn HPP–2 and Naryn HPP–3). Most importantly, Kyrgyzstan is 
counting on Russian support to build Kambarata–1 HPP,83 the project designed to considerably 
increase winter electricity production volume. However, the extent to which Russia is willing to 
get involved in rather big and at the same time controversial HPP projects is unclear. Moreover, 
the current ruble crisis and Western sanctions effectively takes this plan off the table at the 
moment. 
Fighting Corruption and Energy Inefficiency 
 Decreased gas and thermal electricity supplies from abroad forced the government of 
Kyrgyzstan to pay greater attention to the problem of electric power sector inefficiency. Fifty-
three percent of electric power generation facilities in the country are over 40 years and 37 
percent are over 30 years old.84 Current total loss in the electric power system of Kyrgyzstan is 
almost 40 percent, out of which 25 percent (3.3 billion kWh per year) is commercial losses and                                                                                                                                                                                   
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thefts. Technical losses account for the remaining 15 percent.85 The current Kyrgyz government 
has partially built its legacy on blaming the previous (Kurmanbek Bakiyev) administration for 
the appropriation of money devoted to Kyrgyz energy sector development. The new government 
openly acknowledges the importance of fighting the corruption that negatively affects 
Kyrgyzstan’s ability to address energy efficiency problems in a timely and effective manner. 
Even though so far the government has achieved little progress, unlike other Central Asian 
leaders that have been in power for decades, new Kyrgyz authorities at least elevated this 
problem to the state-priority policy level.86  
Shortcomings of the National Priority Energy Project 
 To overcome the consequences of uneven distribution of electricity, the Kyrgyz 
government has recently put into force the Datka electric power station and complete the Datka–
Kemin electric power transmission line connecting the southern and northern parts of the 
country. 87  However, the energy security of Kyrgyzstan cannot be ensured without the 
cooperation of its neighbours. According to Nikolai Kravcov, member of the Monitoring Council 
under the Ministry of Energy, Kyrgyzstan will continue to experience electricity supply 
shortages due to lack of production. And even the Datka–Kemin electric power transmission line 
will not save Kyrgyzstan from an energy crisis. This transmission line solves the problem of 
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transporting electricity, but does not add electric power-production capacity. And it will be a 
decade or two until Kambarata–1 is put into full operation.88 
 Despite the fact that Kambarata–1 can considerably increase the volume of electricity 
production in the country, the current administration acknowledges that all claims that a single 
giant HPP can solve all energy security problems in Kyrgyzstan is an illusion. The electricity 
production coefficient of Kamabarata–1 is low.89 Besides, every added 1 kW of new capacity 
will cost US$2700, which Kyrgyzstan can hardly afford.90  
 The cost of electricity production in Kambarata–1 (1900 MW capacity) is estimated to be 
higher than in the Kara–Keche coal-fired plant (800 MW). Despite its lower electric power 
capacity, the coal-fired plant operates year round, while the power production capacity 
coefficient of Kambarata–1 accounts for only 31.5 percent. Building the Kara–Keche TPP with 
the capacity of 700 MW by 2017 with the possibility to increase it up to 1400 MW and then 
2800 MW91 might have a greater effect on the energy security of Kyrgyzstan. 
 For a limited Kyrgyz budget, building Kara–Keche is economically more efficient and 
thus, should be more attractive. Adding 1 kW of new power capacity costs around US$1,500 in 
TPPs and around US$2,000 in hydro-power plants. The government announced that the cost of 
Upper Naryn HPP exceeds US$727 million. If this sum is divided by the capacity of 237 MW, 
the cost of 1 kW will reach US$3,000, which is even US$1,000 higher than the average in the 
country. Construction of Kamabarata–1 will cost Kyrgyzstan US$5.2 billion. With a capacity of 
1900 MW, this means 1 kW will cost US$2,700. Ernest Karibekov, head of Research Institute                                                         
88 N. Kravcov, “V Voprosax Energobezopasnosti Nam ne Oboytis Bez Sosedey, kak I im Bez Nas (To Ensure 
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in Kyrgyz Republic, January 2015, accessed February 15, 2015, 
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for the Central Asian Water and Water-Energy Resources Problem Studies, believes that 
Kambarata–1 will not be constructed in the next 20 years. To return US$5.2 billion in 
investments, this plant will have to operate fully, selling electricity for 8 cents per kWh. 
Kyrgyzstan now exports electricity for around 4 cent per kWh along with the water supply.92 
 Kyrgyzstan’s considerable hydro-power potential has yet to be developed. Although it 
suffered from gas supply cuts within the CAES, Kyrgyzstan succeeded in mitigating an energy 
crisis by selling its strategic gas facilities to external actors so that they can invest in modernizing 
the gas sector. Despite prioritizing hydro-power development in its energy policy, the Kyrgyz 
government decided to step away from aggressively promoting the Kambarata–1 project that is 
causing disagreement with Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan’s neutral position over this project in 
combination with other policy initiatives has resulted in very limited, but nonetheless important, 
Uzbek gas and thermal electricity supply to the country. 
Energy Sector of Tajikistan 
 Although it possesses huge potential for hydroelectricity production (more than 527 
billion kWh annually—4 percent of the worldwide hydro-power potential), Tajikistan currently 
generates only 16.5 billion kWh per year (4–5 percent of the potential reserves) with installed 
capacity of 5190 MW. More than 98 percent of electricity is generated by HPPs (4872 MW).93 
Development of this potential could significantly contribute to sustainability of energy sector not 
only in Tajikistan, but also other Central Asian states, by providing large quantities of relatively 
inexpensive and “green” electricity. Currently, there are almost 300 small HPPs producing 
electricity in the country. According to the Government program, adopted in 2009 for the                                                         
92 Karibekov, “Is There an Energy Market in Kyrgyzstan?” 
93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, The Energy Sector of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
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construction of small HPPs for domestic and foreign investors for 2009–2020, Tajikistan is 
planning to build 189 more small HPPs to add an additional 103.6 MW.94 While the construction 
of small and mini HPPs is among the priority areas in the program, it is the medium and large 
HPPs that can significantly contribute to electricity production in the country.  
 Of the more than 98 percent of electricity produced by HPPs, 97 percent of that 
electricity is generated by large and medium HPPs.95 While small HPPs are mostly designed to 
meet the electricity demand of hundreds of people living in remote areas of the country, the 
planned Rogun HPP, with a capacity of 3600 MW to produce 13 billion kWh annually, may 
considerably increase the level of electricity production in Tajikistan. For the moment, Nurek is 
the largest HPP in Central Asia, with total production capacity of 3000 MW. The Nurek Dam 
was built between 1961 and 1980 and at 300 m is considered the tallest in the world. Another 
major complex of HPPs producing electricity in the country is Sangtuda–1 HPP, constructed by 
Russian companies in 2009, and Sangtuda–2, built by Iranian investments and with an expected 
capacity of 900 MW.96 
 In addition to hydro-power resources, Tajikistan also possesses very limited fossil fuels. 
Its estimated coal reserves account for 4.5 billion tonnes. Tajikistan produced 500,000 tonnes of 
coal in 2013.97 The government is also planning to develop 87 small oil and gas fields.98 Proven                                                         
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gas reserves of Tajikistan are estimated at the amount of 10 billion m3, but its gas production 
level is extremely low. 99 Tajikistan produced less than 10 million m3, while consumed 140 
million m3 of gas in 2012 and imported the rest from Uzbekistan. 100 Complete gas supply 
disruptions form Uzbekistan in 2013 had a tremendous impact on energy security of Tajikistan. 
The government of Tajikistan cooperates with 15 energy companies to develop its oil and gas 
potential and deal with energy crisis.101 Most of all, Tajikistan is counting on newly explored 
Sarikamysh and West Shokhambary gas fields, which according to the preliminary estimates by 
the Gazprom may possess around 70 billion m3 [not proven yet] of gas.102 However, the fact that 
94 percent of the country is mountainous area (geographic constraint) makes it extremely 
difficult and costly to extract and transport natural gas in Tajikistan thus turning the whole fossil 
fuel sector not quite attractive to foreign investors. For instance, the Shakhrinav–1P well has a 
planned depth of 6,300 meters, a deepest well in Central Asia and require significant upfront 
investments.103 
Tajikistan: In Pursuit of an Independent Energy System 
 Tajikistan’s domestic energy production almost completely relies on hydro-power sector 
development. The hydro-power potential to produce renewable and clean electricity provides 
Tajikistan certain leverage. However, due to seasonal variation in hydroelectricity production 
and limited fossil fuel reserves Tajikistan has never been able to meet its electricity needs all 
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year round. Like all other Central Asian republics, Tajikistan’s energy sector was designed to 
operate within the CAES. Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CAPS and the cut of gas and 
thermal electricity supply left Tajikistan in complete isolation and severely affected the level of 
its energy security, especially in winter months. To free itself from high dependence on 
neighbouring Uzbekistan, the government of Tajikistan has decided to establish countrywide 
(north-south) electricity transmission lines, since within the CAPS some regions of the country 
were only connected to the electric power grid of Uzbekistan, and increase electricity production 
by attracting investments to share the construction cost of the Rogun dam and HPP. While 
establishing an independent electric power system and a construction of Rugun HPP are the 
number one energy policy priority for Tajikistan, mitigating the current energy crisis by 
increasing efficiency of electricity producing and consuming facilities and development of the 
small hydro-power sector seem to be considered important as well. However, my analysis shows 
that there are limited opportunities for Tajikistan to ensure its energy security on its own in the 
short- to medium-term. 
Establishing an Independent Energy System 
 Total primary energy production in Tajikistan has never matched the level of 
consumption. Within the CAES, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan supplied insufficient thermal 
electricity, natural gas, and oil to Tajikistan. When the supply of these resources from its 
neighbour started to decrease, Tajikistan had no other choice but to rely on its own resources. 
The reduced level of total primary energy consumption for the last several years indicates that 
Tajikistan has not yet succeeded in covering the volume of previously imported energy.  
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Figure 4: Primary Energy Production and Consumption (quadrillion BTU) of Tajikistan104 
 
 
 Complete isolation from the CAES with no other possibility to import energy resources 
forced the government of Tajikistan to pursue the development of an independent national 
energy system. Ensuring energy independence by connecting hydro-power rich regions 
(southern) with those that were connected to the CAES (northern) and development of its hydro-
power and limited fossil fuels potential has three objectives:  
• to meet the population’s electricity needs year round; 
• to give a powerful impetus to the economic development of the country; and 
• to increase electricity export potential. 
                                                        


























































 Tajikistan was completely cut off the electric power grids of Uzbekistan in 2011.105 To 
supply electricity to its northern regions, the government decided to build 500 kV south–north 
and several 220 kV electricity transmission lines. 106 The 220 kV Lolazor–Khatlon line was 
finished in 2009. 107 These transmission lines, however, cannot solve the problem of winter 
electricity deficiency; therefore, the government of Tajikistan has prioritized the construction of 
the Rogun dam and HPP with the capacity to double the current electricity production volume, 
which would also allow hydroelectricity generation during the winter period. However, Uzbek 
authorities perceive this project as a threat to the water balance in the region and thus strongly 
oppose any progress in this direction. Hypothetically, hydro-power development in Tajikistan 
and meeting water needs in Uzbekistan should not necessarily be viewed as static. Tajikistan can 
potentially improve its energy security by fully developing huge hydro-power potential (527 
billion kWh per year). In terms of water withdrawal per capita Uzbekistan is placed fourth in the 
world after Turkmenistan, Iraq and Guyana, and has a potential to reduce domestic consumption 
of water. 108  Currently, however, Tajikistan’s’ ability to improve its energy security by 
developing hydro-power potential and Uzbekistan’s capability to reduce domestic water 
consumption, at least in the short-term perspective, face a number of obstacles associated with 
lack of financial resources, technological limitations and political constraints.109 
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 The Soviet gas pipeline system was constructed in a way that all gas transport 
infrastructures to Tajikistan passed Uzbek territory. Uzbekistan was and still remains major 
supplier of gas to Tajikistan. Thus, the country has been experiencing severe gas shortage since 
2013, when Uzbekistan completely stopped gas supplies to Tajikistan.110 Tajik authorities may 
potentially count on Line–D of the CAGP, expecting that China will agree to leave a certain 
amount of gas for Tajikistan to meet its gas needs, especially during the winter period. 
According to the initial design, however, Line–D is being built to transport gas to China, using 
both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as transit countries only. In fact, all participants of the project try 
to keep the question of turning Line–D into a source of gas supply to Central Asian upstream 
states off the table for the moment. The biggest concern still lies with Uzbekistan—a key transit 
country that does not refrain from using gas as a weapon to influence the foreign policies of its 
upstream neighbours. While Uzbekistan will no longer possess a legal right to unilaterally stop 
natural gas flow, because its section of pipeline is operated by Joint Venture Company, it still 
can physically cut supplies as all pipelines pass through its territory. Uzbekistan opposes 
construction of large dams, because it fears that its upstream neighbours could interfere with the 
water supply necessary for the downstream irrigation and particularly cotton industry, which 
accounts for 9 percent of total exports of the country and quite important for the livelihood of the 
people.111 It has been using the dependence of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on Uzbek gas as a 
political and economic instrument to block the construction of those dams. Gas supply to Central 
Asian upstream countries from the CAGP will decrease energy leverage of Uzbek authorities in 
relations with its upstream neighbours and may thus cause tensions between Uzbekistan and 
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China. So, China would most likely try to avoid any conflict with Uzbekistan. In this regard, 
until the energy-water nexus dispute between Central Asian downstream and upstream countries 
is resolved, counting on the Line–D pipeline as a source of gas supply to Tajikistan and 
potentially Kyrgyzstan would be problematic. 
Dealing with the “High Cost” of Energy Security 
 Tajikistan cannot afford to bear the cost of the transition to an independent energy system 
on its own. The cost of energy consumption already accounts for around 60 percent of the GDP. 
Households in Tajikistan spend around 50 percent of their total income on energy in the winter 
months and still receive an amount insufficient of fully meeting their needs.112 While the Rogun 
HPP can solve the problem of seasonal variation and deficiency of electricity production, 
disagreement between Central Asian upstream and downstream countries over this project 
affects the majority of investment proposals. Uzbekistan fears that the proposed highest dam 
would lead to: (a) unduly interruptions of water release; (b) safety of the dam can easily be 
jeopardized resulting in serious environmental, economic and social consequences for 
downstream countries. Due to tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well as certain 
domestic economic constraints over this project foreign investors are not rushing to take part in 
the construction of the dam. Construction of Rogun started during the Soviet period, and now 
requires from US$3–6 billion in additional investments. With a public campaign to collect 
money for building the Rogun dam, the government of Tajikistan succeeded in collecting 
US$187 million. However, once collected, Tajik authorities had few initiatives to put the money 
toward.113 The government made it compulsory for citizens to purchase almost US$700 worth of 
shares, which at the time exceeded the average annual income for most Tajik residents. It                                                         
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planned to collect around US$600 million, but managed to collect less than 30 percent of this 
amount. 114  This did not only fall short of the goal, but also was not enough to continue 
construction. Attracting foreign investments in energy projects and ensuring affordability of 
energy resources are among the priority policy areas for Tajikistan. 
Development of Small Hydro-power Potential 
 According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, more than 1 
million people suffer from frequent and prolonged blackouts each winter in Tajikistan.115 The 
World Bank’s estimates of the number of people suffering from electricity shortage during the 
winter are even higher and reach 70 percent of the population. 116  People living in remote 
mountainous areas are the most vulnerable. Due to geographical constraints to establishing a 
countrywide network of electric power transmission lines, the most feasible way to bring 
electricity to these regions is to build small and mini HPPs at these sites. Over the last two 
decades, 310 small HPPs have been constructed in the country and 10 more are in the process. 
The government is planning to build an additional 190 small HPPs by 2020.117 However, while 
98 percent of electricity generation comes from the hydro-power sector, 97 percent of it is 
produced in medium and large HPPs.118 This does not imply that building small HPPs is a 
failure, because they supply electricity to a number of remote areas, where connecting them to 
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the central electric power system would be costly. But it means that without the construction of 
large HPPs, Tajikistan will not be able to resolve its energy crisis. 
Improving Energy Efficiency 
 Tajik authorities acknowledge that investment in increasing the efficiency of some 
outdated major hydroelectricity producing facilities in Tajikistan may hypothetically save some 
electricity. Nurek, the largest contributor to the electricity production of Tajikistan, was built in 
1972. Kairakkum was constructed even earlier, in 1956.119 Due to a variety of factors, including 
inefficiently functioning electricity producing facilities, Tajikistan’s electric power sector is not 
operating to its full capacity (see Table 16). 
Table 16: Operating Electric Power Generating Plants in Tajikistan (January 1, 2012)120 
Name 
Technical capacity, megawatt 
Designed Available Operating 
Nurek HPP 3,000 2,385 1,625.3 
Baipaza HPP 600 450 273.5 
Dushanbe thermal electric plant 198 100 4.9 
Yavan thermal electric plant 120 – – 
Kairakkum HPP 126 104 83.8 
The Vakhsh cascade of HPPs 285 211 139.61 
The Varzob cascade of HPPs 25.36 8 7.1 
Pamir Energy 42 39 37 
MGES 13 11 10 
Sangtuda HPP–1 670 670 440 
Sangtuda HPP–2 110 110 40 
Total 5,190 4,088 2,661.21 
  
 Tajikistan is counting on multilateral institutions’ support (technical, financial and 
expertise) to reduce electricity loss. According to some estimates, electricity production and 
transportation losses can be reduced by 30 percent.121 
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 However, unless the problem of the TALCO aluminum plant, which consumes 40 percent 
of the electricity produced, is resolved, the electric power sector of Tajikistan will remain 
inefficient. TALCO consumed 5,480 GWh in 2009 and 6,460 GWh of electricity in 2011. The 
World Bank recommended Energy Efficiency Action Plan for TALCO, arguing that if 
implemented it would cut 20 percent of electricity and 37 percent of gas consumption by the 
plant.122 The government, however, remains quite sensitive to any significant reform initiatives 
that could affect current management system of the company. TALCO, one of the 10 largest 
aluminum smelters in the world, provides up to 70 percent of the country’s foreign currency 
earnings,123 which is 60 percent of total export of Tajikistan and generates 20 percent of GDP.124 
TALCO is gobbling up Tajikistan’s electricity in a most non-transparent manner, so that the 
government can immediately collect rents off exporting aluminum. TALCO legal case in the 
London high court revealed information on how President Rakhmon’s family and their associates 
profit from TALCO company management. John Helmer, a Moscow based journalist, who was 
closely following the court proceedings, calculated the Tajik state revenue loss at US$1.145 
billion in between 2005 and 2008 due to a particular trading scheme, which only benefited 
owners of the TALCO operating companies, including the family of the President.125 In this 
regard, there is sometimes a trade-off between successful energy efficiency initiatives and 
personal gains of certain political groups in Tajikistan that prevents achieving progress in this 
direction. 
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Energy Sector of Turkmenistan  
 The history of the Turkmen energy sector dates back to 1913, when the first HPP started 
supplying electricity to very small population areas.126 Gindikush HPP, with the capacity of 1.2 
MW, has celebrated its 100 years anniversary two years ago and is still operational. 127 
Hydroelectricity production, however, is currently almost completely absent in the total 
electricity production balance (0,02 percent) in Turkmenistan128 and the electric power sector of 
Turkmenistan is entirely dependent on gas-fired TPPs. 
 The first gas-fired (combined heat and power) TPP in the country (Turkmenbashi) was 
put into operation in 1961 with initial capacity of 170 MW and has now reached a capacity of 
420 MW. The process of connecting some remote areas of Turkmenistan to the central electric 
power grids was initiated in 1966. To establish a countrywide electric power system, it was 
decided to connect Ashgabat, Mary, and Charjou electric power grids in 1970. Ten years later, 
the formation of the centralized Turkmen electric power system was complete. Electricity 
generation on Mary TPP, with a capacity of 1685 MW, started operating in 1987. In 2011, it 
produced 9022 million kWh, accounting for 49.4 percent of total electricity production in the 
country. Currently, there are nine state electric power plants with a capacity of 3984.2 MW to 
produce electricity in Turkmenistan. Having withdrawn from the CAPS, Turkmenistan is now 
increasing its electricity production capacity by building new TPPs. The first TPP constructed 
after gaining independence is Seydi (combined heat and power) TPP, with installed capacity of 
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160 MW. Three electric power stations with overall capacity of 1643 MW were introduced in 
2010. Balkanabad TPP, with a capacity of 380 MW, was put into operation in 2010. Dashoguz 
TPP and Axal TPP, both with a capacity of 254.2 MW, started operating in 2007 and 2010 
respectively. Avaz TPP was put into operation in 2010, with a capacity of 254.2 MW.129 
 Currently, Turkmenistan is exporting electricity to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. 
Turkmenistan is exporting up to 2 billion kWh annually, which is 13–17 percent of total electric 
power production. Between 2007 and 2009, Turkmenistan exported electricity to Tajikistan in an 
amount of 1 billion kWh annually, but stopped due to Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CAPS. 
Currently, there are four main transboundary electricity transmission lines connecting Turkmen 
TPPs with Uzbekistan and Iran (See Table 17) and there is a potential to reinstate electricity 
trade with other Central Asian countries. The government of Turkmenistan is also planning to  
construct 500 kV “Mary–Atamurad–Andxoy” transmission line connecting its largest (Mary) 
TPP with Afghanistan and increase the capacity of the “Mary–Seraxs” transmission lines.130 
Table 17: Transboundary Electricity Transmission Lines of Turkmenistan131 
 
 So the electric power sector of Turkmenistan is completely dependent on gas-fired TPP 
and the country possesses sufficient amount of gas to meet its domestic demand. Turkmenistan, 
with the amount of 17.5 trillion m3, enjoys the fourth-largest natural gas reserves after Russia, 
                                                        
129 Ministry of Oil Industry and Mineral Resources of Turkmenistan, Ministry. 
130 Ibid. 
131 “Elektroenergetica Turkmenistana (Electric Power of Turkmenistan),” 183. 
 Transmission lines Voltage (kV) Length (km) Capacity (MW) 
Uzbekistan Serdar–Karakul 500 100 1,000 
Cherdjev–Karakul 220 67 120 
Iran Balkanabad–Gonbad 220 311 300 
Shatlyk–Seraxs 220 112 160 
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Iran, and Kuwait.132 The Turkmen government is even more optimistic suggesting the reserves 
of 24 trillion m3.133 The country’s first gas production infrastructure was put in place in the 
1970s. 134  Turkmengaz, state gas company, is currently developing around 30 gas and gas 
condensate deposits, including such unique fields as Galkynysh, Dovletabad, Shatlyk, Malay, 
Kerpichli, Garashsizligin 10 yilligi, Gazlidepe, Bagadja, Garabil, Gurrubil, etc. Overall, gas 
extraction accounts for over 1000 gas wells in the country. In 2014 Turkmenistan produced 76 
billion m3 and exported 45 billion m3.135 On the XVII People’s Council in 2006 the government 
adopted the “Oil and Gas Industry Development Programme of Turkmenistan for the period till 
2030” according to which it is targeting to reach the volume of gas production in the amount of 
230 billion m3 annually by 2030. 136  There is a potential for significantly increasing gas 
production in Turkmenistan, since having fourth largest gas reserves in the world, the volume of 
Turkmen gas production is almost 10 to 9 times lower than in the United States (728.3 billion 
m3) or Russia (578.7 billion m3).137 Many experts, however, doubt that Turkmenistan can reach 
the targeted level due to lack of investments as well as technical and geographical constraints to 
reach external energy markets. 
 The development of natural gas is the priority area in Turkmenistan’s energy sector. 
However, due to a large number of sparsely located population spots it is economically too costly 
to develop a countrywide gas supply network. The government has made certain progress in                                                         
132 British Petroleum Company, BP Statistical Review. 
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supplying majority of its population with gas. The Turkmen government initiated the 
construction of an “East–West” gas pipeline capable of transporting 30 billion m3 in order to 
increase the availability of natural gas to some distant parts of the country, as well as to raise its 
export capacity. However, a 770 km long pipeline starting from Mary going through Axal and 
ending at the Balkan regions will only be justified if extended gas extraction starts in the giant 
Galkynysh gas field with total reserves estimated at around 13.1 to 21.2 trillion m3.138 This 
pipeline is designed to transport natural gas from Galkynysh field (south Yolotan, Osman, and 
Yashlar) to the western regions.139 Turkmenistan is counting on recently explored (2006) giant 
Galkynysh gas field to significantly increase its gas production capacity, the first stage of 
production on which was commenced in 2013.140 The “West–East” gas pipeline has integrated 
all major gas deposits in the country into a single system thus making it physically possible to 
increase export volume in all/any direction.141 
 Turkmengaz controls 90 percent of all hydrocarbon fields. The remaining 10 percent 
belongs to the state oil company Turkmenneft.142 According to the law adopted by the former 
Turkmen President, Saparmurat Niyazov, no energy assets can be privatized until 2020.143 Even 
though Turkmenistan declared the country “open for business,” the Turkmen government 
reserved the right to develop its onshore fields itself. International oil companies are limited to 
exploration only. As well, the government officials decided to sign new service contracts and not 
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the PSAs.144 Companies that still operate within the PSA signed their agreements back in the 
1990s. However, the fuel complex development of Turkmenistan is largely dependent on foreign 
investments and to attract major Chinese investors the government of Turkmenistan agreed to 
PSA format of agreements. During the visit of the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov to the People’s Republic of China on July 17, 2007, PSA agreement on 
development of Bagtiyarlik on the Amu Darya river territory was signed between parties. China 
is obliged to develop the field and build infrastructure and gas processing plants. This was an 
important precondition of the strategy to build the Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline two years 
later.145  
Turkmenistan: Neutrality and Integration into the Global Energy System 
 Neutrality has always been an important part of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. During 
the Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in July 1992 Turkmen 
representatives declared “positive neutrality” as one of its foreign policy pillars. General 
Assembly of the United Nations, for the first time in the history of International Relations, 
adopted special resolutions on “Turkmenistan’s Permanent Neutrality” on December 12, 1995. 
Twenty years passed, but neutrality remains the priority in its regional and global foreign policy 
as indicated in the “Foreign policy concept of Turkmenistan for the period of 2013–2020”.146  
 Turkmenistan’s domestic energy policy is almost completely linked with its international 
energy interests. Its total primary energy production and consumption levels show that,                                                         
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Turkmenistan has sufficient production capacity to meet its energy needs. Natural gas constitutes 
the main source in the primary energy mix of Turkmenistan. However, the largest share of its gas 
production has been exported. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, lack of investment in 
maintaining the Turkmen gas sector and lower demand for gas all over the former Soviet space 
meant the level of primary energy production decreased up until the end of the 1990s.147  
Figure 5: Primary Energy Production and Consumption (quadrillion BTU) of 
Turkmenistan148 
  
 Increasing demand for natural gas in Europe prompted Russia to use its transit leverage to 
gain economic revenues from re-exporting Turkmen gas and to boost gas production in the 
country again. A second sudden drop in gas production was instigated by Russia’s inability to re-
sell Central Asian gas to European markets due to the Russia–Ukraine gas crisis. While the gas 
crisis caused a temporary disruption, the 2008–2009 financial crisis had a longer-lasting effect on 
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the gas supply cuts. Construction of a pipeline connecting Turkmen gas with the Chinese market 
instigated the second major gas production increase in the country. These ups and downs indicate 
that the gas production rate has always been dictated by external demand for Turkmen gas and 
not necessarily by the desire of the government to improve the country’s energy security by 
connecting remote areas of Turkmenistan to the central pipeline networks.  
Table 18: Turkmenistan—Major Export Items (in US$ million and as Percentage of Total 
Exports)149 
 Natural gas Oil products Crude oil Electricity 
 US$m % US$m % US$m % US$m % 
1996 1022.0 60.8 173.0 10.3 N/A N/A 58.0 3.4 
2000 1825.0 47.2 966.0 24.7 262.0 6.8 29.0 0.8 
2005 5509.0 59.1 1661.0 17.8 1400.0 15.0 72.0 0.8 
2008 274.0 36.4 221.0 3.6 N/A N/A 39.0 5.2 
2009 70.0 11.7 214.0 36.0 N/A N/A 32.0 5.3 
2010 389.0 32.8 211.0 17.7 142.0 11.9 10.0 0.8 
2011 1244.0 49.7 513.0 20.5 242.0 9.7 16.0 0.7  
Integration into the Global Energy System 
 With one of the richest natural gas reserves in the world, the government of 
Turkmenistan prioritizes integration into the global energy system and for the moment refrains 
from active cooperation with other Central Asian states.150 “Oil and Gas Industry Development 
Programme of Turkmenistan for the period till 2030” is an important document in determining 
the country’s energy security strategy.151 Almost complete dependence on Russian pipelines to 
move gas out of the country had negative consequences for Turkmenistan, and the country wants 
to diversify export routes in all possible directions (China, South Asia, and Europe) with long-                                                        
149 Central Asia Data Gathering and Analysis Team, “Trade Policies and Major Export Items,” 11. 
150 Government of the Republic of Turkmenistan, Towards New Paradigm of Global Energy Space (Ashgabat: State 
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term commitments, including swap deals. The government of Turkmenistan is currently referring 
to the “World Energy Outlook 2014” and the “Global Vision for Gas” forecast, which shows 
significant and continues increase of natural gas demand and Turkmenistan’s potential to play 
even bigger role in supplying this particular type of energy source. It is expected that gas 
consumption in China and India will amount to 603 billion m3 and 202 billion m3, respectively, 
by 2040. And Turkmenistan would be able to increase its gas production up to 230 billion m3, by 
2040, to partially meet this growing demand.152 By highlighting the above-mentioned figures, 
the government of Turkmenistan is trying to emphasize its contribution to the global energy 
security, which was possible due to its neutral status, vast gas reserves and geographical location 
on the crossroads of Europe and Asia.153 While the government prioritizes integration into the 
global energy system in its foreign energy policy, which basically implies connecting its oil and 
gas reserves with external energy markets, so far it has only succeeded in swapping Russian 
patronage for Chinese.  
 Having realized the possible consequences of such dependence, Turkmen government 
has been claiming the desire to establish gas export corridors toward European and South Asian 
directions. Current Turkmen elites show particular interest in the construction of the TAPI 
pipeline with the capacity of 33 billion m3. Turkmengaz, Afghan gas corporation, Pakistani Inter 
State Gas systems (Private) Limited and GAIL (India) Limited form the operating team of the 
TAPI Ltd. Project participants have already signed purchase agreements and determined 
sources, including Galkynysh giant gas field, to provide gas supplies. With the support of the                                                         
152 “Posledovatel’niy Rost Znachimosti Turkmenistana na Mejdunarodnom Gazovom Rinke (Increasing Role of 
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ADB, project participants expressed willingness to start the construction of the pipeline as soon 
as possible, even in 2015.154 Among various planned projects to export Central Asian natural 
resources, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline—1,099-miles [1,820 
km] long, with a capacity of 33 billion m3 of natural gas per year from the Dauletabad field in 
Turkmenistan—is considered the most challenging. While geography creates various challenges 
for the TAPI pipeline, it is not so much physical as commercial and political/security obstacles 
that are causing the delay in project realization. After the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan pipeline (an extremely difficult project from an engineering point of view), 155  the 
chances of building the TAPI pipeline significantly increased. However, the region’s 
vulnerability to such security threats as terrorism and conflict, and doubts concerning the 
consuming countries’ capability to compete with Chinese and European prices for Central Asian 
energy have significantly slowed the project down. As a result, no significant progress has been 
made so far in terms of physical construction of the pipeline. 
 The Deputy Minister of Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources, Kurganguly Yaziv, 
highlighted gas export diversification roots currently prioritized by the government:  
• Turkmenistan–China: 65 billion m3; 
• Turkmenistan–Russia: 10 billion m3, but the existing pipeline capacities allow 
exporting way more [up to 45 billion m3]; 
• Turkmenistan–Iran: 20 billion m3; 
• TAPI: 33 billion m3; 
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• Turkmenistan–Europe: 30 billion m3 through the Trans–Caspian Gas pipeline.156  
 With the current level of gas export capacity it will be quite challenging for Turkmenistan 
to supply gas in all directions. While export of Turkmen gas is increasing (it exported 45 billion 
m3 out of which 35 billion m3 went to China in 2014), gas supply in other directions is 
significantly dropping. Turkmenistan exported nearly 40 billion m3 to Russia in 2008 and only 
10 billion m3 in 2013. Lack of gas transporting infrastructure, along with political and security 
issues, prevent Turkmen government from exporting gas in the European and South Asian 
directions.157  
Implementing Major Energy Projects 
 To meet external gas demand, Turkmenistan has to develop the giant gas field 
Galkynysh158 (in the east) and connect it to some major gas pipelines located in the western parts 
of the country via the “East–West” trans–Turkmen gas pipeline.159 Only by developing this field 
and increase extraction of gas in other fields Turkmenistan will be able to fulfill its obligations to 
external customers, but it is happening very slowly. As planned in the first stage of the 
development of this field, several gas-extracting facilities were completed allowing the 
development of 30 billion m3. During the second stage gas production capacity is targeting to 
reach 60 billion m3. Gas field, which began production in 2013 is expected to add 20 billion m3 
annualy by 2020.160 It is expected to increase the volume of gas production up to 83,8 billion m3 
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and export 48 billion m3 of it in 2015.161 If the government gets close to this number, it will be 
possible due to the development of this giant gas field. 
 Given that Turkmenistan is the least-connected country in the region, and is not 
dependent on other Central Asian countries’ energy resources, it is not surprising that the 
Turkmen government decided to isolate itself from tensions over the shared management of 
water and energy resources in the region. 162  Without doubt the importance of revenues, 
generated from selling gas to external markets, for the development of Turkmen energy sector, 
should not be underestimated. Exporting gas to external customers does not directly contribute to 
the energy security of the country; however, the export of gas to neighbouring Uzbekistan in case 
of emergency and potentially to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan via the CAGP Line–D or swap gas 
deals through Uzbekistan and in exchange receiving (cheaper and environmentally cleaner) 
electricity from upstream Central Asian countries does. Arranging delivery of Turkmen gas to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan via swap arrangements with Uzbekistan and supply of upstream 
countries’ electricity to Turkmenistan again through swap agreements with Uzbekistan have the 
potential to contribute to the level of energy security in the region. The fact that Turkmen and 
Uzbek gas is currently transported to China through Kazakh territory only adds strategic 
importance to the Line–D pipeline, from the Chinese perspective that feels uncomfortable of 
complete dependence on solely Kazakhstan’s pipeline infrastructure. Line–D with a capacity of 
30 billion m3 per year, which is designed to move natural gas avoiding Kazakhstan, and thus, has 
a very high chance of realization. However, the conflict between Uzbekistan and upstream 
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countries may negatively affect any sort of swap arrangements to move and transit gas within 
Central Asia. 
Energy Sector of Uzbekistan  
 Uzbekistan is a major fossil fuels producer in Central Asia. Uzbekneftgaz, a state-owned 
oil and gas company, estimates 60 percent of Uzbekistan’s territory has a potential for oil and 
gas extraction. Two hundred and eleven hydrocarbon fields had been discovered in the country: 
108 gas and gas condensate, 103 oil and gas, oil condensate and oil. Over 50 percent of them are 
being exploited, while 35 percent are under development. Currently, oil and gas production 
accounts for 86 million tonnes of oil equivalent, which increased by 60 percent comparing to 
1991. Uzbekistan has the capacity to not only extract, but also refine most of the oil and gas 
produced. Fergana oil refinery was put into operation back in 1958. Another oil refinery was 
built in Bukhara in 1997.163 The gas refinery complex of Uzbekistan consists of Mubarek and 
Shurtan complexes. Mubarek has the annual gas processing capacity of 30 billion m3 and 
Shurtan around 20 billion m3.164 
 In 2013, Uzbekistan celebrated the 60th anniversary of its gas industry. The country 
possesses around 1.1 trillion m3 of gas.165 The largest gas field in the country, Gazly (Bukhara 
region), has the capacity to provide 500 billion m3 of gas. Most of the gas production (around 
45–50 billion m3 per year out of annual 60–70 billion m3) comes from the Bukhara–Khiva region 
from such fields as Gazli, Shurtan, Kultak, Alan, Zevardy, Umid, South Kemachi, Kruk and 
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Urtabulak. 166 Gas to the Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent regions through the Dzharkak–
Tashkent gas pipeline is supplied from this field. Gas from Gazly is transported to Ural through a 
pipeline that is 2000 km long.167 This gas field also fills the Uzbek section of the CAGP. The 
State Investment Program of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2013 aimed to attract foreign 
investments in a number of branches of industry, including oil and gas (58.9 percent) and 
electricity generation (5 percent).168 
 Currently, 87 percent of consumed electricity is produced in gas- and coal-fired TPPs. 
Uzbekistan possesses explored coal reserves with a volume of 1900 million tonnes, which are 
being extracted mainly in Angren, Shargun, and Baysun fields. 169  The Government of 
Uzbekistan, at least officially, acknowledges that the “brown economy” model slows down the 
transition to a long-term sustainable electric power sector. The sustainability of electricity 
supplies can be achieved through the development of a green economy and government officials 
often claim that Uzbekistan is steadily moving in this direction. Solar energy research and 
development in Uzbekistan started in the 1980s, but little progress is achieved so far. Currently 
RES is highly underdeveloped since its share does not exceed 2 percent (excluding hydro power) 
of the overall electricity production. In the 1960s, more than 250 small and mini HPPs were 
functioning in Uzbekistan. Even though the number of small HPPs is decreasing, Uzbekistan is 
willing to support small HPPs, because they are considered environmentally less damaging, 
capable of supplying electricity to remote areas, and require less capital and investment, which 
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can shortly be returned.170 Uzbekistan does not prioritize hydro power like it prioritizes gas or 
oil. However, hydro power is still important for the Uzbek energy sector development, since it 
accounts for 20 percent of the overall electricity production and is considered to be the main 
source of clean electricity production in the country.171 
Uzbekistan: Prioritizing Stability in Energy Policy 
 Uzbek authorities believe that Uzbekistan is among the few countries in the world that 
have sufficient energy supplies to meet their energy demands. Guided, in part, by the belief of 
self-sufficiency, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS and signed a number of agreements on 
exporting natural gas to external markets. To keep prices affordable, the government of 
Uzbekistan is subsidizing its energy sector. The sustainability of the Uzbek energy sector is 
another area that authorities often highlight in their speeches. The evidence, however, shows that 
Uzbekistan neither enjoys energy security, nor is capable of continuing to subsidize its energy 
sector without negatively affecting its economy. 
Energy Production Capacity 
 Total primary energy production matches the consumption level in Uzbekistan. Natural 
gas constitutes the major part of primary energy production. With the capacity of over 60 billion 
m3 per year, it is one of the major producers of gas in the region. However, Uzbekistan consumes 
most of its produced gas. Gas consumption represented approximately 85 percent of the primary 
energy consumption level in 2013; with oil products and coal representing 7 percent and 3 
percent, respectively. Hydroelectricity accounted for the remaining 5 percent of the share in                                                         
170 V. V. Alixanov, “Konceptualnie Podxodi k Formirovaniyu Green Economy v Uzbekistan (Conceptual 
Approaches to Green Economy in Uzbekistan),” Center for Economic Research, Analytical report, 2011, 64. 
171 World Bank, Electricity Production from Hydroelectric Sources (percent of total), for 2011 (Washington, DC: 
World Bank), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.HYRO.ZS. 
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2013.172 Installed capacity of all electric power plants in Uzbekistan exceeds 12.3 GW, with 
TPPs contributing more than 11 GW and HPP around 1.3 GW, which equals 50 percent of all 
generating capacities of the interconnected CAPS.173 The largest share of thermal electricity 
production comes to the gas-fired TPPs. So Uzbekistan consumes almost as much gas as it 
produces, which means that any initiative to increase gas export to external customers will come 
at the expense of domestic consumption. 




 Most of the gas produced in Uzbekistan is consumed domestically. Uzbekneftgaz, a state 
owned gas company, supplied 48.8 billion m3 of gas out of produced 57.3 billion m3 to domestic                                                         
172 US EIA, Uzbekistan—Overview/Data (Washington, DC: US EIA, n.d), accessed January 7, 2015, 
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173 Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Energy Resources of Uzbekistan (Tashkent: Governmental Portal of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan, n.d), accessed July 1, 2014, http://www.gov.uz/en/helpinfo/energy/10004. 

























































consumers in 2014.175 The population of around 30 million people (almost equal to other Central 
Asian countries’ population combined) is a factor that can explain the higher rate of energy 
consumption compared to other Central Asian states. Most importantly, however, highly 
inefficient energy production, transportation and consumption facilities account for 60 percent of 
primary energy loss and affect the consumption level.176 Due to its considerable gas production 
capacity Uzbekistan avoids severe and prolonged gas crises. Uzbekistan’s electric power 
generation capacities saved it from experiencing serious electricity supply shortage even when it 
left the CAPS. However, it is not an issue of survival, but rather the question of sufficient gas 
and electricity supplies to meet economic and population needs for the foreseeable future that 
constitutes the core of energy security of the country. Electricity blackouts and gas supply 
shortages, especially for the population needs, are indicators of energy security challenges that 
Uzbekistan has to deal with. 
 T. P. Salikhov from the Institute of Power Engineering and Automation in Tashkent 
argued that Uzbekistan achieved self-sufficiency in fuel in 1995 and became fully self-sufficient 
in energy resources in 1996–1997.177 However, despite that claim, energy security challenges 
that Uzbekistan is currently facing prove the fact that the operation of its energy system in 
isolation mode has its cost. As a first stage of energy strategy, Uzbekistan aimed to achieve: 
energy independence; natural gas supplies accessible to the entire population; and low energy 
prices.178  Uzbekistan has perhaps achieved these goals, as it no longer imports energy, there is a 
countrywide gas pipeline and electricity transmission lines and energy prices are relatively low.                                                         
175 British Petroleum Company, BP Statistical Review. 
176 World Bank, “Uzbekistan: The Economics of Efficiency. Uzbekistan Pushes to Reduce Energy Consumption in 
Industry,” (Washington, DC: World Bank), April 30, 2013, accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/30/uzbekistan-the-economics-of-efficiency. 
177 T. P. Salikhov, “Stages and Results of Energy Strategy Realization in Uzbekistan,” Journal of Economic Review, 
October 2004, 49. 
178 Ibid., 48. 
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Uzbek authorities, however, failed to sustain sufficient energy supplies and the subsidized energy 
market cost the budget billions of dollars. 
Securing Affordable Gas Prices 
 The energy sector of Uzbekistan is highly subsidized. Due to its share in the overall 
energy consumption, gas sector has the greatest affect on the Uzbek economy. Uzbek household 
consumers paid US$50 per 1,000 m3 of gas in 2013.179 For the comparison, Uzbekistan exported 
gas for the last several years at around the price of US$300 per 1,000 m3. The government 
subsidizes almost US$10 billion annually in the country’s gas sector alone each year.180 Due to 
financial difficulties, however, Uzbekistan cannot afford to continue subsidizing the gas sector 
and keeping prices low without negatively affecting the economy. Since private gas companies 
refrain from engaging in the distribution and sale of gas in the domestic market, which is the 
highly subsidized Uzbek energy sectors, the state-owned energy provider Uzbekenergo, fully 
controlled by the government, is responsible for ensuring the affordability of gas.  
Ensuring Sustainability and Efficiency of the Energy Sector  
 There is a lack of transparency in the energy sector, and it is difficult to provide statistical 
data proving deficiency of energy in the country. However, numerous complaints by the 
population and periodic electricity blackouts and gas supply shortages in the country indicate 
that there are serious energy security challenges that require attention by the Uzbek authorities. 
 First, Uzbekistan consumes too much environmentally unfriendly energy sources. 85 
percent of total coal produced in the country is used to generate electricity.181 Second, the energy 
intensity (energy efficiency measurement) of Uzbekistan exceeds other middle-level developing                                                         
179 Head of Sales Department of “Buxorogaz,” Personal Interview, Bukhara, Uzbekistan, June 23, 2013. 
180 International Energy Agency, Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidy Rates. 
181 Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Coal Industry. 
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countries by 2–2.5 times.182 Thus, increasing the energy efficiency of outdated energy producing 
and transporting facilities requires urgent government attention. Most importantly, however, to 
have an immediate affect on sustainability of the Uzbek energy sector, existing resources have to 
be used in the most rational way. In the winter, burning gas and coal produces thermal electricity 
and is used for heating purposes, while in summer TPPs only generate electricity. Within the 
CAPS, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan supplied clean electricity to downstream Uzbekistan during 
vegetation (spring–summer) period. In return, Uzbekistan exported electricity produced in gas-
fired TPPs to upstream neighbours in the wintertime and provided heating services to its 
population. The majority of Uzbekistan’s population receive heating services through the central 
heating system run by the coal- and gas-fired (combined heat and power plants) TPPs. 
Withdrawal from the CAPS forced Uzbekistan to increase thermal electricity production in 
summer months, with no need for heat generation. Coordinated operation of the electric power 
systems, also contributed to Uzbekistan’s ability to fully meet its electricity demand peaks in the 
morning and evening.183 
 Nonetheless, Uzbekistan decided to withdraw from the CAPS. Some experts characterize 
the decision as a politically motivated move.184 Others argue that Uzbekistan’s withdrawal was 
provoked by Tajikistan itself. Announcement of the opening of a new 500 kV electric power 
transmission line South–North by Tajik authorities without proper notification of their 
counterparts was considered by the Uzbek side as Tajikistan’s attempt to establish independent 
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electric power system and a preparation to withdraw from the CAPS.185 Perhaps referring to this 
particular announcement, Sagdulaev, head of the Uzbekenergo, published an article in the Pravda 
Vostoka newspaper saying that, “[from now on (2009)] Central Asian electric power grid 
operations will jeopardize stability and safe functioning of Uzbek electric power system, and 
Uzbekistan raises the issue of withdrawing from the system and operating in a separate mode.” 
The message that he tried to deliver was that every Central Asian state was pursuing its own 
interests with no concerns for the consequences to others. And that exactly what Uzbekistan 
did.186 In any case, Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CAPS to a different extent affected all its 
member states.  
Increasing Gas Export Capacity  
 Uzbekistan had been annually supplying approximately 10–15 billion m3 of gas to 
Russia187 and 4.5 billion m3 within the Central Asian region.188 The leaders of Uzbekistan and 
China also agreed to reach the total volume of gas supply of 25 billion m3 by 2016189 and 
maintain the annual export volume of 10 billion m3 through the Line–C of the CAGP. However, 
outdated and inefficient natural gas transportation systems, growing internal energy demand, and 
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the fact that no major natural gas reserves have recently been developed are indications of 
Uzbekistan’s physical incapability to increase its gas export capacity. 
Lack of Energy Sector Accountability and Transparency 
 The above analysis highlights particular areas of activity that Central Asian governments 
prioritize in their national energy policies. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which has recently 
undergone a regime change, Central Asian elites have remained in power for decades, and it is 
not surprising that they refrain from elevating the problem of lack of accountability as well as 
corruption in the energy sector and rent-seeking to the policy priority level. Central Asian energy 
policies as they stand right now can be characterized as short-term oriented, state centric, and 
hydrocarbons/hydro power focused. This implies that the Central Asian elites, having retained 
control over energy production and transportation industries, try to take maximum benefits out of 
them while remaining in power. The Central Asian elites and their political clients collect rents 
and extract private benefits from mismanaging the energy sector. The problem of energy sector 
accountability and transparency affects equal distribution of oil/gas funds, prioritizing energy 
security concerns of the population and economies of the Central Asian countries as well as the 
development of non-conventional energy sectors from which elites cannot extract immediate 
benefits. 
 There are, in fact, many examples of rent-seeking that plague the Central Asian energy 
sectors, including: the “Kazakhgate” scandal over the secret account in a Swiss bank on payment 
made for oil contract;190 Bakiyev’s energy sector reform as a result of which the electric power 
sector of Kyrgyzstan was partially privatized and exported, pocketed by the ruling regime even                                                         
190 “Kazakhstan – an End to ‘Kazakhgate’,” OSW Center for Eastern Studies, August 18, 2010, accessed April 15, 
2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-08-18/kazakhstan-end-to-kazakhgate. 
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at the expense of creating serious domestic blackouts;191 nationwide obligatory collection of 
money to build the Rogun dam in Tajikistan with insignificant final result;192 the scandal around 
the Zeromax conglomerate in Uzbekistan for the control of resources by the government against 
certain elite groups;193 and the problem of lack of transparency in regards to the “stabilization 
fund” of Turkmenistan.194  
 Even though there are many signs indicating that short-term sufficiency of resources and 
long-term sustainability of energy supplies are highly dependent on reforming the energy 
governing system, Central Asian elites profit from the current energy sector management 
schemes established in their respective countries and thus, refrain from raising the issue of 
energy sector accountability and transparency to the state policy level. Without doubt elites 
benefit from natural endowment rents and perhaps only care about maximizing short-term 
profits. Since the subsidized domestic energy markets are rather burdens for the Central Asian 
governments than a source of income, it is not surprising that they are actively looking for the 
possibilities to earn hard currency by increasing energy exports to as many external markets as 
possible. Intra-Central Asian energy trade, which can contribute to the sufficiency and 
sustainability of energy supplies, however, does not conflict with either availability of energy for 
domestic consumption or to meet external demand. First, the volume of energy traded within the 
Central Asian region is insignificant compared to the level of domestic consumption and external 
demand. So the intra-regional energy trade does not affect revenues from selling energy to 
external customers or availability of energy for local consumers. Second, intra-Central Asian gas                                                         
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and electricity trade is no longer subsidized and may be considered as a source of income for the 
regional producers. Initiatives to establish economic regionalism, argues Kathleen Collins, fail 
because it implies liberalization of Central Asian countries’ economies, which can directly affect 
personalities rule and patronage systems, and Central Asian leaders try to block such 
initiatives.195 Energy trade within the region, however, does not necessarily imply liberalization 
of the Central Asian energy sectors, but the release of information required to ensure coordinated 
operation of gas pipeline networks and electric power grids. Thus, I tend to believe that the lack 
of energy trade within the CAES is not just a mindset problem of elites coupled with a series of 
internal governance problems, but also a coordination problem, which sometimes downplays 
domestic obstacles.  
Governments’ Position Toward Regional Energy Cooperation  
 The analysis of the Central Asian states’ energy policy priorities illustrates that intra-
Central Asian energy cooperation is no longer a priority. Uzbekistan considers itself capable of 
entirely meeting its electricity as well as gas/fuel needs. Within the framework of its National 
Development Programs, Uzbekistan prioritizes “stability”—a status quo in energy and water 
consumption.196 Any project that brings major changes to the status quo is considered to be 
compromising stability and, thus, unacceptable. The Uzbek government’s inflexible position 
regarding construction of the Rogun and Kambarata–1 is a clear example of its static 
energy/water policy. Despite the fact that the lack of intraregional energy cooperation is to some 
extent negatively affecting the energy security of Uzbekistan, it continues to avoid the resolution 
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of water-energy nexus problems in Central Asia, because the current water distribution, in which 
Uzbekistan enjoys over 50 percent of water withdrawal, the amount necessary to cultivate high 
quantities of water-intensive cotton and wheat, perfectly suits its interests.197 Uzbekistan warns 
to use actions, including force, against any serious interference with the current level of water 
withdrawal in the region.198 Geographical location and inherited energy infrastructure turned 
Uzbekistan into an extremely important actor, without which any initiative to improve Central 
Asian energy cooperation will most likely fail. Over the last years, however, Uzbekistan has 
been using its infrastructural as well as geographical advantage for purposes other than to 
improve the energy security of the country and the region as a whole.   
 There are still some prospects for the security of the CAES through increasing intra-
Central Asian energy cooperation. Prolonged energy supply cuts forced Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan to accelerate the process of establishing independent energy systems and, thus, 
decrease Uzbekistan’s energy leverage over them. 199  So keeping a certain level of energy 
exchange serves Uzbekistan’s strategic interests. Kazakhstan is also in the process of 
establishing independent energy system, but it can still benefit from exchanging energy resources 
with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as well as from its important gas transit status. More than 90 
percent of Turkmen gas has to pass through the territory of the Central Asian countries; 
therefore, the stability and security of the region is in Turkmenistan’s direct interest. Overall, 
cheap and clean electricity imported from upstream countries would allow Central Asian 
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downstream countries to efficiently use coal- and gas-fired TPP as well as contribute to the 
sustainability of their energy sectors. 
 Small HPPs and a countrywide electric power transmission network will not solve the 
problem of electricity shortages in wintertime in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Development of oil 
and gas fields in these countries is too costly due to difficulty of extraction and transportation of 
these resources. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, which may rely on Kazakhstan to ensure limited winter 
electricity supplies and Russia to import Uzbek gas, Tajikistan has no state actor in the region to 
entrust in assisting in energy crisis mitigation. President of Tajikistan, Imomali Rahmon, often 
highlights the Tajik position in regards to regional cooperation, arguing that “it [Tajikistan] will 
always adhere to the principles of friendship, mutual respect and trust, good will and beneficial 
and constructive collaboration.”200 In fact, leaders of the Central Asian states often talk about 
historical friendship, but such claims rarely result in regional projects especially in the 
strategically important energy sector. Tajikistan can clearly benefit from the intra-Central Asian 
cooperation in the energy sector, but the Tajik government does not possess the power to either 
force or encourage neighbouring Uzbekistan to reinstate gas and electricity trade and 
cooperation. Surplus of electricity generation in summer (3–5 billion kWh annually) and 
electricity shortage in winter (2.5 billion kWh annually) provides some prospects for mutually 
beneficial electricity trade in the region.201 Unable to export extra produced electricity in summer 
to neighbouring Uzbekistan, Tajik authorities, with the support of some international actors such 
as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, wish to redirect this electricity to South 
Asian countries. However, the Central Asia–South Asia Regional Electricity Trade Project 
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(CASA–1000), a project designed to move electricity from Central Asia to South Asia, will not 
solve the energy security problems of the Central Asian upstream states because it is designed to 
move electricity out of the region. The following chapter identifies the main challenges 
preventing Central Asian states from engaging in a greater level of energy sector cooperation to 
ensure security of the CAES.  
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CHAPTER III. Security of the Central Asian Energy (Gas and Electric Power) System 
 Central Asia is one of the regions in the world that enjoys an abundance of energy 
resources. There is also a demand for Central Asian energy both within the region and by 
external customers such as Russia, China, Europe and potentially India. Due to relatively limited 
production capacity, inefficient energy sectors, and the necessity to meet domestic needs, Central 
Asian producers may experience difficulties to entirely meet growing demand by those 
customers. The temptation of revenues coming from exporting large quantities of energy to 
external markets and binding obligations to supply agreed amounts of resources force Central 
Asian producers to increase export capacity, even at the expense of domestic and intraregional 
energy consumption. 
 The resource-sharing mechanism ensured reliable and stable energy supplies during the 
Soviet era and right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The mechanism was quite 
simple: the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ensured a continuous flow of water 
and a certain amount of electricity during the summer to the downstream countries, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which channelled thermal electricity, gas, and light oil products 
to them in return. 1 The CAES, which operated within the resource-sharing mechanism and 
ensured sufficiency of energy supplies simultaneously to all five countries, mainly consisted of 
the Central Asian gas pipeline system and the Central Asian electric power grids. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet-era supranational energy sector management system also 
broke down into smaller units. Central Asian energy sectors, which were initially designed to 
function within its own unified system, continued to operate by inertia in coordination with each 
other by retaining high level of interdependence. However, the level of interdependence has been                                                         
1 Murodbek Laldjebaev, “The Water–Energy Puzzle in Central Asia: The Tajikistan Perspective,” International 
Journal of Water Resources Development 26, no. 1 (2010): 24, doi:10.1080/07900620903391812.  
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gradually decreasing since then. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, introducing a 
pricing policy for the oil and gas trade while simultaneously sharing water resources and 
increasing and diversifying exports to external markets all put strains on the mechanism, 
particularly in a context of rising prices. The Almaty Agreement of 1992 was supposed to keep 
the mechanism functioning “until the states could reach a solution amenable to all parties.”2 
Fundamental disagreement between the region’s demand for water for irrigation and the use of 
water to generate electricity, along with disputes over the price for fossil fuels and many other 
factors have led to a conflict between upstream and downstream countries. While both coal and 
oil are important sources of energy for the Central Asian countries, this research is focused on 
gas pipeline networks and electric power grids that bind regional states and create an element of 
high interdependence. While oil sector is largely determined by the global market rules and coal 
is locally traded energy commodity in the region, it is the natural gas and electricity trade that 
mostly drive regional dynamics in the energy sector in Central Asia. 
 Central Asia is not the only region where non-cooperative dynamics between states in the 
energy sector impact the availability of sufficient and stable energy supplies. What distinguishes 
this region from the rest of the world, however, is the fact that, initially, Central Asian countries’ 
energy sectors were designed to operate within a unified energy system. Interdependence of 
energy sectors implies that energy security challenges, which go beyond the scope of one state, 
require coordinated actions to be taken by all parties involved. However, intra-Central Asian 
energy trade within the framework of the resource-sharing mechanism that ensured stability of 
energy supplies in the region is being compromised by producers’ desire to increase export 
capacity to external markets at the expense of intraregional consumption: trade between Central                                                         
2 Ariel Dinar et al., Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and 
Cooperation (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2007), 294. 
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Asian oil and natural gas exporters and external energy importers (Russia, China, Iran, indirectly 
Europe, and potentially Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India); and hydro-power export from mainly 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and possibly Kyrgyzstan to South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and 
potentially to China and India. 
 The security of the CAES, within which Central Asian states are highly dependent on 
intraregional gas pipeline networks and electric power grids, is complicated both by the region’s 
landlocked status and the fact that Central Asia is surrounded by larger powers, such as China, 
Russia, India, and Europe, which often compete for the region’s resources.3 These powers are 
currently avoiding major confrontation and relatively peacefully co-existing in Central Asia by 
largely pursuing distinct (non-competing) strategic interests (political influence for Russia, 
energy interest and stability in Xinjiang for China, partnership within a number of areas, 
including human security, good governance, etc. for Europe).4 However, perhaps to a different 
extent at the moment, they all are interested in Central Asian energy resources. And, it is not the 
consequences of competing interests of these powers for their own energy sectors, economies 
and geopolitical gains that this research is concerned about. It is rather the impact of bigger 
powers’ competing energy interests on the availability of sufficient energy resources for 
domestic and intra-Central Asian consumption that is placed in the center of this particular 
research. And there are already signs that diversified energy markets, which significantly 
increase the demand for the region’s resources, affect and will continue to threaten sufficiency of 
energy supplies for internal and intraregional needs. 
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 The landlocked geographical location not only limits Central Asian states’ access to 
global energy markets, but also makes pipeline networks the only economically efficient way to 
transport oil and gas from Central Asia. Building pipelines requires significant upfront 
investments that Central Asian producers, due to their limited financial capabilities, cannot 
afford to cover. The same applies to the construction of large HPPs and electricity transmission 
lines connecting Central Asian producers and external customers. Taking loans forces regional 
producers to agree upon the distribution of control over resources, which often does not serve 
their best interest. Due to asymmetrical interdependence among actors and strategic interest that 
states input in their energy export/import relations, energy has sometimes been used for purposes 
other than to ensure energy security, causing supply disruptions in Central Asia, especially when 
it is needed the most (during the winter period).  
Security of the Central Asian Gas System   
 Possessing reserves of approximately 20 trillion m3 of natural gas, 5  Central Asia is 
becoming increasingly attractive to energy-thirsty larger powers surrounding the region. While 
gas importers address the need to ensure steady imports of gas and the security of gas supplies, 
Central Asian exporters aim to secure their ability to constantly export it to obtain a steady 
income. 
 The Central Asian countries can roughly be divided into net consumers (Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan) and net producers (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The CAES during 
the Soviet period was constructed in such a way that the stability and reliability of gas supplies 
were maintained through a resource-sharing mechanism. Although there is still a demand for gas                                                         
5 British Petroleum Company, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015 (London: British Petroleum Co., 
2015), accessed June 25, 2015, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-
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by the consumer countries, relatively recently emerged geopolitical and economic realities have 
challenged the effectiveness of this exchange mechanism. 
 Almost complete dependence on Russian pipeline network in exporting natural gas put 
Central Asian states in a very vulnerable position (low prices for oil and gas, economic 
dependence, political pressure, etc.). Thus, diversification of such dependence by building 
alternative pipeline networks promoted by regional and global gas customers was highly 
supported by Central Asian exporters. Projects to move gas to Europe avoiding Russia, 
increasing the capacity of the gas pipeline network to Iran and a TAPI project hypothetically 
significantly redrew regional energy map. However, so far only China succeeded to significantly 
challenge Russian monopoly on Central Asian gas import by constructing the longest gas 
pipeline in the world from Turkmenistan to China through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and oil 
pipeline from Kazakhstan to China.  
 Having experienced the negative impacts of excessive dependence on Russian pipelines, 
Central Asian exporters are now pursuing the diversification of gas export routes to obtain access 
to various gas markets while avoiding Russian territory. However, pipelines are the only cost- 
efficient way to transport gas from this land-locked region, and Central Asia is surrounded by 
larger powers (Russia, China, Europe, and India) that often compete for region’s resources. Thus, 
particular consideration is required when pursuing the diversification of gas export routes. Since 
the Central Asian region is considered to be a source of energy for external customers, desire to 
increase the volume of imported gas may and is affecting availability of this particular type of 
resource for domestic and intra-regional consumption. From the energy security perspective 
external customers are those juicy hares that Central Asian countries chose to go after sacrificing 
the possibility to hunt a stag—a stable functioning of the CAES.  
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 This section discusses factors that may threaten and that are already affecting security of 
gas supplies for the Central Asian countries, such as asymmetrically interdependent supply 
relations among state actors within the CAES, in which these actors interact and affect each 
other’s security; insufficient volume of natural gas production to meet external demand without 
compromising internal consumption needs and gas exports to the neighbouring consumer 
countries. 
Diversification of Central Asian Gas Exports 
 To secure reliable gas supplies regional exporters are attempting to establish symmetrical 
interdependent relations with major customers so that there is less incentive on either side to 
cause gas supply disruptions. Brenda Shaffer argues that energy security is provided when 
suppliers and consumers are interdependent in gas supply relations. The extent to which each 
side possesses alternative supply or market options, including transport infrastructure, determines 
the extent of interdependence in gas relations.6 On the one hand, the diversification of gas export 
routes ensures alternative ways of transporting it for energy consumers, which decreases the 
impact of technical failures or gas supply disruptions by either exporters or transit countries. On 
the other hand, diversification provides alternative energy markets for producers, which 
increases exporting countries’ bargaining power so that they can sell gas at the highest possible 
price.7 In addition to the existing Turkmenistan-Iran gas pipelines, the newly constructed CAGP 
that runs from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China decreased regional 
gas exporters’ dependence on Russia. However, even though Central Asian exporters are now 
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less vulnerable to unilateral disruptions of gas imports by Russia, they fall into the same trap by 
turning highly dependent on China. 
 There is clearly a demand for the region’s gas resources, both within the region and by 
external customers. Taking into account the fact that Central Asia (mainly Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) possesses significant reserves, providing sufficient gas for both 
economic and population needs should not be a problem. However, despite considerable 
reserves, the overall gas supply-demand relations are far from being stable and reliable within 
the CAES. 
 Although, hypothetically, the diversification of gas transporting routes benefits both 
exporters and importers, many factors determine the success of such diversification: 
• geography (the distance between exporting and importing countries; 
security/vulnerability of transport routes), 
• political relations among energy actors, 
• availability of sufficient energy resources to meet energy demand and transport 
• infrastructure, 
• policy (commitment to implement), 
• resources (capacity and willingness to pay the price to secure access to alternative 
energy).8 
 Central Asian gas exporters’ desire to further diversify export routes is understandable. 
However, policy makers must consider particular characteristics of the region and natural gas 
supply deals when pursuing the further diversification of export routes because supplying gas to 
alternative markets may not necessarily contribute to overall security within the CAES.                                                         
8 Vlado Vivoda, “Diversification of Oil Import Sources and Energy Security: A Key Strategy or an Elusive 
Objective?” Energy Policy 37 (2009): 4620, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.06.007. 
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 For a landlocked region such as Central Asia, cross-border pipelines are the only cost- 
efficient way to export gas. The construction of such pipelines requires significant investments 
from both the producer and customer sides. Because new international gas pipelines need to 
operate for at least fifteen to twenty years before investments can be recouped, natural gas is 
often traded within the framework of long-term supply contracts.9 These characteristics of the 
gas trade and the fact that the region is surrounded by major powers that often compete for 
energy resources establish a particular type of gas supply relations in which actors might be 
willing to use various political, economic, and military tools to force Central Asian exporting 
countries to fulfill their obligations at any cost. Although there have been partially successful 
efforts to diversify away from Russia and possibly obtain higher prices for the exported gas, this 
strategy is constrained by a lack of production capacity and the conflict between export desire 
and regional consumption needs. 
The Monopoly of the Russian Pipeline System 
 In an attempt to decrease its dependence on Russia’s pipeline network, some former 
Soviet republics adopted a “two-track” or “offend no one” foreign policy strategy. For instance, 
Azerbaijan could not afford to offend Russia but wanted to export its oil to the US and Europe. 
Thus, Azerbaijan opted for two export routes, one through Russia and another through Georgia. 
When the Russian route was closed due to the war in Chechnya in 1999, the two-track strategy 
proved to be very useful because Azerbaijan could still use the pipeline to Georgia.10 However, 
Central Asian energy producers did not or could not adopt a “two-track” strategy and remained 
significantly dependent on the Russian pipeline system for a long time.                                                           
9 Shaffer, Energy Politics, 38. 
10 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: Penguin Press, 
2011), 58. 
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 There are two critical conditions that have always determined gas supply relations 
between Central Asian exporters and Russia: (a) Russia needs Central Asian gas to fulfill its 
commitments to the European customers; (b) Central Asian exporters used to be almost 
completely dependent on Russian pipeline infrastructure to move their resources to external 
markets. The Russian government effectively used Central Asian exporters’ dependence on 
Russian pipelines to promote its economic and political interests. Central Asian gas producers 
had to sell their resources to Moscow, which partially re-exported that gas to Europe at two and 
sometimes three times the purchase price and also supplied its southern regions with the gas. 
Prior to the 2000s, the price paid by Russia for natural gas not only did not correspond to the 
market value of the gas, but was also often in the form of barter.  
 Turkmenistan has always been a major supplier of gas to and through Russia. While 
Turkmenistan produced 86 billion m3 in 1990, it consumed only 8 billion m3 and exported the 
rest to Russia and other former Soviet countries. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
the demand for Turkmen gas started decreasing. Disagreements between Russian Gazprom and 
Turkmenistan in 1994 resulted in gas export disruption of Turkmen gas to Europe, because 
Russia no longer allowed Turkmen gas to flow through its pipelines. Russian representatives’ 
visited Ashgabat in 1998 to resolve the tensions but failed to achieve any positive outcomes. 
Turkmenistan due to large debts by Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia also stopped exporting gas to 
these countries in 1997. As a result, gas production in Turkmenistan dropped to the level of only 
17 billion m3 in 1997. Revenues from exporting gas accounted for two-thirds of GDP in the mid-
1990s and thus gas export cuts seriously hit the budget and the overall economy.11  
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 Turkmenistan cut gas export to Ukraine due to a debt of US$700 million in 1997. By the 
end of 1997 US$185 million was paid off and two countries signed new agreement according to 
which Turkmenistan was supposed to supply up to 20 billion m3 up until 2005. It was agreed that 
Turkmenistan would receive 40 percent of payment in hard currency and 60 percent in goods and 
services.12 Turkmenistan delivered 20 billion m3 of gas to Russia in 2000, which was paid in 
hard currency (40 percent) at the price of US$36 and in food and commodities (60 percent). 
Turkmen side, however, was unhappy about the price for gas. During negotiations on gas supply 
to Russia, President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov insisted on gas price of US$42–45 per 
1000 m3, but Russia considered it too high and proposed the price of US$36 per 1000 m3, to 
what he stated: “let's calculate: You sell gas to Europe for US$85 per 1000 m3 and you want to 
buy from us for US$36.”13  
 In end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s there were no long-term gas contracts and 
Russia purchased very small amount of Turkmen gas on an annual and semiannual basis. All 
attempts by the Russian side to draw Turkmenistan into a Russian-led alliance of gas exporting 
countries failed, because Niyazov refused to join any alliance unless Russia allowed 
Turkmenistan to export gas to Europe using Russia as a transit country only. To loosen up the 
tensions, Russia instead allowed Turkmenistan to supply gas to Ukraine. In May 2001 
Turkmenistan signed another agreement with Ukraine to export around 250 billion m3 of gas in 
2002–2006 with the payment of 50 percent in hard currency and remaining 50 percent in goods, 
services and investments. Russia, in its turn, benefited even from such trading arrangements as: 
a) it received transit fees; b) filling up Ukrainian market with Turkmen gas allowed Russia to 
                                                        
12 Ian Jeffries, The Countries of the Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century. The Baltic and European 
States in Transition (London: Routledge, 2004), 583. 
13 Marat Gurt, “Turkmenistan Stifles U.S. Gas Plans,” The Moscow Times, June 3, 2000, accessed May 15, 2014, 
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increase export of its own gas to Europe at much higher price; c) Russia reduced gas export to 
Ukraine, which had a reputation for falling behind in its payments.14 
 Since 2006, gas trade relations between Russia and Central Asian producers have taken 
the form of cash payments only. Discriminatory pricing, however, remained part of the Russian 
energy policy toward Central Asian producers. Russia purchased Turkmen gas at the price of 
US$60 per 1,000 m3 in 2006. During the last quarter of 2006, the price rose to US$100 per 1,000 
m3, and it increased to US$150 per 1,000 m3 in the second half of 2008.15 However, when 
Gazprom bought Turkmen gas for less than US$100 per 1,000 m3 in 2006, it resold that gas 
through RosUkrEnergy to Europe for US$250 per 1,000 m3.16 The inability to sell its resources 
directly to Europe was one of the reasons Turkmenistan and other gas exporters agreed to these 
terms.  
 In an attempt to block projects that could challenge its almost complete monopoly over 
the region’s gas exports, Russia agreed to pay a higher price for Central Asian natural gas. 
Russia signed an agreement with Turkmenistan in 2008, according to which Russia was 
obligated to purchase Turkmen gas in the amount of 70–80 billion m3 per year for the European 
price of US$350 per 1,000 m3.17 At that time the largest gas pipeline network—Central Asia 
Center (CAC)—with the capacity of up to 50 billion m3 was supposed to carry this gas to 
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Russia.18 To increase the capacity of the CAC Russia was planning to build Pre-Caspian pipeline 
with the capacity of 20 billion m3.19 
 Due to the Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in 2009 and the economic recession, the European 
price for natural gas fell to US$280 per 1,000 m3, which meant that Russia would lose from re-
exports or swaps of the Central Asian gas to Europe according to the most recent agreement. 
Thus, Russia effectively used an explosion that occurred on the CAC as an excuse to cut gas 
imports from the region. Consequently, Turkmenistan experienced significant economic losses, 
which accounted for US$1 billion every month during the period of cut-off.20 Turkmen Foreign 
Ministry blamed the Russian side for the explosion by highlighting that “this accident was 
caused by a gross unilateral violation by Gazpromexport of the norms and rules of the natural gas 
sales agreement.”21 Anderi Grozin, director of the Central Asia Department at the CIS Institute 
in Moscow, stressed the seriousness of the nine months of gas export disruption by arguing that 
Turkmenistan owed its financial survival to a Chinese loan of 2 billion Euros.22 
 As a result, export of Turkmen gas to Russia has been declining since 2009. Russia 
imported 42.6 billion m3 of Turkmen gas in 2007, 11.8 billion m3 in 2009, 10.95 billion m3 in 
201323 and only 10 billion m3 in 2014. Moreover, Turkmenistan is expecting to reduce the 
                                                        
18 International Energy Agency, Optimizing Russian Natural Gas. Reform and Climate Policy, (Paris: International 
Energy Agency, 2006), http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/russiangas2006.pdf. 
19 Vladimir Socor, “Russia Resuming Gas Imports From Turkmenistan on a Small Scale,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, 
no. 1 (January 2010), 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35866&no_cache=1#.VaVAecZViko. 
20 “Central Asia Considers Alternatives to Gazprom for Exporting Gas. Will Silk Road Producers Actually Prefer 
Europe to Russia?” Central Asian Online, November 18, 2011, accessed June 5, 2013, 
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2011/11/18/feature-01?change_locale=true. 
21 John C.K. Daly, “Pipeline Explosion Reseals Turkmenistan–Gazprom Rift,” United Press International, April 13, 
2009, accessed May 15, 2014 http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2009/04/13/Pipeline-explosion-
reveals-Turkmenistan-Gazprom-rift/16101239666679/. 
22 Deirdre Tynan, “Gas Flows Again To Russia,” While Discontent Simmers, 2010, accessed March 4, 2014, 
http://www.gundogar.org/?0220048966000000000000011000000. 
23 “Gas Purchases,” Gazprom official website, n.d., accessed June 1, 2015, 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/central-asia/. 
 131 
amount of gas export to 4.5 billion m3 in 2015.24 In light of declining gas export to Russia, 
Turkmenistan has also accused Gazprom for delaying with payment for its gas, in response to 
which Gazprom filed a case in international arbitration court in Stockholm. A spokesman for the 
Gazprom said: “a lawsuit has been filed in Stockholm. The demand—a revision of prices.”25 
This whole situation may represent the declining Russian influence over the Turkmen gas sector. 
And the fact that most of the Turkmen gas is now heading toward Chinese direction implies that 
Russia has clearly lost its monopolist position over the transportation of gas to external markets. 
However, it is worth mentioning that this whole situation perfectly suits Russian interests as 
well. And Russia may use its political and economic leverage to force/encourage Turkmen 
suppliers to move gas to and through Russia when sending gas toward Northern direction turns 
beneficial for both Russia and Turkmenistan. For instance, Russia may tempt Turkmenistan to 
restore its gas supply to and through Russia in large quantities by allowing them to directly sign 
gas contracts with the European customers, which still pay the highest price for gas in the region. 
 Russia–Ukraine gas crisis and economic recession have also affected the volume of 
Uzbek gas export to Russia. While Uzbekistan supplied 9.6 billion m3 in 2007 and 15.4 billion 
m3 in 2009, the volume of export decreased to 8.7 billion m3 in 2012 and only 5.6 billion m3 in 
2013.26 It is expected that the export of Uzbek gas to Russia will drop to 1 billion m3 in 2015.27 
The volume of Kazakh gas exports to Russia has not undergone significant changes. The volume 
of Kazakh gas export to Russian accounted for 8.5 billion m3 in 2007, 10.1 billion m3 in 2009 
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and 11.87 billion m3 in 2013.28 Differently from Uzbek and Turkmen gas, Kazakhstan exports 
gas to Russia to be processed and returned back to the Kazakh market. Currently, Kazakhstan, 
due to increasing demand for gas and lack of pipeline infrastructure, is even importing gas via 
Bukhara–Ural gas pipeline, which was used to transport Uzbek gas to Russia and is now 
operated in reverse direction.29 
 Russian monopoly over the gas exports from the region was challenged by the 
construction of Chinese pipeline networks. The current state of gas export–import relations in the 
region seems to perfectly meet all actors’ interests. By reducing gas exports to Russia Central 
Asian producers are increasing the volume of export toward Chinese direction. Ongoing 
dialogues between regional exporters and potential European and South Asian natural gas 
importers, however, show that the goal pursued by exporters is not merely to diversify their 
dependence on Russia, but also to obtain access to as many energy markets as possible. 
However, the realization of the ongoing and planned pipeline projects is likely to negatively 
impact availability of sufficient supply of gas in Central Asia.  
The Pitfalls of Natural Gas Export Diversification 
 With all of the existing gas transportation projects upgraded and planned ones 
constructed, there is doubt that the Central Asian producers will be able to meet their supply 
obligations and to sensibly use the additional transport capacities. Russia remains an important 
customer of the regional gas via the CAC gas pipeline network, with the capacity to transport 45 
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billion m3 per year and, if upgraded, 90 billion m3 per year.30 Russia has also been interested in 
the construction of the Pre-Caspian pipeline (from Turkmenistan via Kazakhstan to Russia) to 
significantly increase the overall capacity of the CAC.31 While current Russia–Ukraine crisis and 
economic sanctions against Russia is negatively affecting Central Asia–Russia gas trade Russian 
government might want to restore the volume of gas import when the conflict is over. 
Turkmenistan has planned to increase its gas supply to Iran from 6–8 billion m3 via Korpedzhe–
Kurt–Kai pipeline32 built in 1997 to 20 billion m3 per year by fully operating new Dauletabad–
Sarakhs–Khangiran pipeline constructed in 2010. 33  While Turkmenistan is capable of 
transporting 20 billion m3 to Iran the volume of transported gas never reached its full capacity. In 
2014, Turkmenistan exported only 9 billion m3 of gas. 34  In an environment of economic 
blockade, Iran is also undergoing a major gas expansion program, which will make it possible to 
meet gas needs of Northern Iran on its own.35 But, the Iranian direction was the first successful 
attempt to diversify Turkmenistan’s complete dependence on Russia. Turkmenistan exported gas 
to Iran when the Russian demand was decreasing. And, now by limiting the volume of gas export 
to Iran, Turkmen authorities will be able to increase gas export capacity to China. The Iranian 
direction has always played an important role in Turkmenistan’s foreign energy policy. Besides 
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direct exports of gas, Turkmenistan might also be interested in extending the volume of swap-
based gas supply arrangements with Iran to export resources to external markets. 
  Among the major planned pipeline projects, the TAPI pipeline, with a capacity of 33 
billion m3 per year,36 and the Trans–Caspian project, with a capacity up to 30 billion m3 per 
year,37 stand out. President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov during his speech 
at the VI International Gas Congress on May 19, 2015 highlighted that he truly believes in the 
successful implementation of the TAPI project. 38  The idea to build the TAPI pipeline first 
emerged in the middle of 1990s. However, no progress has been achieved so far. The economic 
viability of the project and security challenges in Afghanistan are considered the biggest 
challenges along the way toward promoting the TAPI project. While the Asian Development 
Bank has carried out feasibility study of the project and found it economically viable and showed 
even the willingness to financially support the construction of the TAPI pipeline,39 no party has 
taken a responsibility to cover or significantly contribute to the construction of the pipeline with 
the total cost of US$7.6–10 billion.40 
 The EU has always been interested in getting access to the Central Asian gas reserves 
avoiding the Russian territory. A 300–killomenters long pipeline is designed to move Turkmen 
gas beneath the Caspian Sea and connect it to the Trans–Anatolian pipeline to supply gas 
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through Azerbaijan and Turkey to Europe.41 The leaders of Turkmenistan, on the one hand, and 
Turkey/European states, on the other, reached a framework agreement according to which 
Turkmenistan was to supply 16 billion m3 to Turkey and 14 billion m3 to Europe via the Trans–
Caspian gas pipeline. However, the customers wanted to pay for gas only when it reached 
Turkish border, while Turkmenistan did not want to take responsibility for the transit of its gas 
through Azerbaijan and Georgia and refused to sign up under the detailed construction proposal 
in 2000. A new Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov revived the interest in the 
Trans–Caspian pipeline. Only this time, no one had to worry about Azerbaijan, as the Deputy 
Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan said, “if the project is implemented, Azerbaijan will take part 
with great pleasure.”42  
 Maros Sefcovic, EU Energy Commissioner, has visited Turkmenistan in May 2015 to 
give new impetus to the negotiations over the Trans–Caspian gas pipeline. Moreover, mass 
media reported quoting him that “Europe expects supplies of Turkmen gas to begin by 2019.”43 
The Trans–Caspian pipeline is part of a bigger pipeline network to move Azeri gas to Turkey and 
Europe. And the Trans–Anatolian pipeline is already under construction. Technologically, laying 
down the pipeline beneath the Caspian Sea is no longer a serious obstacle either. There are, 
however, several challenges that can further postpone the construction of the pipeline. Turkmen 
gas will not entirely replace Russian gas to Europe, since Europe currently imports around 150 
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billion m3 of Russian gas, which accounts for about 30 percent of its total annual gas imports.44 
However, Turkmen gas will be an important source to decrease the extent of Europe’s 
dependence on the Russia gas and cost Russia both money and political leverage. As a result, 
Russia could easily use undetermined legal status of the Caspian Sea not to let Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan proceed with the construction without the consent of all littoral states. 45 
Turkmenistan is currently trying to keep up with Chinese demand for gas and the European 
customers will most likely be pulled into a competition for the region’s resources. 
 However, even without the TAPI and the Trans–Caspian pipelines, existing gas trading 
arrangements may still result in a mismatch between a region’s production capacity (without 
compromising regional consumption needs) and external demand for Central Asian gas. The 
reason for that is rapidly growing Chinese demand and Central Asian producers’ obligation to 
supply over 80 billion m3 of gas to China. Talks between Chinese and Turkmen leaders on the 
possibility to move Turkmen gas to China started in 2006 and already in 2009 resulted in the 
construction of the first line of the Central Asia–China gas pipeline. Turkmenistan was initially 
obliged to export annually 30 billion m3 of gas to China according to the agreement signed in 
2006. However, the new agreement that was signed two years later increased the volume to 40 
billion m3 per year by 2015. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s summit in Beijing 
in June 2012, the countries’ presidents, Hu Jintao and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, agreed to 
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increase the amount of gas exports even further, to 65 billion m3 per year.46 China will be 
receiving an additional 10 billion m3 per year from Uzbekistan according to the agreement 
signed in 2010. 47  China has already turned into the largest importer of Turkmen gas. 
Turkmenistan exported 45.1 billion m3 in 2014, out of which 35 billion m3 went to China.48 
Uzbekistan is expecting to deliver 10 billion m3 of gas to China in 2015 against 6 billion m3 in 
2013.49 Kazakhstan is planning to supply gas to China when the second phase of the Beineu–
Bozoy–Shymkent pipeline, which connects Kazakh gas fields with Line–C, is put on line.50  
 In fact, there are already signs that it would be quite challenging for some regional gas 
exporters to increase their export capacity. For instance, outdated and inefficient natural gas 
transportation systems, growing internal demand, and the fact that no major natural gas reserves 
have recently been explored are indications of Uzbekistan’s physical incapability to increase its 
exports. The fact that Uzbekistan had to cut its gas export to Russia for 40 days to meet its 
internal needs in 201251 and that it supplied less than the agreed amount of gas to Tajikistan (132 
million m3 instead of 155 million m3 of gas)52 in 2012 and completely stopped gas export since 
2013 can be considered signs that Uzbekistan will face challenges in supplying annually 
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approximately 15 billion m3 of gas to Russia,53 10 billion m3 to China, and 4.5 billion m3 within 
the Tashkent–Shymkent–Bishkek–Almaty pipeline system.54 The volume of Uzbek gas export to 
Russia is expected to decline to 1 billion m3 in 2015.55 Given the fact that there has been no 
natural gas production boom in Central Asia and the region’s gas export capacity remains at 
approximately 65–70 billion m3 per year, even Turkmenistan, with its massive gas reserves, may 
face technical, economic, and security challenges to keep up with external demand. By reducing 
gas exports in almost all other directions only, Turkmenistan is currently able to gradually 
increase the volume of its gas supply to China. It is also not clear to what extent Kazakh 
authorities would prioritize ensuring sufficiency on its own gas market (southern and south-
eastern regions) over the increasing export capacity to China. 
Competing Energy Markets 
 Having experienced the negative consequences of excessive dependence on the Russian 
pipelines, Central Asian exporters started pursuing diversification of gas export routes to obtain 
access to various energy markets. However, the Central Asian region is considered to be a source 
of gas for external customers. Thus, increasing the volume of gas exports may have a reverse 
affect on availability of gas for domestic and intraregional consumption.  
 Energy actors promote regional cooperation through six priority gas corridors. Taking 
into account limited gas production capacity, however, regional gas trade within one corridor 
                                                        
53 Farkhad Sharip, “Uzbekistan’s Quest for Aral Sea Oil May Weaken Kazakhstan’s Position in the 
Caspian,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 23 (2012), accessed June 1, 2014, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38962. 
54 US EIA, Kazakhstan—Analysis (Washington, DC: US EIA, n.d), accessed March 20, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=KZ. 
55 Sevinj Mamadova, “Changing Market Dynamics In Central Asia: Declining Russian Interests And Emerging 




may negatively impact availability of resources for trade within another. Gas export capacity of 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the external markets does not currently exceed 65–
70 billion m3 per year. Even though the Central Asian producers are not supplying gas in all five 
directions and some corridors (to South Asia and Europe avoiding Russia) due to financial, 
geopolitical and security reasons have low probability of near future realization, there are already 
signs that regional exporters may not be able to keep up with growing demand within already 
connected corridors (Russian and Chinese directions and intra-Central Asian cooperation): 
• Central Asia–East Asia (CAGP: over 80 billion m3 per year) 
• Central Asia–South Asia (TAPI project: 33 billion m3 per year) 
• Intra-Central Asia Cooperation (up to 6 billion m3 per year) 
• Central Asia–Russian Federation (CAC: up to 50 billion m3 per year) 
• Central Asia–European Union (Trans–Caspian Pipeline: around 30 billion m3 per year) 
• Turkmenistan–Iran (up to 20 billion m3 per year). 
 Simple interest in importing Central Asia gas does not turn exiting and potential 
customers into direct competitors. Certain conditions, however, upon which gas supply relations 
over the Central Asian gas are being developed imply the possibility for a more active 
competition. Once the expensive pipelines are put in place, in the construction of which 
(potential) consumers cover significant share of the cost, importers will make sure that the 
pipeline operates in its full capacity, to first return their investments and then profit from the 
export/import relations. Over time consumers’ economies will turn dependent on this imported 
gas, which will further increase customer’s interest in obtaining resources.  
 The current situation with the Central Asian gas export is tricky, which instigates regional 
producers, especially Turkmenistan, to look for alternative markets. Gas export diversification-
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oriented energy policy, however, may overshadow the consequences of it for the energy security 
of the exporting states and security of the CAES in general. European sanctions against Russia 
and tensions between Central Asian upstream and downstream countries have led to the 
decreasing gas trade volume within the Russian and intra-Central Asian corridors. According to 
the gas contract signed between Turkmenistan and Russia in 2003, the former was supposed to 
supply up to 70–80 billion m3 annually via CAC pipeline. However, the amount of gas export in 
the Russian direction decreased to 10 billion m3 in 2014.56 Uzbekistan decreased the volume of 
gas supply to Kyrgyzstan from 800 million m3 in 2000 to 280 million m3 in 2013.57 Tajikistan is 
currently completely cut off the Uzbek gas supply chain. Turkmenistan exported around 6 billion 
m3 of gas to Iran in 2013 and was expected to keep the export volume in the amount of 9–10 
billion m3,58 which is still less than targeted 20 billion m3 after the construction of the second gas 
pipeline connecting these two countries. Rapidly increasing gas export to China is balancing or 
in some cases instigating gas supply drops in other directions.  
 Since the European and South Asian markets are not yet physically connected to the 
Central Asian gas reserves, the volume of gas export and thus, dependence of the Central Asian 
producers on the Chinese market is increasing. To decrease such dependence, Turkmenistan is 
showing even greater interest in promoting the South Asian and European corridors, which are 
yet in the planning stage.59 Once stability, on the Russian and European fronts, is more or less 
restored, under the condition that the demand for gas is expected to increase, powers interested in 
Central Asian resources will try to reinstate gas supply/transit relations. But again even though it                                                         
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is unlikely that bigger powers’ competing energy interests will take the radical form of 
competition for resources, their influence (political, economic, security) over Central Asian 
producers and regional elites’ desire to profit from exports may result in an increasing gas supply 
to external markets even at the expense of domestic consumption. Both customers and suppliers 
will keep the domestic energy supply at the level that does not provoke social instability or 
economic crisis. It is not, however, the minimum survival level, but rather the ability to enjoy 
sufficiency of gas supplies that constitutes the core of energy security in this context. 
 It is expected that gas consumption in China and India will amount to 603 billion m3 and 
202 billion m3, respectively, by 2040.60 Gas consumption forecast shows increasing demand for 
this particular type of energy source in all major energy markets, including Europe by 2040.61 
Turkmenistan positions itself as an important source to meet growing demand for gas in these 
directions, which claims to be capable of increasing its gas production capacity from the current 
level of 70 billion m3 up to 230 billion m3, by 2040.62  Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have 
also been signing gas contracts to increase the volume of export to China and showing 
willingness to move gas in other directions. However, due to growing domestic demands and the 
increasing volume of wasted gas in highly inefficient gas transporting and consumption facilities, 
there are serious doubts regarding Central Asian producers’ ability to keep up with external 
demand without negatively affecting the level of energy security in their respective countries. An 
attempt to increase the volume of gas exports to external customers threatens security of the 
CAES by affecting availability of gas for domestic and intra-Central Asian consumption.                                                         
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 On the one hand, inability to meet growing demand may lead to a conflict of interests and 
a more active form of competition between customers. On the other hand, it affects sufficiency 
of gas for producers’ internal consumption. While the Central Asian corridor due to its relatively 
insignificant volume of gas trade should not seriously threaten availability of natural gas to 
external customers, regional producers’ own desire to generate higher revenues and importing 
states’ direct interest in moving gas out results in export increase even at the expense of domestic 
and intra-Central Asian consumption. In this regard, the creation of broader gas markets 
negatively affects intra-Central Asian energy cooperation. Moreover, gas supply shortage within 
Central Asia forces upstream states to push forward their giant HPP projects and thus, further 
escalate water-energy nexus conflict. 
 Despite the fact that there are energy shortages for regional consumption, Central Asian 
gas producers will most likely continue increasing their export capacity to meet growing 
international demand. There are two major reasons for regional exporters’ willingness to restrict 
domestic consumption in favour of increasing export capacity: first, regional exporters are 
attempting to compensate their economic losses from subsidizing gas for domestic consumption 
by generating higher revenues from gas exports; second, asymmetrical power relations between 
Central Asian gas producers and such external customers as Russia, China, and, potentially, 
Europe/US will force regional exporters to go along with the system (in which gas export to the 
external markets is prioritized) rather than challenge it.  
Energy Subsidies, Energy Efficiency 
 One of the reasons for Central Asian gas exporters’ policies of restricting domestic 
consumption through rationing is the use of subsidized gas for political purposes domestically. 
Low prices for gas on the domestic market result in over-consumption and lower profits for 
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producers (both private and state-owned companies), making it unattractive to invest in 
upgrading domestic gas infrastructure that can significantly increase efficiency to avoid gas 
waste and expanding pipeline networks to supply distant regions and a larger number of people 
with gas.63 In 2011, natural gas subsidies cost US$4.36 billion to the budget of Turkmenistan. In 
Uzbekistan, subsidies amounted to US$9.09 billion.64 While Uzbekistan spends in total more 
money on subsidies than Turkmenistan, per capita Turkmen government subsided US$1593.4 in 
2013, whereas Uzbek and Kazakh subsidies accounted for US$406.1 per capita and US$358.6 
per capita, respectively. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan spend over 20 percent of their GDP on 
subsidizing fossil fuels supplies. Average subsidization rate Turkmenistan 65.7 percent, 
Uzbekistan 58.7 percent and Kazakhstan 32.8 percent. 65  Revenues from the export of gas 
compensate the economic loss from the subsidized energy market and thus export-oriented 
energy policy would remain a priority for the regional producers. 
 Losses caused by outdated and inefficient gas production and transportation 
infrastructures cost Uzbekistan approximately 4.5 percent of its GDP every year.66 Kazakhstan 
consumes only half of its overall gas production and exports the other half because it lacks 
extensive internal gas supply networks to transport resources from the resource-rich regions to 
distant consumption centers. 67  Increasing the volume of gas by building large production 
facilities seems to be a priority area for regional producers. However, according to some experts,                                                         
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because the level of gas loss at the consumer end is extremely high, investments in energy 
projects to increase efficiency would most likely cost about half as much as building new 
facilities with almost the same results. 68  For instance, even though Uzbekistan ranks 24th 
worldwide in terms of gas reserves, 69  poor transportation and distribution infrastructures 
accounted for losses of 20 billion m3 of natural gas per year in the beginning of 2000s. 70 
Inefficient energy transportation and consumption facilities still account for 60 percent of 
primary energy loss in the country.71 Another example is the CAC pipeline network, which was 
designed and built in 1966–1987 with an overall capacity of about 90 billion m3 per year. The 
lack of maintenance and investment over time has almost halved the operational capacity of the 
system to less than 50 billion m3 per year.72 According to the International Energy Agency, at 
least 30 billion m3 of gas is annually wasted. Even the Gazprom representatives acknowledge 
that investments in the pipelines would save up to 10 billion m3 of gas annually.73 Figures 
significantly vary depending on different sources, but what is important is that in any case gas 
losses in the region are still very high. Low gas prices in the domestic markets make it 
unattractive for the government and private enterprises to invest in improving gas sector. In an 
attempt to compensate financial losses caused by subsidizing domestic gas markets, Central 
Asian producers are increasing their gas export capacity, which is negatively affecting 
sufficiency of domestic consumption. 
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Asymmetrical Power Relations within the Central Asian Energy System 
 Central Asian gas producers’ attempt to reduce their gas exports dependence on Russia 
by establishing interdependent relations with external customers was successful, to a certain 
extent, especially with China. In 2009 the dominance of Russia, with its century-long cultural 
and political ties to the Central Asian region, but with aging pipelines in the energy sector, was 
challenged by China.74 However, there is still asymmetry in the extent of vulnerability to gas 
supply/demand disruptions for producers within the CAES. The higher the cost of the 
termination or drastic alteration of gas relations for an actor, the more vulnerable this actor is.75 
Currently, most of the Central Asian gas is transported through Chinese and Russian pipelines. 
However, neither China nor Russia considers Central Asian gas a vital source for their economy. 
Russia needed Central Asian gas mainly to fulfill its supply obligations to Europe. While Central 
Asian gas represents approximately half of all imported gas, it yet accounts for only insignificant 
share of the Chinese overall energy consumption. China consumed 170 billion m3 in 2013. 
Central Asian producers supplied in total over 27.5 billion m3 of gas, which was around 16 
percent of the total gas consumption. Taking into account the fact that gas represented around 5 
percent of the total primary energy consumption in 2013, the share of the Central Asian gas does 
not exceed 1 percent of it.76 Given the fact that selling natural gas accounts for approximately 
half of Turkmenistan’s77 budget and significantly contributes to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s 
budgets, Central Asian gas exporters are more vulnerable to gas supply disruptions than either                                                         
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Russia or China.78 Central Asian producers are currently increasing gas supply to China by 
reducing the volume of export in other directions, thus, swapping their dependence on the 
Russian infrastructure into dependence on the Chinese market. The amount of gas being exported 
to China from Central Asia is growing fast and it is important to meet gas needs of the western 
regions of China. However, Central Asian gas still covers relatively insignificant share of the 
Chinese overall primary energy consumption. Thus, Central Asian producers will remain more 
vulnerable to potential gas supply disruptions to China than the Chinese economy could 
potentially suffer from supply cut-offs. 
 Due to asymmetrical power relations within the CAES, some countries hold power 
advantages over others, in which the latter are very limited in their foreign policy choices. In this 
sense, more vulnerable states are likely to go along with the pattern, in which energy export to 
external markets is prioritized.79 However, in an attempt to increase their bargaining power, 
regional exporters support various gas export diversification projects. However, regional 
exporters’ physical inability to produce sufficient gas to meet international demand may lead to 
competition between external customers for the region’s gas. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization is the only (and quite vague) institutional framework to regulate gas export/import 
relations between regional producers and major customers (China and Russia).80 In the absence 
of an effective enforcement mechanism to coordinate gas supply relations, the consequences of 
such competition are unpredictable. 
 If the Central Asian gas exporters are relatively weaker players in the gas export/import 
relations with China and Russia, they are in a far better position to dictate terms of gas supply                                                         
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relations with the Central Asian consumer countries. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s gas reserves 
are insignificant, and these countries rely on imports from Kazakhstan, but mostly unreliable 
Uzbekistan. For instance, gas supply disruptions from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to 
Tajikistan in 2008 caused countrywide electricity blackouts throughout the entire winter 
period.81 Uzbekistan has also stopped gas supply to southern Kyrgyzstan in 2013 without any 
warning. According to general director of “Kyrgyzgaz” Turgunbek Kulmurzaev: “Uztransgaz 
[state-owned energy company of Uzbekistan] stopped gas supply at night without any warning 
and we don’t know the reason, because no one is answering the phone in Uzbekistan.” Kyrgyz 
government acknowledged that it owned US$88,000 to Uzbekistan, but the sum was not critical 
enough to cut gas supply without warning.82 Even though Kyrgyzstan has developed seven oil 
fields and two gas fields, difficult geological conditions keep the recovery rate very low. 83 
Neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan is capable of influencing the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. 
Besides, increasing the volume of exports to external customers is negatively effecting intra-
Central Asian gas consumption. 
 During the summer of 2008, the outlet of water to produce electricity increased. This 
significantly decreased the level of water in the reservoirs for the winter to generate electricity to 
meet at least the minimal internal consumption needs. 84 The price hike for Uzbek gas and 
reduced amount of gas imports worsened the level of energy security in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Just before the winter, Uzbekistan doubled the price of natural gas exported to 
Tajikistan. Although the government of Tajikistan persuaded Uzbek authorities to decrease the                                                         
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gas price from US$300 to US$240 per 1,000 m3 (US$90 higher than the previous price),85 it was 
still higher than the price Tajikistan was willing to pay.  
 Having experienced severe energy shortages in the past, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want 
to speed up the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata HPPs. For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
increasing hydro-power potential to meet their electricity needs has become a national security 
priority. Taking into account the huge hydro-power potential of these countries, the construction 
of the Kambarata I and Rogun HPPs will increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis Uzbekistan 
and may provide greater energy security. 
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Security of the Central Asian (Electric) Power System 
 The CAPS was established in the 1960s and 1970s. The system consisted of mainly 30 
percent HPPs of Central Asian upstream and 70 percent TPPs of downstream countries.1 The 
Integrated Dispatch Center Energia, based in Tashkent, controlled the electric power supply 
operations of the CAPS. Even though the CAPS was part of the Unified Energy System of the 
USSR, physically it was isolated from the Russian electricity grids. Nonetheless, Energia was 
still subordinate to the Central Dispatch Center based in Moscow and financed by the Ministry of 
Energy and Electrification of the former Soviet Union.2 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the CAPS started operating on its own. Also called the Central Asian “electricity ring,” CAPS 
connected all 83 power units (including 29 thermal and 48 hydro) of the southern part of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and was managed by 
Energia.3 Fifty-one percent of total CAPS electricity was generated in Uzbekistan, 13.8 percent 
in Kyrgyzstan, 9.1 percent in Kazakhstan, 15 percent in Tajikistan, and 10 percent in 
Turkmenistan.4 
 The resource-sharing mechanism ensured reliable and stable energy supplies up until 
recently. Following the well-functioning pattern, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan ensured a continuous 
flow of water and hydroelectricity to downstream countries. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan in turn channelled light oil products, gas, and thermal electricity to their upstream 
neighbours. The CAPS not only solved the problem of uneven distribution of electricity, but also 
prevented electricity supply disruptions due to seasonal variations of electric power production in                                                         
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the region. Despite the fact that everyone benefitted from cooperation within the CAPS, formally 
the system collapsed under the pressure of geopolitical processes in the region in 2009. That 
year, Uzbekistan withdrew from the “electricity ring.” Turkmenistan left the CAPS even earlier, 
in 2003. 5 Central Asian countries’ electric power grids are no longer managed by Energia. 
However, regional electric power systems remain physically connected to each other. Electricity 
trade with sometimes-prolonged disruptions still take place. Central Asian countries are still very 
much dependent on each other to ensure efficiency, sustainability and sufficiency of electricity 
supplies. All these conditions imply the necessity to consider Central Asian countries’ electric 
power sectors within the unified system, perhaps, malfunctioning, but the system of 
interdependent national electric power sectors. 
Figure 7: The Central Asian Power system Major Interlinkages 
 
 The CAPS, as designed during the Soviet period, incorporated electric power systems of 
southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The national 
electric power system of Kazakhstan is divided into three loosely connected internal networks: 
northern, western, and southern power zones. Northern and, to certain extent western regions of 
Kazakhstan are mostly connected to the Russian electric power grid. The southern regions of the 
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country received electricity from the CAPS. The central role in the CAPS was devoted to 
Uzbekistan. Since the CAPS was designed irrespective of national borders, due to Uzbekistan’s 
central geographical location, it was economically cost-efficient to establish the network of 
transmission lines connecting all other countries through the territory of Uzbekistan.  
Figure 8: Central Asian (Electric) Power System6 
 
 After Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CAPS, Tajikistan, which heavily relies on 
hydroelectricity export to pay for the fossil fuel imports needed to mitigate its winter supply 
shortages, had to redirect its some electricity supply flow to Afghanistan and speed up the 
construction of Rogun, the highest HPP in the world. Kyrgyzstan was forced to largely count on 
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Kazakhstan and Russia to meet its winter energy needs and search for investors to share the cost 
of the second-largest Kambarata–1 HPP to start the construction process as soon as possible. 
Central Asian downstream countries, however, perceive the construction of giant HPPs as a 
factor that can negatively affect the water withdrawal balance in the region. To prevent full-scale 
realization of these projects, Uzbekistan used its political, economic, and energy leverage to 
influence the decision making of upstream states. Conflict over the water withdrawal and 
electricity supply within the CAPS without establishing self-sustaining electric power systems 
are negatively affecting Central Asian countries’ energy security. While Central Asian states 
have a history of cooperation in the electric power sector and have all the necessary 
preconditions to engage in mutually beneficial electricity trade, Central Asian states still fail to 
coordinate their policies to respond to energy security challenges. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Unified Energy System, every Central Asian state started thinking about the possibility of 
strengthening its national energy system, including electric power system. It is, however, 
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CAPS that forced other regional state actors to give up the 
policy focused on sustaining a unified electric power system in which everyone’s interests are 
met and concentrate on establishing their own countrywide electric power systems through a 
painful transformation process. Going after small hares prevents them from hunting a bigger 
stag—the security of the CAPS.  
Water and Energy Modes of the HPP 
 During the Soviet period, HPPs in Central Asia were designed first to ensure stable water 
release for irrigation purposes and then to generate electricity. Two major dams, Nurek and 
Toktogul, were built to regulate water flows, supply sufficient water for irrigation purposes, and 
prevent floods that could damage downstream countries’ agricultural sector and especially cotton 
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industry.7 It was later decided to build two other giant dams/HPPs (Rogun and Kambarata–1) to 
strengthen water management in the region.  
 Receiving large quantities of water during the vegetation period has always been 
important for downstream Central Asian states. The Soviets promoted an active policy to expand 
irrigated lands in Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan. As a result, Uzbekistan’s irrigated land 
increased from 1.2 million hectares in 1913 to 4.2 million hectares in 1990. Its agricultural sector 
was specialized in cotton production and was accounting for two-thirds of all cotton produced in 
the Soviet Union.8 Cotton production together with some other crops cultivation consumed over 
90 percent of water resources from Amu Darya and Syr Darya.9 Cotton industry remains an 
important part of Uzbek economy and the government obliges Uzbek farmers cultivate about 60–
70 percent of their farmland with cotton and wheat, meaning that Uzbekistan is still highly 
dependent on large quantities of water.10 Currently, cotton accounts for 9 percent of the total 
export of Uzbekistan.11 That is why Uzbekistan is concerned about any major projects in its 
upstream neighbours capable of affecting existing water distribution balance. 
 The general schemes of Rogun and Kambarata dams were designed in Tashkent 
(Uzbekistan). Working in the water mode, Nurek, the largest HPP in Tajikistan, was never 
capable of accumulating enough water to produce significant volume of electricity in winter and 
Toktogul HPP, with the capacity to potentially accumulate enough water to produce electricity                                                         
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any time of the year, mostly generated electricity in the summertime.12 In the 1990s, to keep the 
water mode functioning, Central Asian countries signed a number of agreements, according to 
which downstream states were ensured stable water supply for irrigation purposes. In exchange, 
Central Asian upstream countries received natural gas, oil products, and thermal electricity in 
wintertime to meet their energy demands.  
 However, when Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS and it was no longer possible to 
ensure coordinated operation of the unified electric power system, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
decided to turn the water mode of operating HPPs into the energy mode focused on producing as 
much electricity as possible whenever there was a need. 13 Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
having experienced deficiency of gas and winter electricity supplies, transformed their energy 
sectors first to meet their needs and second to significantly increase electricity export capacity. 
Currently, Central Asian upstream countries continue releasing water to downstream neighbours 
during the vegetation period for two main reasons. First, they are bound by intergovernmental 
agreements (Nukus Declaration (1995), Protocol 566 (1987) and agreements on using the waters 
of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers—Syr Darya Framework Agreement (1998) and 
Agreements on Hydrometeorology and Parallel Operation of Energy systems (1999)).14 Second, 
and most importantly, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are physically incapable of accumulating a 
large amount of water to produce electricity both in summer and winter. When Uzbekistan 
withdrew from the CAPS, Tajikistan was left in complete isolation. With no possibility to export 
electricity, both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had to spill water. The governments of the Central 
                                                        
12 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Consultant, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation: 
Power Sector Regional Master Plan (Metro Manila: Asian Development Bank, Report no. 43549, 2012), accessed 
January 15, 2015, http://adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2010/43549-01-reg-tar.pdf. 
13 Karibekov, “Plus Electrification to the Whole Country.” 
14 Eli Keene, “Solving Tajikistan’s Energy Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 
2013, accessed June 17, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/25/solving-tajikistan-s-energy-crisis. 
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Asian upstream countries are counting on the Rogun and Kambarata–1 dams to increase their 
ability to accumulate more water.  
 Filling the planned Rogun and Kambarata dams with water will take many years and may 
cause reallocation of water shares in Central Asia. Melted glaciers are main source of water flow 
in rivers in Central Asia. However, glaciers in the mountains have been rapidly receding in the 
region. Glacier volume changes in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan accounted for around 100 km3 
(out of 500 km3 and 600 km3 respectively) over the last 50 years and are expected to continue in 
the same amount for the next half-century.15 Calculations of the volume of water needed to fill 
dams were based on the water flow already under the condition of glacier melt. Thus, we cannot 
expect any significant increase in water flow from the receding glaciers in Tajik and Kyrgyz 
mountains. Besides, the fact that these dams will most likely be operated in energy mode 
suggests that water will be accumulated in summertime when downstream countries need it the 
most and released in winter. The generation capacities from Kambarata–1 HPP may allow 
Toktogul to return to irrigation mode with minimal effect on the current water withdrawal 
balance. Central Asian downstream states, however, fear that building new HPPs will take many 
years and new generation capacities will produce electricity for export, forcing Toktogul to 
continue operating in energy mode.16 
Main Source of Disagreements—Giant HPPs 
 Around 80 percent of water in Central Asia is generated in upstream Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. More than 85 percent of it, however, is consumed by downstream Kazakhstan, 
                                                        
15 Vladimir Fedorenko, “Prospects for Water Cooperation in Central Asia,” Rethink Paper 14 (February 2014): 14, 
accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Fedorenko-Prospect-of-
Water-Coop.pdf. 
16 Karibekov, “Plus Electrification to the Whole Country.” 
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Turkmenistan, and especially Uzbekistan. While such distribution of water perfectly suits 
downstream countries’ interests, authorities of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan believe it is unfair and 
advocate for non-interference into their energy/water policy in regard to increasing their water 
accumulation and electricity production capacity.17 To increase electricity production upstream 
states have to accumulate more water in the summer and release it in winter as well as reduce the 
amount of water to be released until dams are filled up. The Government of Tajikistan argues 
that the construction of large HPP facilities is the sovereign right of the state, and will be in full 
compliance with international law.18 
 Central Asian region still has the highest rate of water withdrawal per capita in the world 
and Uzbekistan,19 with half the population of the region, accounts for around 50 percent of the 
total water withdrawal. Water quotas for transboundary rivers in Central Asia are allocated as 
follows: 
• Amu Darya 
o Uzbekistan: 48.2 percent 
o Turkmenistan: 35.8 percent 
o Kyrgyzstan: 0.6 percent 
o Tajikistan: 15.6 percent 
• Syr Darya 
o Uzbekistan: 50.5 percent 
o Kazakhstan: 42 percent 
                                                        
17 Sunnatullo Jonboboev, Personal Interview, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Central Asia in Tajikistan, 
Astana, Kazakhstan, May 25, 2014.  
18 Ekaterina Klimenko, “Central Asia as a Regional Security Complex,” Central Asia and Caucasus Press 12, no. 4 
(2011). 
19 Olli Varis, “Resources: Curb Vast Water Use in Central Asia,” Nature, October 1, 2014, accessed January 25, 
2015, http://www.nature.com/news/resources-curb-vast-water-use-in-central-asia-1.16017. 
 157 
o Kyrgyzstan: 0.5 percent 
o Tajikistan: 7 percent.20  
 The high rate of water consumption in Uzbekistan is explained by the domination of the 
water-intensive cotton industry in its agricultural sector, which accounts for over 90 percent of 
water consumption, and the fact that 70 percent of river water does not reach irrigated land 
owing to deteriorated infrastructure. 21  Reforms to increase the efficiency of Uzbekistan’s 
irrigation infrastructure and introduce water saving technology are not progressing quickly 
enough to make a difference.  
 Most of the hydro-power generation facilities in Central Asia are run-of-river-type HPPs 
generating electricity only in summer. The only exception in the region is the Toktogul HPP, 
which has a storage capacity large enough to produce electricity even in winter and transmit it to 
the north of the country via a newly constructed 500 kV line.22 Most of the other HPPs of the 
Narin cascade are connected to the Uzbekistan’s electricity grid. In return, Uzbekistan has been 
transmitting electricity to Kazakhstan, part of which was then sent back to Kyrgyzstan while the 
rest was retained for Kazakhstan’s electricity needs. Northern parts of Tajikistan are also 
connected to Uzbekistan’s electric power grid. When Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS, 
electricity exchange between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan via the electricity network of 
Uzbekistan remained operational to some extent, while Tajikistan was left in complete isolation. 
Kyrgyzstan is currently importing electricity as well as oil products and gas from Kazakhstan 
and Russia. The Kyrgyz government has recently completed the Datka–Kemin electricity 
transmission lines connecting the north and south, but has made no progress in building                                                         
20 Jenniver Sehring, The Politics of Water Institutional Reform in Neo-Patrimonial States: A Comparative Analysis 
of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Springer Science & Business Media, 2009), 71. 
21 Rakhmatullaev et al, “Water Reservoirs, Irrigation and Sedimentation in Central Asia,” Environmental Earth 
Sciences 68, no. 4 (2013) in Nariya Khasanova, “Revisiting Water Issues in Central Asia,” 12.  
22 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Consultant, “Power Sector Regional Master Plan,” 3–3. 
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Kambarata–1. The situation is, however, quite serious in the case of Uzbekistan–Tajikistan 
energy relations. The largest water reservoir in Tajikistan is Nurek, but it has limited capacity 
and must generate full electricity output in summer or spill water.23 Severe energy shortages 
explain Tajikistan’s desire to have at least one (Rogun) reservoir large enough to store water to 
produce electricity in wintertime. This project, however, turned out to be one of the main reasons 
for disagreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  
Table 19: Some of the Main Controversies with Respect to the Governance of Water 
Resources in the Region24 
  KAZ KGZ TJK TKM UZB 
Priorities of use Electricity Generation 
NA 
X X   
Irrigation   X X 
Water-trade regime Monetization X X X   
Barter (status quo)    X X 
Release-regime Power regime  X X   
Irrigation regime X   X X 
Water-sharing criteria Per capita     X 
Status quo X X X X  
Quotas regime Revisionist  X X   
Status quo X   X X 




X X   
Status quo   X X 
 
 The Tajik government expects the Rogun HPP to serve three major purposes: produce 
electricity in wintertime; increase electricity export capacity; and improve water management. 
Tajikistan, like any other country in the region, has a right to increase electricity exports to 
generate revenue. Moreover, improved water management is in the interests of both upstream 
and downstream countries. However, only increased electricity production in winter contributes 
                                                        
23 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Consultant, “Power Sector Regional Master Plan,” 2–17. 
24 Victor Jensen, “Hydroelectric Dams and Conflict in Central Asia,” Central Asia Regional Data Review 1, no. 1 
(September 2009). 
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to national energy security. While Rogun can potentially add summer electricity production 
capacity, which would be exported, revenues generated from increasing electricity exports does 
not guarantee the possibility of wintertime gas and thermal electricity imports from neighbouring 
states. 
 There is a belief that Uzbekistan is against the Rogun HPP; in fact, it finds the proposed 
heights of the dam threatening to downstream countries (335 m, 3,600–2,800 MW; 300 m, 
3,200–2,400 MW; and 265 m, 2,800–2000 MW).25 Official statements by the Uzbek government 
emphasize the consequences of a dam failure, which according to them, may potentially cause a 
245–280 m high wave at the start-point and a 6–7 m high wave in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
endangering 5 million people, including 3 million living in Uzbekistan in a flooded area of 1.3–
1.5 million hectares.26 Tajik authorities, on the other hand, emphasize a recently released World 
Bank report on the environmental and social impact assessment of the Rogun dam showing that 
the highest possible option of the dam is the most economically efficient, with acceptable 
environmental impact, compared to other alternatives.  
 However, what Uzbekistan fears most is the fact that the construction of the Rogun and 
Kambarata–1 HPPs will decrease the current level of water flow to downstream neighbours. 
Tajik authorities ensure that to fill up the Rogun reservoir (the expected time is 16 years), 
Tajikistan will use the amount of water allocated to it according to the Nukus Declaration and 
Protocol 566, which has been spilled out so far. Under the Nukus Declaration, Tajikistan has a 
right to use 15.4 percent of the Amu Darya river water and Uzbekistan is granted 48.2 percent. 
                                                        
25 OSHPC Barki Tojik, Techno-Economic Assessment Study for Rogun Hydroelectric Construction Project (World 
Bank, 2014), accessed October 5, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/central-
asia/TEAS_Executive%20Summary_Final_eng.pdf. 
26 World Bank, To Executive Secretary, The Inspection Panel (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), accessed 
May 10, 2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/258598-
1297718522264/Request_for_Inspection_Eng.pdf. 
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Tajikistan is currently withdrawing less water than is allocated to it according to the agreements. 
Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan`s quota from Amu Darya rivers was 22 km3 in 2011, but they 
consumed 28.2 and 29.4 km3 respectively.27 Many years of using this extra water has made 
Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector dependent on it. Infringing on the amount of water rightfully 
allocated to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is something Uzbekistan is not ready to do. 
 Construction of Rogun is not only an issue of electricity production, but also a matter of 
saving the Tajik hydro-power sector. “If Tajikistan fails to build Rogun HPP, it will lose Nurek 
HPP,” said the head of dispatch center of Barki Tojik national holding, Odin Chorshanbiev. The 
process of silting in the Nurek dam poses a serious threat and if measures are not taken, the dam 
will lose its capacity to store water in 20 years. Building Rogun would release clean water to 
Nurek located down the Vakhsh river stream. If Rogun is not built, even cleaning technologies 
would not save Nurek and it will only operate on a run-off basis. Currently, Nurek provides 70 
percent of the country’s electricity.28  
Diversifying Hydro Power Supply Routes 
 Intra-Central Asian electricity trade ensured security of the CAPS. However, regional 
electricity trade that accounted for 25 GWh per year in 1990 dropped to the level of 4 GWh per 
year in 2008 and has been further decreasing since then. 29  Decreasing intra-Central Asian 
electricity trade and frequent electricity supply disruptions forced Central Asian upstream 
countries to consider building alternative electricity supply routes. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s 
excessive dependence on thermal electricity imports from neighbouring countries makes them                                                         
27 Nariya Khasanova, “Revisiting Water Issues in Central Asia,” 3.  
28 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, Pushing for Energy Security and Trade in the Region (Metro Manila: 
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, n.d), accessed September 15, 2014, 
http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=energy. 
29 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Consultant, “Power Sector Regional Master Plan,” 1. 
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vulnerable to electricity supply disruptions. For instance, electricity supply cuts from Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan to Tajikistan in 2008 caused countrywide electricity blackouts throughout the 
whole winter period. To address electricity deficiency due to such supply disruptions, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan started establishing independent electric power systems. 
 Over 90 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s electricity is generated from hydro resources in the 
central parts of the country, while the major consumption is in the north. There is only one 500 
kV transmission line connecting the Toktogul HPP with the north of the country. The other four 
HPPs in the Naryn cascade are connected to the 220 kV grid located in the Fergana part of the 
Uzbek electric power system. The electricity exchange between Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, 
and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, on the other, in the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s was conducted approximately within the following formula:  
 From the Republic of Kazakhstan (annually): 
• thermal electricity: 150 million kWh  
• coal: 150 thousand tonnes 
 From the Republic of Uzbekistan (annually): 
• natural gas: 500 million m3 
• thermal electricity: 54 million kWh 
• fuel oil: 15 thousand tonnes 
 From Kyrgyz Republic to the neighbouring states annual hydroelectricity supplies: 
• to the Republic of Kazakhstan: 1100 million kWh 
• to the Republic of Uzbekistan: 1100 million kWh. 
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 During the 1999 summer period, Tajikistan provided the return of electricity to 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in a 1:1 ratio.30 
 Until 2009, Central Asian countries’ electric power systems operated in coordination with 
each other. That is why there were no payments for transit of electricity through the Central 
Asian electric power grids. The payment mechanism, first based on barter, was later applied only 
to export/import relations. When Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS, the payment mechanism 
was introduced even for transit of electricity. However, Kyrgyzstan stopped paying transit fees 
for electricity transited from Toktogul HPP to the southern Batken region of the country. The 
construction of the Datka electric power station 30 km from Djalal Abad and the modernization 
of several transmission lines ensured some electricity supply to its southern regions.31 Tajikistan 
has also constructed some south–north electricity transmission lines. When these projects 
connecting northern and southern parts of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are completed, 
hypothetically they will be able to establish connections between each other and Kazakh electric 
power grids entirely avoiding Uzbek territory.  
CASA–1000 
 When Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS, Kyrgyzstan continued electricity trading 
with Kazakhstan. Tajikistan, however, was completely isolated from other Central Asian states. 
Possessing a surplus of electricity production in the summertime with no possibility to export it 
to the neighbouring Uzbekistan, the Tajik government decided to redirect extra electricity to                                                         
30 Protocol of the Workshop for the Representatives of Water and Energy Authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan Related to Water and Energy Use 
Issues in the Forthcoming 1998/9 Fall-winter Season and 1999 Vegetation Period (1999), accessed May 20, 2015, 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/Annual-Protocol-99.pdf. 
31 Dmitriy Denisenko, “Kirgizstan Prekratil Platit’ Uzbekistanu za Transit Elektroenergii (Kyrgyzstan Stopped 
Paying Uzbekistan for Power Transit),” Vb.kg, January 24, 2014, accessed January 25, 2014, 
http://www.vb.kg/doc/259320_kyrgyzstan_prekratil_platit_yzbekistany_za_tranzit_elektroenergii.html. 
 163 
Afghanistan. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan supported the Central Asia–South Asia Regional 
Electricity Market (CASAREM) initiative to move surplus electricity to South Asia. As the first 
phase of this initiative, CASA–1000 is expected to supply electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
from the current surplus in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Even though CASA–1000 excludes India 
as a potential beneficiary, hypothetically, India might benefit from the Central Asian hydro-
power potential in case electricity production in upstream Central Asian countries increases (with 
the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata–1 HPPs) and electricity transmission lines are 
extended to India. However, concerns regarding the security of electricity supply infrastructure 
and economic viability of the project as well as lack of electricity production in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan pose serious challenges for South Asian states to pursue their energy interests in the 
region.  
 Currently, Central Asian countries’ installed power generation capacity accounts for 
around 25,000 MW, out of which 9,000 MW is hydro power (36 percent) including major Nurek 
HPP (3,000 MW) and Toktogul HPP (1,200 MW), and 16,000 MW is thermal power (64 
percent). However, real production capacity does not exceed 20,000 MW,32 mostly because of 
decreasing hydro-power generation in upstream countries. In addition, South Asian countries are 
interested in winter electricity supplies. Uninterrupted electricity supply to South Asian countries 
can be achieved only with large TPPs operating to export thermal electricity and there are none 
in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan. CASA–1000 was initially counting on electricity generated on 
Uzbekistan’s TPPs to supply electricity to South Asia 295 days/year. However, Uzbekistan did 
not sign up under the project and now Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will only be able to supply 
                                                        
32 Igor Tomberg, “Energy Industry in Central Asia – Challenges and Prospects,” Russian International Affairs 
Council (2012), accessed March 4, 2013, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=350#top. 
 164 
electricity for 70 days. 33 In this regard, if the CASAREM initiative is implemented, it will 
require significant volume of Central Asian electricity to be heading to the South Asian market, 
even at the expense of domestic consumption. Moving electricity out to external markets, even 
though it generates much-needed revenue, does not contribute to improving energy security in 
Central Asia.  
Regional Energy Trade versus the Rogun HPP in the Short-term Perspective 
 Tajikistan, which heavily relies on hydro power to pay for the fossil fuel imports needed 
to mitigate its winter supply shortages, after it was isolated from Uzbekistan had to redirect its 
electricity export to Afghanistan. Since Uzbekistan stopped selling gas to Tajikistan from 
January 2013, despite the fact that Tajikistan had been offering a good price, shows that earning 
money by exporting electricity to pay for Uzbek gas will not necessarily ensure gas flow from its 
neighbour. In an attempt to improve its energy security, Tajikistan prioritized exploitation of its 
hydro-power potential through the construction of the Rogun HPP. The Rogun HPP will increase 
electricity production in general, but most importantly will make it possible to produce electricity 
in the wintertime. The current Kyrgyz government has acknowledged that Kambarata–1 would 
not entirely save Kyrgyzstan from the energy crisis in the short-term. Besides, Kyrgyzstan can 
rely on Russia and Kazakhstan to improve its energy security and to meet wintertime electricity 
demands. There is also a possibility for Kyrgyzstan to build a Kara–Keche coal-fired TPP to 
increase availability of electricity all year round.34 Tajikistan, on contrary, does not enjoy either 
of these options. Therefore, the president of Tajikistan did not give up the idea of building Rogun                                                         
33 Rovshan Dovlatov, “Energeticheskiy Proekt po Postavkam Elektroenergii iz Stran Centralnoy Azii v Yujnuyu 
Aziyu Budet Realizovan Prejde Vsego po Politicheskim Motivam (Energy Project to Supply Electricity from 
Central Asia to South Asia will be Implemented Primarily for Political Reasons),” June 27, 2013, accessed 
September 1, 2014, http://expertonline.kz/a11231/. 
34 Ernest Karibekov, Personal Interview, Head of International Public Fund “Research Institute for the Central Asian 
Water and Water-Energy Resources Problem Studies”, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 4, 2014.  
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in the near future, which he turned into a symbol of energy security and independence of the 
country. 
 However, in the short- to medium-term perspective, the energy security of the country 
can be ensured only through a combination of developing its hydro-power potential with import 
of thermal electricity and gas from neighbouring countries. In other words, the 
exchange/swap/trade of electricity to improve security of the CAPS can contribute to the energy 
security of Tajikistan. There is no guarantee that if Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan postpone the 
realization of the Rogun and Kambarata–1 projects, one of the main sources of disagreements, 
Uzbekistan will restore functioning of the CAES or allow them to use its energy infrastructure to 
transit resources from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Even if Uzbekistan were to provide a 100 
percent guarantee of this sort, some scholars believe that it could not be enough to placate 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and for symbolic and revenue-generating reasons, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan might still not back down. 35  But the analysis shows that giant HPPs may not 
contribute to energy security as expected in the short-run and restoring regional trade is not only 
the better option, but the necessary one.   
 The 335 m high Rogun HPP can almost double current production (16.5 billion kWh per 
year) by adding 13 billion kWh per year. However, it will take up to 16 years until the plant 
starts operating in its full capacity.36 During this period, electricity production in winter will 
remain limited. Taking into account the fact that Tajikistan does not possess sufficient funds to 
                                                        
35 Comment provided by Edward Schatz, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, 
June 9, 2015. 
36 World Bank, “Environment and Social Impact Assessment for Rogun Hydro Power Plant, Analysis of 
Alternatives” (V Round of Dialogue on Technical and Economic/Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of 
the Rogun, Almaty, Kazakhstan, July 14, 2014). 
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complete the project (worth US$3–6 billion37) and foreign investors are not rushing to invest in a 
project that may lead to a conflict with Uzbekistan, Rogun’s large-scale contribution to energy 
security will most likely be further delayed.  
 Current high security risks affect the investment climate, in which to further pursue 
construction of the dam, Tajikistan will be forced to accept terms not serving its best interests.38 
Tajikistan has already refused to agree on investment terms offered by Russian companies 
demanding a higher stake (75 percent) in benefits distribution. Almost similar investment terms 
were accepted by Tajikistan for the construction of Sangtuda–1 HPP and electricity produced in 
this plant is now being mostly exported, since the Russian side has to recover its investments. 
Export of electricity produced in Sangtuda affects the availability of electricity for domestic 
consumption. In this regard, it is preferable to look for foreign investments only after the security 
issues over the Rogun dam are more or less resolved. Besides, economic sanctions against 
Russia, which have had a profound impact on the Russian economy, negatively affect any desire 
or ability to participate in a large energy project such as Rogun.  
 Designed to ensure electricity supply to meet peak demand in winter, there is no 
guarantee that the Rogun HPP will not be extensively used for export purposes. There is 
currently a surplus of electricity production in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and it is argued that 
CASA–1000 is supposed to transport it to southern neighbours. However, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan are mostly in need of electricity import in winter and only Rogun and Kambarata–1 can 
                                                        
37 David Trilling, “Tajikistan: Rogun Dam a Hot Topic As Tajiks Make It Through Another Winter of 
Shortages,” EurasiaNet.org, March 12, 2009, accessed May 20, 2013, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031309f.shtml.  
38 Muzaffar Olimov, Personal Interview, Senior Scientist at the Tajik Academy of Sciences Institute of Language, 
Literature, and Oriental Studies, Astana, Kazakhstan, November 17, 2014.  
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provide it.39 In this sense, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may decide to increase export of electricity 
even at the expense of domestic consumption. The desire to export electricity in wintertime will 
make Rogun and Kambarata–1 economically attractive, but with a limited contribution to energy 
security projects. This does not mean that Tajik and Kyrgyz authorities should give up trying to 
implement these projects. Given their interest in generating extra revenue, they most likely will 
not do so in any case. What it means, though, is that the contribution of these projects to each 
country’s energy security might be limited.  
 Tajikistan does not have the financial resources to complete the construction of the 
Rogun HPP. The cost of the project is estimated at US$3–6 billion. The total sum is not, of 
course, required all at once, since the construction will take many years. But in combination with 
other urgent investment-intensive energy projects, such as building small HPPs and upgrading 
infrastructure to improve energy efficiency, it will be difficult for Tajikistan to make significant 
progress. So far, Tajikistan has been counting on multilateral institutions’ support, but the Asian 
Development Bank, a major contributor, announced that it would not finance the Rogun HPP and 
build CASA–1000 electric power transmission lines.40 Tajikistan will probably seek external 
state contributions (Russian and Chinese, and potentially also Iranian and Indian) to complete 
Rogun. Negotiations with Russia have already failed due to disagreements over the control share 
once the HPP is completed. Chinese investors are unlikely to become involved unless regional 
conflict over the project is resolved or they seriously consider importing Central Asian electricity 
to meet China’s domestic needs. Currently, China prioritizes importing Central Asian oil and 
                                                        
39 President of the Republic of Tajikistan, The Annual Message to the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan 
(Dushanbe: President of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2011), accessed June 5, 2014, 
http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/2189. 
40 “ABR Otkazalsya Finansirovat Stroitelstvo Rogunskoy GES I LEP v Pakistan (ADB Refused to Finance the 
Construction of Rogun HPP and ETL to Pakistan),” Regnum.ru, January 17, 2014, accessed January 20, 2014, 
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1755635.html.  
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gas, and would not sacrifice friendly relationships with the transit country—a significant source 
of Central Asian gas—to participation in the construction of large HPPs.  
 Even if the Tajik government succeeds in finding investors to share the cost of Rogun, 
there is a threat that most of the produced electricity would be exported with insignificant 
contribution to the country’s energy security. While ordinary people’s payment capability is 
limited, electricity for the major consuming facilities are subsidized by the government. Foreign 
investors are only willing to provide money if they are sure that their investments will soon be 
returned. Unfortunately, the amount of money being paid by household consumers does not 
cover electricity production cost plus revenues. Construction of Sangtuda HPP–1 started in 2006. 
Iran’s share in the construction accounted for US$180 million, while Tajikistan covered only 
US$40 million. According to the agreement, Iran would return the investment with interest from 
the HPP in 12.5 years of operation.41 Because the domestic market fails to pay expected price 
(the cost of electricity production only varies from 3–8 cents per kWh), the Tajik government 
had to redirect produced electricity to external markets. If Tajikistan signs up for currently 
offered terms of investment, the Rogun HPP will most likely face the same fate.42 Central Asian 
countries’ selection of projects is often dependent on money they are given. External players are 
taking full advantage of instability in Central Asia to force regional state actors to accept terms 
that they would not under other circumstances.43 
                                                        
41 “Vse GES Vaxshskogo Kaskada Snizili Proizvodstvo Elektroenergii na 30-40% (All HPPs on the Vaksh Cascade 
Decreased Power Production to 30-40%),” Regnum, December 3, 2013, accessed March 15, 2014, 
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1740123.html#ixzz2vRvfDnNU. 
42 Olimov, “Personal Interview.” 
43Maxim Ryabkov, Personal Interview, Director of the OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, September 5, 2013. 
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Lack of Trust  
 In the short- to medium-term perspective, only import of natural gas, oil products, and 
thermal electricity in wintertime from downstream countries can ensure energy security and 
create favourable investment climate for business to operate all year round in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. While Rogun may turn Tajikistan into a major electricity exporting-country, 
intraregional trade of electricity and energy resources can significantly contribute to energy-led 
economic development and improve energy security. Construction of large HPPs in combination 
with increasing intra-Central Asian energy trade would be an ideal option to ensure security of 
the CAES. These two conditions are not mutually exclusive, if Central Asian governments 
coordinate their energy policies.  
 The biggest challenge, as it seems right now, is trust: Tajikistan does not trust Uzbekistan 
that it will not unilaterally cut energy supplies, and Uzbekistan has little confidence that 
Tajikistan will not keep more water than is allocated to it according to the agreements on Aral 
basin water withdrawal quotas. The paradox of water-energy nexus cooperation in the region is 
the fact that the best way to ensure uninterrupted water flow to downstream countries in the 
summer is to purchase electricity generated by releasing water from reservoirs in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Farkhod Tolipov, an expert on security issues in Central Asia, considered the 
counterfactual: what if Tajikistan had not obtained autonomy in 1929 and instead remained part 
of Uzbekistan? How would natural gas trading arrangements take place now and what would be 
the government’s position on the Rogun dam? His answer is that Tajik people would probably 
have received gas for a subsidized price and that the government of Uzbekistan would have 
supported the construction of large HPPs in Tajikistan in order to both improve energy security 
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and increase electricity export capacity.44 Intergovernmental agreements between Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on using water-energy resources of the Syr Darya and 
Amu Darya basins require a multilateral format of negotiations on exchanging water, electricity 
and energy resources. However, starting from 2008, Uzbekistan only signs bilateral agreements45 
and avoids multilateral negotiations on large HPPs.  
 Several factors indicate that Uzbekistan might reconsider its position regarding 
cooperation with upstream states in the energy sector. First, the level of energy security in 
Uzbekistan will continue to worsen, thus leaving it no choice but to look for the most efficient 
way of using available energy resources. Second, Uzbekistan has almost no leverage left to force 
Tajikistan to give up the idea of building Rogun except to use the threat of military intervention. 
While the threat itself may have an impact, acknowledgement that none of the regional states 
want to destabilize the region decreases the potential effect of such threats. Some experts believe 
that there is a threat of large-scale destabilization of the region from outside, but it is less likely 
that the main reason would be the competition for Central Asian energy or water resources. 
Third, these countries are currently engaged in lose-lose relationships. Uzbekistan is pursuing a 
policy to promote its interests by affecting Central Asian upstream countries’ foreign (energy) 
policies. Tajikistan is pursuing “survival” oriented energy policies to get out of the energy crisis. 
However, neither Uzbekistan nor Tajikistan is achieving their primary goal.46  
                                                        
44 Farkhod Tolipov, Director of Bylim Karvoni Non-Governmental Research and Training Center, Personal 
Interview, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 29, 2013.  
45 “Kirgiziya Virazila Sojalenie, Chto Uzbekistan ne Jelaet Sotrudnichat v Voprosax Stroitelstva GES (Kyrgyzstan 
Regrets that Uzbekistan is not Willing to Cooperate in Building HPP),” Regnum, February 5, 2013, accessed 
June 10, 2014, http://www.regnum.ru/news/1621466.html#ixzz2vXzxCrdn.  
46 Tolipov, “Personal Interview.” 
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Concluding Remarks 
 The security of the CAES is the condition in which all Central Asian states enjoy 
sufficient and sustainable energy supplies for both population and economic needs 
simultaneously. And there are several factors affecting the stability and reliability of energy 
supplies within the CAES, such as natural gas trade deals, which are usually signed on a long-
term basis with long term obligations; pipelines, the only cost-efficient way to transport natural 
gas, and which require significant investments from both producers and customers; and the fact 
that Central Asia is surrounded by larger powers that often compete for energy resources.  
 Due to asymmetrical power relations within the CAES, larger powers attempt to maintain 
their influence over energy policy choices, and weaker powers are constantly searching for ways 
to increase their leverage. Central Asian exporters’ dependence on the Russian pipeline network 
to export their natural gas put them in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis Russia. Russia effectively 
used this dependence to promote its economic and political interests. However, the Russian 
monopoly was challenged by the Chinese energy pipeline network. While it constitutes partially 
successful efforts to diversify away from Russia, diversification of export routes has minimal 
direct contribution to the level of energy security of the Central Asian states. 
 Taking into account the fact that there has been no natural gas production boom in 
Central Asia; there is doubt that regional producers will be able to produce necessary amounts of 
gas to keep up with international energy demand. An attempt to fulfill obligations to supply an 
agreed volume of natural gas to external customers may worsen unstable regional energy market 
in which less gas is available for Central Asian consumer countries. Having experienced a 
shortage of gas and electricity, especially during winter period, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are 
trying to develop their hydro-power potential, which is further escalating tensions between 
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Central Asian countries over the energy-water balance. Uzbekistan uses the dependence of 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on Uzbek gas as a leverage to block the construction of giant HPPs. 
 To address the problem of energy deficiency in Central Asian upstream countries as a 
consequence of the CAES ongoing disintegration, these countries switched a water mode of the 
HPPs into an energy mode. However, without proper coordination, the energy-operating mode of 
the large HPPs may affect water distribution quotas in the region. Increasing the level of 
electricity production is expected to solve the problem of insufficiency and so the governments 
of these countries have prioritized construction of another set of large and medium HPPs. 
However, the analysis shows that projects, over which Central Asian upstream and downstream 
countries have serious disagreements, such as Rogun and Kambarata–1, have a number of 
limitations that will most likely impact the extent of their contribution to the security of the 
CAES. And, it is the cooperation in the energy sector and the reinstated gas and electricity trade 
within the region that can considerably improve CAES’s security. 
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CHAPTER IV. Security of the Central Asian Energy System through Energy Trade 
 Establishing and operating independent energy systems, within the inherited 
interconnected network, that Central Asian states are currently prioritizing bears high cost and 
negatively impacts the security of the CAES. In contrast, reintegration of the CAES will not only 
restore the energy trade, but also provide a favourable investment climate for the modernization 
of existing facilities and construction of new infrastructures (HPPs, TPP, pipelines and electricity 
transmission lines). So the energy security interests of all Central Asian countries are met 
simultaneously within the integrated CAES. However, Central Asian oil and gas producers 
believe the interdependence that the CAES entails threatens their sovereignty and national 
security. Moreover, the revenues from exporting energy to external markets are so great that the 
elites who control the energy flow would refrain from full-scale reintegration of energy sectors 
since it will limit governments’ control over their energy resources. 
 But the analysis shows that reinstating the energy trade to meet current demand while the 
state retains full control over its energy sector is not only possible, but also is a necessary 
condition in the short-term perspective. In the short-term, the intraregional energy trade implies 
that Central Asian countries would only assist each other to meet insufficient energy resources, 
which would otherwise be impossible to obtain or at least cost inefficient, especially during 
energy demand peaks. While such trading arrangements contribute to the level of energy security 
in the short run and do not guarantee sustainability of supplies in the long-term perspective, 
restoring the energy trade is nonetheless an important first step toward breaking the status quo 
and achieving a maximally secure CAES. Increasing the intra- Central Asian energy trade, 
however, will be possible only under the condition that state actors, to some extent, reconsider 
their policy priorities.  
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Table 20: Attributes of a Maximally Secure CAES: Development Scenarios 
 
Criteria 
Energy sector development scenarios 
1 2 3 
Status Quo 
(Energy Insecurity) 
Energy trade to meet 
current demand 
(Short-term Security of 
Energy Supplies) 
Integrated Central Asian 
Energy System 
(Sustainable and Long-
term Energy Security) 
Security of Energy 
Supplies 
(Diversification of energy 
by source, fuel type, 
transport routes and 
electricity production by 
fuel type; Strategic 





systems are less 
vulnerable to unilateral 
energy supply cuts 
Challenges: 
-National energy systems 
are not designed to 
operate independently 
(very limited storage and 
processing capacity); 
-Excessive dependence on 
fossil fuels in downstream 
countries and lack of these 
resources in upstream 
countries; 




electricity generation by 
fuel type and energy 
sources in the overall 
balance; 









loss—due to inability to 
agree who is responsible 
for the maintenance of 
transport infrastructure; 




-Stable and reliable 
supplies of diversified 
energy sources; 




- Does not require huge 
investments in new 
infrastructures (only in 
upgrading existing ones); 
-States are encouraged to 
use market mechanisms; 
- Enhanced reliability, 




Expose to demand side 
risks (fossil fuel demand 
reduction; expose to 
demand surges; balanced 




fossil fuel consumption; 
-Unable to meet peak 
demands in response to 
extreme weather 
conditions; 
-Increasing export at the 
expense of domestic 
consumption. 
Prospects: 
-Fossil fuel demand 
reduction (for Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan) due to 




meet energy demand 
peaks; 
Challenges: 
-Energy export still 
prevails over domestic 
consumption needs. 
Prospects: 
-Fossil fuel demand 
reduction as a result of 
policy initiative; 
-Ability to meet energy 
needs for the periods of 
demand peak; 
-No export at the expense 
of domestic consumption; 
-Balanced amount of 




Energy sector development scenarios 
1 2 3 
Status Quo 
(Energy Insecurity) 
Energy trade to meet 
current demand 
(Short-term Security of 
Energy Supplies) 
Integrated Central Asian 
Energy System 
(Sustainable and Long-




(Burning fossil fuels 
produce electricity and is 
used for heating in winter; 
avoiding HPP water spills 
Challenges: 
-Shortage of energy 
production in winter in 
Upstream states; 
-Water spills in summer; 
-Inefficient use of fossil 
fuels. 
Prospects: 
-Availability of energy for 
Upstream states in winter 




energy sector remains; 
-No mechanism to ensure 




term availability of energy 
for both Upstream and 
Downstream countries to 
work all year round by 
using hydro-power and 




(Total fuel costs/GDP; 
Import fuel cost/GDP; 
Fuel import—% of GDP) 
Challenges: 
-Increasing total fuel 
production cost leads to 
higher subsidies in energy 
sector to avoid social 
tensions and political 
instability; 
-Increasing import of oil 
and gas products from 
outside the region for 
higher cost; 
-Building independent 
energy systems (electric 
power transmission lines 
and pipelines) increases 
the cost of energy. 
Prospects: 
-Decreasing the total fuel 
price; 
- Increasing import from 
the regional producers for 
lower prices; 
-Producing energy in a 
more cost efficient way 
(hydro power in the 
summer; thermal power in 
winter); 
Challenges: 




-Sustainability of the most 
economically efficient 
production of energy 
resources; 
-Stable pricing policies; 
-Limited exposure to 
energy related economic 
risks; 







-Slowly developing RES; 
Challenges: 
-For Downstream states, 
increasing fossil fuels 
consumption to cover the 
loss of electricity 
previously imported form 
Upstream states; 
-For Upstream states 
investment in the 





consumption of fossil 
fuels due to periodical 
exchange of cleaner 
energy sources; 
-Sharing the knowledge of 
RES development; 
Challenges: 
-For Upstream countries 
limited increase of their 
own consumption of fossil 
fuels; 
- For Downstream 
countries slowly raising 
the stake of fossil fuels in 
the overall energy 
balance. 
Prospects: 
-Efficient use of natural 
gas (cleaner than oil and 
coal) and hydro power due 
to exchange of energy 
resources, contributes to 
long-term sustainability of 




Energy sector development scenarios 
1 2 3 
Status Quo 
(Energy Insecurity) 
Energy trade to meet 
current demand 
(Short-term Security of 
Energy Supplies) 
Integrated Central Asian 
Energy System 
(Sustainable and Long-
term Energy Security) 
Human Dimension 
(Increase the fraction of 
population with access to 
basic energy services) 
 
Challenges: 
-Supply of energy to 
population spots that are 
already connected to 
energy system is limited 
due to state’s inability to 
meet domestic needs; 
-Energy supply shortage 
due to isolation from the 
CAES; 
-Increasing export at the 
expense of domestic 
consumption. 
Prospects: 
-Availability of additional 
energy to meet peak 
demands; 
-Incentive to wider 
introduce RES technology 
in remote areas; 
Challenges: 
-Availability of energy is 
too dependent on ups and 
downs of negotiation 
processes; 
-Increasing export at the 




-Maintenance of the 
interconnected energy 
transporting system allows 
providing sufficient and 
clean energy to the people 
that now lack energy due 
to withdrawal of some of 
the members of the 
CAES; 
-Ensures slow but gradual 
transition to a more 




conflict over resources) 
 
Challenges: 
-Exposure to military 
conflict over Rogun and 
Kambarata–1 HPPs; 





-Using energy weapon 
(influence the decision 
making of other 
countries). 
Prospects: 
-Provide security of 
energy supply and transit 
within the region; 
-Governments’ can secure 
necessary amount of 
energy to meet basic 
needs in the period of 
energy crisis to avoid 
social uprising and 
political confrontation; 
Challenges: 
-Risk of military 
confrontation remains; 
-Inability to respond to 
non-traditional security 
threats; 




-Low risk of conflict over 
resources among Central 
Asian countries; 
-Interconnected states are 
interested in fighting back 
security/military groups 
threatening security of 
energy supplies within the 
region; 
Challenges: 
-Some external state 
actors may perceive such 
union as a threat. 
Regional Cooperation 
(Commitment to regional 




-Multilateral Inst. provide 
support (grants) to 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
to improve energy 
security; 
Challenges: 
-Frequent energy supply 
cuts due to lack of an 
effective enforcement 
mechanism; 
-Image of an unreliable 
partner. 
Prospects: 
-Short-term and bilateral 
contracts for the 
functioning of the CAES 
is better than the 
disintegrated system; 
Challenges: 






multilateral agreements in 
energy sector; 
-Effective mechanism 
(The Energy Security 
Center for Regional 
Cooperation) to timely 
and efficiently respond to 
energy security threats. 
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Along the Way Toward Independent Energy Systems (Status Quo) 
 The status quo is characterized by the recently emerged energy insecurities due to Central 
Asian countries’ desire and in some cases necessity to establish independent energy systems. 
Currently, each Central Asian government pursues policies designed to establish and strengthen 
their national energy systems. While decreasing dependence on imported oil, gas and electricity 
may potentially improve a country’s ability to resist unilateral sudden energy supply disruptions, 
disintegration process of the CAES has negatively impacted the level of the energy trade. It 
became obvious that energy trade disruptions without establishing self-sustaining independent 
energy systems affect energy security of all Central Asian states to different extents.  
 Guided partially by the belief of self-sufficiency, Uzbekistan decided to withdraw from 
the CAPS and redirect gas and electricity exports to external markets. Due to its strategic 
location on the crossroad of energy-transporting corridors within the region, this decision 
affected the overall security of the CAES. Energy supply cuts, in combination with highly 
subsidized and inefficient energy sectors, underdevelopment of RES, lack of countrywide 
electricity transmission and gas supply networks, as well as disagreements over the water 
withdrawal balance have severely affected availability and affordability of energy supplies to 
Central Asian upstream countries and sustainability and efficiency to downstream states.  
 Independent energy systems do provide higher security from sudden unilateral supply 
cuts, but also bear additional costs and can only be realized in the long-term. Establishing and 
sustaining independent energy systems in Central Asia would require at least:  
(a) Construction of new gas-fired TPPs in Turkmenistan and an extension the gas and 
electric power supply networks;  
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(b) In Kazakhstan, an enlargement of the 500 kV transmission lines connecting north with 
south, and construction of the Beineu–Bozoy–Shymkent pipeline to transport natural 
gas from the gas-rich regions to southern parts of Kazakhstan and Tobol–Kokshetau–
Astana pipeline;  
(c) In Uzbekistan, the construction of new small HPPs and coal/gas-fired TPPs;  
(d) In Tajikistan, establishing countrywide electric power transmission lines, including 
“North–South” and construction of the Rogun HPP;  
(e) In Kyrgyzstan, completing the 500 kV “Datka–Kemin” north-south and other smaller 
transmission lines as well as building Kambarata–1 HPP as well as Kara–Keche TPP; 
and 
(f) Most importantly, introduce energy efficiency technologies in outdated energy 
producing, transporting and consuming facilities.  
 Central Asian countries may strengthen their national energy systems at some point, but 
the transition will be accompanied by a decrease in energy security in some countries, an 
unfavourable investment climate to promote energy-led economic growth and underdevelopment 
of some energy sectors in others.1 
Integrated Central Asian Energy System 
 As highlighted in the previous section establishing and operating independent energy 
systems within still interconnected networks bears high cost and negatively impacts the level of 
energy security in Central Asia in the transition period. From the energy security perspective, re-
integration of the CAES would be the most promising way to address energy security challenges 
                                                        
1 Central Asian countries’ energy insecurities are discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
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in the region. Coordinated operation of the CAES and rationally exploiting energy potential of 
the region would ensure stability and reliability of supplies prioritizing energy trade/resource 
exchange within the region. It will also ensure the sustainability of energy sectors providing 
sufficient and clean energy for population and economic needs for the foreseeable future. Most 
importantly, the CAES will serve as an effective mechanism capable of ensuring energy security 
in the long-term perspective. Long-term stability and reliability of energy supplies as well as the 
resolution of disagreements over the construction of large HPPs in Central Asia will improve 
investment climate for the private sector to participate in energy projects and accelerate energy-
led economic growth. Market mechanisms prevailing within the CAES may contribute to solving 
the problem of highly inefficient and subsidized energy sectors and promote alternative energy 
sources in the region.  
 While energy interests of all countries are met simultaneously within the integrated 
CAES, Central Asian states perceive interdependence as a factor threatening national security 
and would refrain from full-scale reintegration of their energy sectors. Lack of political will is 
considered a major obstacle toward restoring CAES.2 Central Asian countries’ energy security 
policies are currently state-centric, export-focused and short-term oriented. Having perceived 
energy resources as a strategic commodity, state actors try to maintain full control over 
production, distribution, and transportation of these resources. The large revenues that Central 
Asian governments stand to earn from selling their resources, encourage these governments to 
increase export capacity to external markets even at the expense of domestic and intraregional 
energy consumption. Short-term oriented energy policies also impact the sustainability of the 
Central Asian energy sectors. Asymmetrical interdependence between regional producers and                                                         
2 Tolganai Umbetalieva, Personal Interview, Director of the Central Asian Foundation for the Development of 
Democracy, Almaty, Kazakhstan, April 1, 2014. 
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external customers who are eager to acquire Central Asian resources but who also prefer a 
bilateral format of cooperation remains a challenge to establish a strong unified energy system 
(CAES). 
 Reintegration of the CAES varies from simply maintaining the coordinated operation of 
energy networks to large-scale joint investments in the development of hydrocarbon and hydro-
power sectors. Due to different levels of economic development, Central Asian countries will not 
be able to equally contribute to sustaining the system and share the cost. Kazakhstan’s GDP 
accounts for twofold that of other Central Asian states’ combined, while economies of Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan are the least developed.3 Unwillingness of some regional state actors to take 
over the cost of others while equally sharing the benefits is another challenge indicating that full-
scale reintegration of the CAES at this stage is highly unlikely.  
Intra-Central Asian Energy Trade to Meet Current Demand 
 Restoring energy trade may either lead to an integrated energy system or provide 
conditions for a smooth transition to independent energy systems depending on which policy 
priority is chosen by the Central Asian governments. Intra-Central Asian energy trade ensures 
sufficient energy supplies to meet energy demand peaks for Central Asian upstream countries 
and allows downstream neighbours to use their resources more efficiently. It might only 
contribute to energy security level of the Central Asian region in the short run, but it may 
nonetheless be an important first step toward achieving a maximally secure CAES in the future. 
Breaking the status quo through intra-regional energy trade, which is beneficial for both sides, 
should be an important policy direction for the Central Asian countries if they want to improve                                                         
3 World Bank, GDP (Current US$) for 2013 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), accessed March 1, 2015, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/XD-XM?display=default. 
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their energy security. In fact, Central Asian countries would achieve similar benefits from intra-
regional energy trade as from operating within the reintegrated CAES. Short-term bilateral 
agreements-based energy trade within the region, however, is not sustainable. Unless there is a 
well-functioning regional energy governance mechanism designed to ensure cooperation in 
energy sector to improve energy security in emergency as well in normal situations the CAES 
will remain vulnerable. At the same time, while increasing intra-Central Asian energy trade 
requires to some extent reconsideration of the state actors’ energy policy priorities, issues of 
sovereignty, strategic interests and distribution of gains are not as acute as in case of the CAES 
reintegration and thus, more acceptable to Central Asian governments.  
 The analysis of the vulnerability of the CAES shows that there are several advantages of 
intra-Central Asian energy cooperation with direct effect on the level of energy security in the 
region. Regional state actors have inherited gas pipeline and electric power grid networks so that 
there is no need to invest in expensive infrastructure to connect Central Asian energy sectors. 
Comparative advantage in complementary energy sources provides the conditions for using 
energy in the most rational way by exchanging or trading resources. Since the volume of 
electricity and natural gas export/import in the region is insignificant, such trading arrangements 
do not threaten the availability of energy to external customers and thus do not cause 
confrontation from their side. The Central Asian energy trade does not only address the problem 
of the uneven distribution of resources, but also resolves the shortage of energy due to seasonal 
variations. The most cost-efficient way to produce energy and transport it within the region will 
decrease the price of energy. While re-integration of the CAES in the current geopolitical 
realities would be a difficult task to accomplish, coordinated management of energy supply flows 
and increasing energy trade among regional state actors are quite realizable. Trading of energy 
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resources may go beyond formal trading agreements and take the form of swaps, barters and 
other types of exchange arrangements. It is important, however, that such arrangements are 
concluded mainly among Central Asian countries because all external actors are only interested 
in moving resources out of the region with no contribution to Central Asian energy security. 
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Complementarity of Energy Resources 
 Central Asian countries do not only possess a significant amount of resources, but also 
enjoy a comparative advantage in developing different types of energy, which provides incentive 
for intra-regional trade (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan enjoy 5.5 percent of the world’s 
economically-efficient hydro-power potential; Kazakhstan possesses a considerable amount of 
oil and is among the top ten countries with explored coal reserves in the world; Uzbekistan is a 
major natural gas producer in the region; Turkmenistan is the largest natural gas exporter in 
Central Asia and ranks fourth in terms of gas deposits in the world).4 While diversification of 
sources in the energy consumption balance is often tied to RES, in the context of the Central 
Asian region it is the exchange of fossil fuels and hydro power, which can provide sustainability 
of supplies in the short to medium run. Having benefitted from exchanging different types of 
resources, Central Asian states enjoyed stability and reliability of energy supplies for many 
decades. However, the disintegration process of the CAES has forced state actors to develop and 
depend on a particular type of energy source and thus, have become vulnerable. Intra-Central 
Asian energy trade can work to solve these problems by contributing to the diversification of 
energy sources in the overall balance of energy consumption. 
Sufficiency of the Supplies 
 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan import a high volume of primary energy resources and have 
limited opportunities to diversify their dependence on existing electricity transmission lines and 
                                                        
4 R. A. Zakhidov, “Central Asian Countries Energy System and Role of Renewable Energy Sources,” Applied Solar 
Energy 44, no. 3 (2008): 218–223. 
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gas supply networks coming from and through Uzbekistan. While Central Asian downstream 
countries’ oil and natural gas are important for external players, they are also extremely 
important for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.5 
 Hydro power is the main source of energy for these countries. However, water run-of-
river type HPPs produce electricity only in the summer period, leaving countries in an energy 
crisis in the winter. Having quite a few diversification options, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan may 
hope to receive Kazakhstani fossil fuels and thermal electricity. Another possibility is to use 
transited Turkmen gas through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan when CAGP’s Line–D is constructed 
and thermal electricity from Turkmenistan. In any case, Central Asian producers themselves can 
supply an additional volume of energy to upstream states. In addition, using existing 
infrastructure remains the most cost efficient way to improve energy security in upstream Central 
Asian states. 
Sustainability of Energy Supplies 
 Overemphasizing the importance of fossil fuels explains the lack of attention by 
governmental agencies toward the development of RES to ensure sustainability of energy 
supplies. Despite the fact that Central Asian countries enjoy an abundance of clean energy 
resources (5.5 percent of the world’s economically efficient hydro-power potential is found in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and solar energy in mainly downstream states is available an average 
of 8–10 hours of sunshine per day),6 they represent only a tiny proportion of the resources used 
to produce electricity. Renewables, mainly hydro power, accounted for only 1 percent of 
Kazakhstan’s, 2 percent of Uzbekistan’s, and 0.001 percent of Turkmenistan’s primary energy 
                                                        
5 Maxim Ryabkov, Personal Interview, Director of the OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, September 5, 2013.  
6 Zakhidov, “Central Asian Countries Energy System,” 218–223. 
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production.7 When Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS it succeeded to cover electricity loss 
that was previously imported from upstream countries by burning more coal and gas in TPPs. 
Turkmenistan increased the number of gas-fired TPPs to meet its electricity needs. Kazakhstan 
connected its southern regions with electricity produced in coal-fired TPPs located in the north. 
Apart from environmental considerations producing electricity in TPPs during summer period is 
cost inefficient. In winter, TPPs produce electricity and provide a heating opportunity, while in 
summer only electricity is produced.  
 Burning fossil fuels are the source of CO2 emissions. Figures for carbon dioxide 
emissions from the consumption of energy for Central Asian countries in tonnes per capita 
suggest that the level of CO2 in Central Asian downstream countries is quite high: Kazakhstan—
11.3; Kyrgyzstan—1.4; Tajikistan—0.34; Turkmenistan—10.4; and Uzbekistan—4.1).8 While 
energy efficiency initiatives to improve energy-producing facilities can save some energy, it is 
not a solution per se. It can only buy time to develop a sustainable energy sector.9 Importing 
electricity from upstream Central Asian states, which have a surplus of clean and sustainable 
electricity production during the summer, would benefit downstream countries by providing the 
possibility to use their fossil fuels more efficiently with limited CO2 emissions.  
 The water-energy nexus dispute between Uzbekistan and Central Asian consumer 
countries poses a serious challenge to the realization of the region’s full hydro-power potential.                                                         
7 International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Country Profile—Kazakhstan (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 
n.d), accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.irena.org/REmaps/countryprofiles/asia/Kazakhstan.pdf; International 
Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Country Profile—Turkmenistan (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, n.d), accessed 
December 1, 2014, http://www.irena.org/REmaps/countryprofiles/asia/Turkmenistan.pdf; International Renewable 
Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Country Profile—Uzbekistan (Abu Dhabi: IRENA, n.d), accessed 
December 5, 2014, http://www.irena.org/REmaps/countryprofiles/asia/Uzbekistan.pdf. 
8 US EIA, Statistics: Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption of Energy for 2011 (Metric Tons 
of Carbon Dioxide per Person) (Washington, DC: US EIA, n.d., accessed January 4, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=45&aid=8&cid=KZ,KG,TI,TX,UZ,&syid=2007
&eyid=2011&unit=MMTCD.  
9 José Goldemberg, “Energy Choices toward a Sustainable Future,” Environment: Science and Policy for 
Sustainable Development, December 2007, accessed February 5, 2015, 
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/December%202007/Goldemberg-full.html. 
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While approximately 98 percent of Tajikistan’s electricity is produced using hydro power, only 
10 percent of its total hydro-power potential is currently being tapped.10 Further development of 
the region’s hydro-power potential (i.e., the construction of the Kambarata–1 and Rogun HPPs) 
will enable a surplus of electricity for internal consumption, which will most likely result in 
increasing the volume of clean electricity exports to neighbouring downstream countries as well 
as external customers.11 A surplus of electricity will not entirely replace gas and fuel imports, but 
it will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to engage in energy trade negotiations with Uzbekistan 
on a more equal footing.  
Inherited Energy Transport Infrastructure 
 Building infrastructure to connect energy-producing and consuming sites is probably the 
most time-, energy- and finance-intensive part of establishing an energy system. Central Asian 
countries have inherited energy infrastructure (for example, Bukhara–Tashkent–Shymkent–
Almaty–Bishkek, Uzbekistan–Tajikistan, Uzbekistan–Southern Kyrgyzstan gas pipelines and the 
Central Asian electric power grids) capable of transporting enough resources to meet current 
energy needs of the whole region. Increasing energy supplies through upgrading existing 
infrastructure is cheaper and faster than building independent energy systems. In this sense, 
interconnected energy systems entail two key economic benefits: savings in operating costs of 
the interconnected electric power and pipeline systems; and savings in investment costs of 
upgrading interconnected energy infrastructure networks.  
                                                        
10 Robert L. Wilby et al., PPCR Phase I Project A4: Improving the Climate Resilience of Tajikistan’s Hydropower 
Sector (Pilot Program of Climate Resilience, 2011), accessed January 5, 2014, 
http://www.ppcr.tj/IP/Phase1/Component4/ppcr_a4_-draft_final_report_13oct11%20 (Final%20REport).pdf. 
11 Igor Tomberg, “Energy Industry in Central Asia—Challenges and Prospects,” Russian International Affairs 
Council, 2012, accessed March 4, 2013, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=350#top. 
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Alternative Electric Power Transmission Lines 
 An attempt to establish an independent electric power system while avoiding the 
electricity transmission lines of Uzbekistan is still in the planning stage. Once Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan complete the construction of their independent electric power grids 
connecting north with south, there will be a possibility to connect south-eastern Kazakhstan with 
northern Kyrgyzstan via the Kemin–Alma 500 kV transmission line and southern Kyrgyzstan 
with northern Tajikistan via the Datka–Hodzent 500 kV transmission line.12 Alternative electric 
power systems would then allow these three countries to exchange electricity to meet seasonal 
production deficiencies. Establishing a well-functioning countrywide electric power transmission 
networks and connecting all three countries by building trans-border transmission lines are both 
time- and finance-intensive projects. This may seem to be a good option in the long-term, but in 
the short-term, the increasing electricity trade within the existing Central Asian electric power 
grids that will make it possible to address more acute energy security challenges. 
Decreasing the Price of Energy 
 In one of his speeches, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev highlighted, “the 
price of electricity will continue to increase, whether you want it or not; the price of gas will be 
getting close to world prices as well; [so he recommends that industries and people] employ 
energy efficient technologies.”13 Turkmenistan has introduced pricing for natural gas that was 
previously provided free of charge. It has also become difficult for Uzbekistan to sustain low                                                         
12 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Consultant, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation: 
Power Sector Regional Master Plan (Metro Manila: Asian Development Bank, Report no. 43549, 2012), 2–34, 
accessed January 15, 2015, http://adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2010/43549-01-reg-tar.pdf. 
13 Murat Jakeev, “Tarifi na Elektroenergiyu i Gaz Budut Rasti—Prezident RK (Tariffs for Electricity and Gas will 
Continue to Increase—President of RK),” Kazinform, July 2, 2014, accessed August 1, 2014, 
http://inform.kz/rus/article/2674096.  
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prices of gas, electricity and oil products in its highly subsidized energy sector. Total subsidy as 
shares of GDP in Uzbekistan accounts for 21.7 percent, followed by Turkmenistan with 20.6 
percent and Kazakhstan with 2.8 percent.14 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan suffer from high prices for 
energy. These countries are in need of cheaper energy, which can be provided by choosing the 
most cost efficient way to secure supply of energy resources. Even though quick transition to 
equating domestic and foreign prices is difficult, this process in the end is inevitable. Taking into 
account economic, environmental and energy security concerns of using independent energy 
systems, regional energy trade will decrease the cost of energy, thus accelerate the transition 
process.  
Preventing Conflict over the Region’s Resources 
 Guided by the belief of self-sufficiency, Uzbekistan has cut gas and electricity supply to 
upstream Central Asian states, and in response Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are speeding up the 
process of Rogun and Kambarata–1 HPPs construction. Projects capable of affecting the existing 
water distribution level in the region have led to confrontation from downstream Central Asian 
countries. During an official visit of the President of Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan, he warned that 
construction of large HPPs in the region may “lead not only to confrontations, but also to war.”15 
Restoring and sustaining regional energy trade would be a gesture of good will from the 
Uzbekistani side and encourage upstream states to sustain previous water-energy supply balance 
until Central Asian countries can reach solutions amenable to all.  
                                                        
14 International Energy Agency, Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidy Rates as a Proportion of the Full Cost of Supply, 
2013 (Paris: International Energy Agency, n.d), accessed June 15, 2015, http://www.iea.org/subsidy/index.html. 
15 Fuel Energy Sector Transparency Initiative in Kyrgyz Republic, “Kambaratinskie Strasti (Kambarata 




 Regional producers’ perception of energy resources as a strategic commodity and the 
overemphasized sovereignty issues have prevented a full-scale re-integration of the Central 
Asian energy sectors. Transition to independent national energy systems, however, along with 
developing countrywide infrastructure and increasing energy production capacity also requires 
sustaining intra-Central Asian energy trade. Short-term trading arrangements will not solve all 
energy security problems, but they can contribute to enduring affordable prices by using 
resources rationally, enhancing countries’ ability to meet energy peak demands and creating 
preconditions to establish sustainable energy sectors. Since energy sectors are highly controlled 
by the governments, improving intra-regional trade requires particular state policies that 
prioritize intra-Central Asian energy cooperation and trade. What is needed to achieve this goal 
is to have a platform where regional governments and non-state institutions could coordinate 
their course of actions to strengthen regional cooperation in the energy sector.  
 In order to restore intra-Central Asian energy trade, regional state actors’ energy policies 
should be designed in such a way that increasing the energy export does not compromise the 
availability of sufficient energy supplies for regional consumption. Subsidizing energy for the 
domestic market makes it economically inefficient for regional producers to increase the volume 
of energy for internal and intra-regional markets. Moreover, to compensate for economic loss 
due to subsidizing energy for domestic consumers, regional exporters are likely to continue 
prioritizing exports to external markets. In this sense, it is using resources in the most rational 
and cost efficient way that can incentivize regional actors to engage in cooperative dynamics in 
the energy sector. 
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 Having a history of long-term cooperation in the energy sector with the preconditions to 
establish and sustain cooperative dynamics, the “SH” is a good model by which to map Central 
Asian countries’ energy security dilemma. There are prospects to hunt a stag (the security of the 
CAES) through cooperation in the energy sector and to reinstate intra-Central Asian energy 
trade. Existing energy infrastructure, history of the parallel operation of the national energy 
systems, complementarity of energy sources, among many other factors, may incentivize and 
encourage actors to pursue strengthening the security of the CAES. Central Asian actors can 
achieve the highest pay off through cooperation in the energy sector. Since there should be no 
incentives between actors to cheat on each other in pursuit of rewards higher than what they can 
achieve through cooperation, current regional-level energy security problems lie with actors’ 
failure to take coordinated actions to respond to those challenges and not the cooperation itself. 
The main challenge as it seems now is the choice between short- and long-term benefits. While 
all Central Asian countries will most likely benefit from cooperation in the energy sector, current 
geopolitical realities tempt some actors to defect on others and pursue short-term rewards (not 
necessarily in terms of energy security) and force others do the same, thus leaving them 
absolutely no chance to hunt the stag. To encourage energy actors to coordinate their strategies to 
address energy security challenges, several energy governance mechanisms (innovations) were 
put in place. 
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CHAPTER V. Regional Energy Governance Innovations in Central Asia 
 Political context has always been an integral part of the Soviet energy management. 
While the Communist Party and Executive Committee (Politburo) shaped the policy making in 
the energy sector, planning and administrative organizations, ministerial, regional and scientific 
groups also played an important role in formation of those policies.1 Having designed electric 
power systems without regard to republic borders, the Soviets enjoyed the advantage of a 
nationwide Unified Power Systems. There were 11 such systems established within the Soviet 
Union. 2  Management of electric power systems on such a large territory requires effective 
control centres. Coordination and management of these systems was assigned to the central 
dispatching department (CDD). The primary responsibility of the CDD was to ensure stable and 
reliable supply of electric power to consumer sites as well as efficient operation of the unified 
electric power systems.3  
There were two levels of decision making in the Soviet Union. First, the Politburo 
determined the main policy directions and energy strategy. Second, Gosplan (the state planning 
agency), in coordination with ministries and research institutions, elaborated detailed energy 
policies. There were over 60 ministries in the Soviet government, of which 11 were responsible 
for energy production and management and another 6 provided construction, transportation and 
infrastructure support. 4  The energy industry was structured in the way that operated as a 
centrally planned system. It was characterized by horizontal relationships among various 
agencies (the oil ministry, the refining petro-chemicals ministry, the foreign trade ministry, etc.), 
                                                        
1 Lionel S. Johns et al., Technology and Soviet Energy Availability (Washington: U.S. Government Printing, 1981), 
355. 
2 Ibid., 156. 
3 Ibid., 157. 
4 Ibid., 356. 
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each of which had its own areas of jurisdiction.5 The key is that there had been a supranational 
body to establish energy sector development strategies and monitoring mechanisms. Regional 
energy systems, however, have undergone significant internal transformations since the early 
1990s, shifting from horizontal to vertical management systems (widely used in Europe). 6 
Energy companies became responsible for extraction, exploitation and transportation of energy 
resources to energy markets. Most importantly, there was no longer a centre to oversee the 
coherent, efficient development of regional energy as a whole.  
 Having experienced energy insecurity due to decreasing intra-Central Asian cooperation 
in the energy sector, regional state actors are in need of reinstating energy trade and coordinated 
operation of energy systems. However, financial and technological limitations as well as political 
constraints affect Central Asian governments’ capability and often willingness to address energy 
security problems through regional cooperation. As the analysis shows security of the CAES is 
determined by several conditions: reliability and stability of sufficient energy supplies both in 
normal and emergency situations; the ability to coordinate actions to quickly and effectively 
respond to sudden energy supply cuts; transparency and accountability of energy sectors; transit 
security of energy resources through the territories of the Central Asian states; at the country-
level development of the RES and increasing energy efficiency of energy producing, consuming 
and transporting facilities. These conditions were largely provided by the CAES, which was 
controlled by Moscow during the Soviet period and operated by inertia afterwards. Ongoing 
disagreements between Central Asian countries leading to disintegration of the CAES can hardly 
be resolved or, what is more important, the CAES cannot be sustained without an effective 
regional energy governance mechanism. In the Central Asian context such a mechanism must                                                         
5 Daniel Yergin, THE QUEST: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (The Penguin Press, 2011), 
27. 
6 Ibid., 28. 
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possess powerful instruments to encourage Central Asian states to fulfill their obligations to 
ensure stability of energy supplies within the region, in which sacrificing some of their interests 
due to integration of energy networks into a broader system would still be better than non-
compliance with terms of intergovernmental agreements.  
 One of the key aspects of energy security in Central Asia is the ability of the regional 
actors to ensure joint investments in maintenance and modernization of transboundary electricity 
transmission lines, pipeline infrastructures as well as the development of the Central Asian 
(hydro) power and fossil fuel sectors by pulling financial resources, technologies and qualified 
expertise from multilateral-institutions, private companies, civil society organizations and 
national governments. It has been found that a governance innovation capable of guiding 
national energy policies along the lines of the Central Asian Regional Energy Cooperation 
Strategy and Action Plan (which mainly focuses on five Central Asian states) can be an asset to 
ensure sustainability of cooperative dynamics in the energy sector. Conceptually, achieving the 
above-mentioned goals depends on whether Central Asian energy governors share a common 
understanding regarding what constitutes the core of energy insecurity, the seriousness of energy 
security challenges and the importance of collective policy initiatives to overcome those 
obstacles. 
 Acknowledging the importance of regional energy cooperation and the above-mentioned 
attributes of a maximally secure CAES, several regional-level governance innovations were put 
in place to promote and strengthen it. International financial institutions, NGOs, private and state 
energy companies as well as research institutions have, to certain extents, successfully engaged 
in the development of the Central Asian energy sectors and provided security for the CAES 
through several regional energy programs and initiatives (governance innovations): the Asian 
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Development Bank (ADB) promoted the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC); the World Bank supported the Central Asia Energy–Water Development Program 
(CAEWDP); Central Asia–South Asia Regional Electricity Trade Project (CASA–1000); Rogun 
Techno-Economic Assessment and Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Studies in 
Tajikistan as well as the European Union-supported Central Asian Regional Environmental 
Center.7 Besides, multilateral platforms there are also intergovernmental organizations such as 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which have developed mechanisms hypothetically 
capable of providing some prospects for coordinated regulations of strategically important 
Central Asian energy sectors and address regional energy security challenges. This chapter 
provides the analysis of these regional-level energy governance innovations, which among a 
number of key functions, prioritize improving energy security through regional cooperation in 
Central Asia, and identifies major weaknesses of these innovations.  
The Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 
 The CAREC is probably the largest and the most effective regional initiative in terms of 
the number of practically implemented projects in the energy sector in Central Asia. The 
CAREC is a program of partnership among ten countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) supported by six multilateral institutions (the ADB, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development 
                                                        
7 Derya Deniz, “Top Development Aid Groups in Central Asia: A Primer Devex,” Devex, April 23, 2011, accessed 
March 5, 2015, https://www.devex.com/news/top-development-aid-groups-in-central-asia-a-primer-74324. 
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Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank). 8  The initiative 
“CAREC 2020—Good Neighbors, Good Partners, and Good Prospects”9 perfectly lines up with 
the idea that the regional cooperation in the energy sector contributes to reliable, secure and 
stable supplies of the energy sources, which in its turn is believed to lead to economic growth 
and development. The CAREC has indeed developed comprehensive conceptual tools to 
promote regional trade and improve the level of energy security. However, the analysis shows 
that practically implemented regional-level energy projects are limited to technical assistance 
within the CAREC. In this sense, Central Asia is currently perceived more as a geographical 
territory composed of separate units within which the CAREC implements local and national 
energy projects. 
The CAREC Energy Sector Development Strategy 
 For thirteen years, the overall input of the CAREC amounted to US$24.6 billion for 158 
projects in such areas of cooperation as transport, trade facilitation, trade policy, and energy.10 
The energy sector received US$4.6 billion of the total investment package. Having focused 
mostly on bilateral electricity trade and improving regional electric power grids, the CAREC 
completed more than 2,322 kilometers of electricity transmission lines. 11 Particularly in this 
sector, the CAREC aims to implement regional-level projects to improve energy security and 
energy-driven economic growth by ensuring stability and reliability of energy supplies through                                                         
8 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, Regional Cooperation at Work in Central Asia (Metro Manila: Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, n.d), accessed December 1, 2014, 
http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=carec-program.  
9 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, A Strategic Framework for the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation Program 2011–2020 (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2012), 10, accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/docs/CAREC-Publications/2012/CAREC-2020-Strategic-Framework.pdf. 
10 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, At a Glance (Metro Manila: Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation Program, n.d), accessed December 1, 2014, http://carecprogram.org/. 
11 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, Energy Results (Metro Manila: Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation Program, n.d), accessed December 1, 2014, http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=energy. 
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improved trade of energy resources. The regional cooperation that the CAREC has claimed to be 
actively promoting is supposed to be a powerful instrument to implement national projects that 
brings benefits to all participating states.12 It is expected that energy trade can overcome the 
consequences of uneven distribution of energy resources and seasonal variation of electricity 
production in the region. Cooperation will open up new energy market opportunities for the 
Central Asian producers, which is in line with their dependency-diversification-oriented foreign 
energy policies. Transit revenue is another encouraging factor for greater regional cooperation. 
 What distinguishes the CAREC from most of the regional initiatives in Central Asia is 
the fact that it is very much practical-results oriented.13 It also promotes mutually beneficial 
regional cooperation. Projects are implemented based on the following principles: (a) country 
ownership; (b) pragmatism and result orientation; and (c) 2+X principle, which is the 
development of strengthened partnership. The CAREC encourages Central Asian governments 
and non-state institutions to successfully pull their resources through a public private partnership 
initiative.14  
 The CAREC is the only actor/institutional mechanism in the region that has its own 
strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector in Central Asia. This strategy is 
developed to assist member states to improve “energy security through the balanced 
development of the region’s energy infrastructure and institutions, and stronger integration of the 
region’s energy markets to make available adequate volumes of commercial energy to all in a 
reliable, affordable, financially sustainable, and environmentally sound manner; and economic 
                                                        
12 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, Projects Supported by the CAREC Program, (Metro Manila: Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, 2014), accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=carec-projects§or=energy#table_start.  
13 Aidana Berdybekova, Personal interview, Regional Cooperation Coordinator (Consultant) Kyrgyz Resident 
Mission, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, February 4, 2014.  
14 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, “A Strategic Framework for the Central Asia,” 17.  
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growth through energy trade.”15 An Energy Work Plan (EWP) for the period of 2013–2015 of 
the CAREC was specifically designed to take concrete steps along the way toward achieving 
these goals. The EWP entails six main elements:  
• Developing the Central Asia–South Asia Energy Corridor within CASA–1000 electricity 
transmission line and Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline projects. These 
projects are designed to bring Central Asian natural gas and hydroelectricity to energy 
thirsty South Asian neighbours.  
• Resolving regional energy dispatch and trade issues, which calls for the re-establishment 
of energy trade patterns between Uzbekistan and upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
which was broken when Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS and cut gas supplies. 
• Managing energy-water linkages. The resource-sharing mechanism in the region closely 
tied up water supply for irrigation and hydro-power production sectors. The Rogun and 
Kambarata–1 HPPs are essential to improve energy security of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, but the construction of giant dams can affect water balance in Central Asia.  
• Mobilizing funds to build energy facilities, assess countries’ own resources and attract 
potential private investors. The CAREC member countries differ in their economic 
development. Not surprisingly, countries with the lowest level of energy security are also 
the ones with limited financial resources—Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. This organization is assisting member states to attract investments within public 
private partnership initiatives. 
• Implementation of energy priority projects. The CAREC prioritizes modernization of 
energy infrastructure connecting Central Asian countries and building new production                                                         
15 Strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector of CAREC Countries (Baku, Azerbaijan: Seventh 
Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, 2008), 5, accessed March 24, 2015, 
http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/docs/CAREC-Regional-Cooperation-Strategy-in-Energy.pdf.  
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and transportation facilities to increase states’ export capacity and connect energy 
producing and consuming regions. 
• Capacity building and knowledge management.16 
 While conceptually, the CAREC has developed a comprehensive instrument for 
promoting projects designed to contribute to energy security and energy-led economic growth 
through regional cooperation, so far it has implemented a few regional-level projects in the 
energy sector.17 It does not necessarily mean that the CAREC does not prioritize regional-level 
energy projects. It may, however, imply that in addition to financial constraints and investment-
related risks to improve energy trade patterns there are political and security risks that are far 
more difficult to overcome, such as: (a) risks associated with internal and regional conflicts; (b) 
competing geopolitical interests of greater regional powers over the region’s energy resources; 
(c) non-market regulations of energy supplies and payment risks associated with a “take or pay” 
trading arrangements; and (d) prevailing bilateral agreement over multilateral cooperation in the 
energy sector.18  
Few Regional Energy Projects 
 Analysis of projects initiated within the CAREC and separately promoted by ADB shows 
that in the last two decades, of over sixty-two projects only four are regional and an additional 
                                                        
16 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, Energy Sector Coordinating Committee Work Plan 2013–2015 (Metro 
Manila: Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, 2012), accessed May 10, 2014, 
http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/docs/CAREC-Energy-Sector-Coordinating-Committee-Work-Plan-2013-
2015.pdf. 
17 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, All Key Energy Projects (Metro Manila: Central Asia Regional 
Economic Cooperation Program, n.d), accessed May 15, 2014, http://www.carecprogram.org/index.php?page=all-
energy-projects. 
18 Strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector, 13–14. 
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three engage several Central Asian states. All these projects are in the form of technical 
assistance.19  
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 The CAREC energy strategy pays particular attention to three elements. First, it is a 
capacity building and knowledge sharing initiative that allows identifying the most lucrative 
investment projects so to give them priority in implementation. The second element takes certain 
measures that will lead to a favourable policy environment in which investors are ensured that 
their money is secure and will have their investments returned with interest. And third, while 
focusing on economically sound initiatives, the strategy distinguishes those that require domestic 
investments (energy efficiency and clean energy) and those that can be realized through the 
cross-border investment measures (cross-border energy transmission, facilitation of access/transit                                                         
19 Asian Development Bank, CAREC Unit, “All Key Energy Projects.” 
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to third-country energy markets, production for export, integration of energy markets, etc.).20 
Tensions in the relationships among Central Asian countries over some major energy projects 
force regional state actors to pursue energy policies, which distance them from each other. As a 
result, the Central Asian countries’ energy policies prioritize local- and country-level energy 
development projects. Since the CAREC usually responds to governments’ request to assist in 
implementation of energy projects, which are usually local in nature, it is not surprising that 
small projects constitute the absolute majority of the CAREC initiatives.21  
Competing Energy Corridors 
 Another challenge preventing the implementation of regional-level energy projects is the 
fact that the CAREC claims to promote cooperation with external customers, but the export 
capacity of the region does not allow it. It is argued that the integration of energy markets will 
solve the problem of uneven distribution of energy resources among the CAREC countries and 
address some problems in the energy sector through optimizing existing energy 
interrelationships. Greater regional cooperation and trading energy resources are indeed possible: 
Central Asian rich hydrocarbon producers are surrounded by countries thirsty for energy 
resources either due to rapidly growing energy intense economies (China, Europe, Turkey), 
inherited energy infrastructure and interdependent energy sectors (Russia) or simply because 
they lack energy resources to meet their basic energy needs (South Asian countries); and, there is 
also yet unexploited hydro-power potential of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that can increase the 
level of renewable and clean energy sources in the overall energy balance in all CAREC member 
states.                                                          
20 Strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector of CAREC Countries. 
21 Ilkhom Teshabaev, Personal Interview, ADB Project Manager in Uzbekistan, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 20, 
2013.  
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 The strategy implies that in the medium- to long-term perspective regional cooperation 
will be developed within five priority energy corridors to integrate energy markets: 
• Central Asia–East Asia: oil and gas exports from Kazakhstan and gas export from 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China; 
• Central Asia–South Asia: Central Asian countries exporting natural gas and 
electricity to mainly Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
• Intra-Central Asia Cooperation: gas, oil products and thermal electricity supply 
from downstream to upstream countries in exchange for hydroelectricity; 
• Central Asia–Russian Federation: oil and gas exports to Russia and imports of 
Russian oil products; and 
• Central Asia–European Union: supply of oil and gas from the Central Asian 
region.22 
 
Table 23: Regional Energy Corridors23 
 
The two regions with the highest 

























 X X X X 
Energy-Water 
Linkages  X X   
                                                         
22 Strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector, 10. 
23“Energy Sector Coordinating Committee Work Plan 2013–2015.” 
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 With the current pace of natural gas export capacity increase, Central Asian states would 
not be able to meet the external customers’ expectations in all directions, existing and potential 
(45 billion m3 to Russia; 80 billion m3 to China; 20 billion m3 to Iran; 33 billion m3 to South 
Asia; and, approximately 30 billion m3 to Europe), in the near future because the current level of 
natural gas export capacity of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan combined hardly 
exceed 65–70 billion m3 per year. It will even be challenging to keep up with gas export within 
existing several corridors, especially Chinese. So the regional energy trade within one corridor 
may negatively impact the availability of energy resources in other directions. While more 
powerful states use economic and political leverage to influence decision making and ensure 
energy flows toward their direction, less powerful countries are counting on multilateral 
institutions to secure energy supplies. However, alliances between multilateral donors with 
countries in need of such assistance seem not powerful enough to challenge major powers’ 
interest in the region. In this competition, despite the fact that intra-Central Asian and Central 
Asia–South Asia partnerships require priority attention, cooperation in these directions is 
progressing extremely slowly. Most of the energy resources are consumed by or transited 
through Russia, which has inherited energy-transporting infrastructure, and China, which has 
connected its market with energy-producing Central Asian countries via newly built pipeline 
networks. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was officially established on June 15, 2001 with 
full membership of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. Having started as a security organization with a particular focus on solving 
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border issues and then joining forces to fight against the three “isms” (terrorism, extremism and 
separatism), its activity was soon extended to economic cooperation. The political scientist Zhao 
Huasheng once argued that “if the SCO is unable to bring economic benefits to the Central Asian 
states, it is likely that they will focus their attention elsewhere, away from the SCO, leading to 
the weakening and irrelevance of the organization.” 24 Energy as a strategic commodity had 
immediately drawn the attention of state actors within the organization. Governmental 
representatives of the SCO member states argued many times for the necessity to establish an 
effective mechanism (governance innovation) to regulate the energy sector.  
Institutional Framework 
 The SCO has developed quite a comprehensive decision-making and enforcement 
mechanism. Currently, energy projects are implemented within the framework of the SCO 
economic cooperation. The heads of State Council and the heads of Government Council are 
supreme decision-making bodies responsible for setting the course of the organization’s activity 
and addressing urgent issues. Meetings of ministers of economy, trade and transport deal with 
the concrete fields of activity in the energy sector. The Commission of Senior Officials in the 
fields of economy and trade develop detailed action plans to implement energy projects. The last 
body in the chain are Special Working Groups, which are responsible for providing customs 
services, standardization and certification procedures, investments, development of transit 
potential, information and communication technologies and energy resources.25  
                                                        
24 Zhao Huasheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization at 5: Achievements and Challenges Ahead,” China and 
Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 3 (2006): 13. 
25 Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Brief Introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (Beijing: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, n.d), accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp. 
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 There are also other complementary bodies assisting in implementation of energy 
projects. The SCO Interbank Consortium is a special body that provides financial services for 
approved economic projects.26 The SCO Forum is the platform for cooperation among national 
research institutions. The SCO Business Council is a non-governmental body that brings together 
representatives of the business community and is responsible for promoting economic 
development through facilitation of cooperation in such areas as science, technology, 
transportation, communication, investment and energy. 27 An important agency that the SCO 
member states have been counting on is the Energy Club.  
The “Main” Energy Agency: The Energy Club  
 Russian President Vladimir Putin first presented the idea to create the SCO Energy Club 
during the International Conference on “Central Asian Energy Market: Tendencies and 
Perspectives” in 2005 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.28 A policy initiative to establish the SCO Energy 
Club was officially announced in 2007. Eight years later in December 2013, the SCO member 
states finally signed a memorandum on formally establishing the SCO Energy Club. According 
to the Russian deputy minister of Energy Anatoliy Yanovskiy, the main objective of the Club is 
to form recommendations to the SCO member states on how to behave in dynamically changing 
regional-energy markets and to ensure stability of the energy demand/supply balance. Because 
                                                        
26 Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO Interbank Consortium (Beijing: Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, 2014), accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=514. 
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the Club’s decisions do not have enforcement power, they remain only recommendations.29 
Although the specifics of how the SCO regional mechanism will deal with energy security issues 
are still quite vague, this is the only organization that encompasses almost all Central Asian 
states and two major external energy importers (Russia and China), while engaging with other 
states interested in region’s natural resources (India, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc.) as 
observers. 
 According to official statements, there is an overall agreement among heads of states that 
“reliable and mutually beneficial partnership in the energy sector strengthens security and 
stability across the SCO region.”30 This partnership (among producing, transit and consuming 
states), however, is limited to ensuring the stability of moving energy out of the region to China 
and Russia from and through Central Asian states. The SCO member countries signed a “Treaty 
on Long-Term Good—Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” according to which they base their relationships on 
principles of equality and mutual benefit.31 However, both Russia and China consider Central 
Asian countries as sources of energy, and the partnership is focused on importing energy 
resources. Muratbek Imanaliev, former SCO secretary general, once highlighted that the idea to 
integrate consumers and producers in one union (the SCO Energy Club) is not promising and 
such agency will most likely turn into a sort of political union.32 And greater energy security 
may not necessarily be a primary objective of a politically-motivated organization. Energy 
                                                        
29 “SCO Member States Agreed to Establish Energy Club,” Kazenergy, December 9, 2013, accessed July 5, 2014, 
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projects that engage members of the organization are implemented according to bilateral 
agreements between China and Russia and each of the Central Asian countries separately, while 
the Energy Club remains only a formally-existing special agency of the SCO. Besides, the SCO 
member states still cannot agree on a united position over the common strategic energy concept.  
 Nursultan Nazarbaev highlighted that Kazakhstan strongly supports the idea to create the 
SCO Energy Club, “We think that the mechanism of Ministries of Energy meetings…must be 
organized within the framework of the SCO Energy club, which from our point of view, would 
become one of the main elements of [Kazakhstan’s] Asian Energy Strategy.” The strategy 
implies establishing an SCO energy agency that would serve as a “brain centre,” the information 
centre and the SCO energy exchange—trading energy on the SCO market.33 The Asian Energy 
strategy aims to ensure: 
• stable and reliable energy supplies for the population and economic needs of the 
participating states in the Asian energy strategy—adequate energy supplies during 
stable conditions and minimal energy supplies in case of emergencies; 
• RES development (providing balance between fossil fuels and RES); 
• diversification of energy sources (decreasing extensive dependence on a single 
energy source); 
• respect for environmental concerns; 
• energy efficiency and conservation; 
• development of economic conditions to ensure the most cost efficient way of 
energy supplies to internal and external markets and rationalizing the structure of 
energy export; and 
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• innovative technologies are employed in the energy sector of the SCO member 
states.34 
 However, the analysis shows that currently energy cooperation within the SCO is not 
developing in all directions as Kazakhstan, and probably all other Central Asian states, have been 
expecting.  
Insufficient Export Capacity 
 The SCO member states can roughly be divided into exporters and importers of energy 
resources, in which Central Asian countries are part of the former. Moving energy out of the 
region in large quantities, with limited production level, threatens the availability of sufficient 
and affordable energy supplies for the population and economic needs of the Central Asian 
countries. Central Asian countries have signed agreements to supply over 80 billion m3 per year 
of gas to China, which is more than the region’s export capacity. Kazakhstan is still not capable 
of filling an annual 20 million tonnes capacity oil pipeline to China on its own. The Chinese 
customers will also be looking for electricity import from upstream Central Asian countries once 
the conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan is resolved. Such cooperation does 
contribute to the budget of the Central Asian exporters, but not to energy security, because of the 
limited energy production governments are increasing export capacity at the expense of domestic 
consumption. 
 One of the main resources in which both Russia and China are interested in is the natural 
gas of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmen gas has to pass several transit countries to reach 
Chinese and Russian energy markets. In this sense, what the SCO member states are concerned 
about is the security of energy supply flows. Article 3 of the Charter of the SCO implies that the                                                         
34  International Scientific Conference Materials, The SCO in Quest of New Perception of Security, 121. 
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member states pool their resources to ensure “… effective use of available transportation and 
communication infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member states and 
development of energy systems.”35 Even Turkmenistan, which has maintained neutral status in 
almost all situations, supports the SCO initiatives on securing energy supply flows through the 
territory of the region. The President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov made it 
clear what the country expects from the engagement in SCO projects is: “the reliable and stable 
transit of energy reserves and its role in ensuring steady development and international 
cooperation.”36 
Prevailing Bilateral Arrangements 
 Despite the fact that heads of states and governments have many times declared that they 
support regional cooperation, most of the energy projects are still implemented on a bilateral or 
trilateral basis.37 Bilateral agreements have been signed separately with several member states 
that in combination cover a wider range of issues and create the illusion of ongoing regional 
cooperation. For instance, China has signed contracts with Central Asian states to secure the 
movement of natural gas. The bilateral format of negotiations and agreements are then presented 
as an achievement of the SCO regional mechanism.38 Construction of gas pipeline (Line–D) 
from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to China is a good example. It is 
expected that the construction of transit sections will cost around US$6.5 billion with the                                                         
35 Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(Beijing: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2009), accessed July 15, 2014, 
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization – Flurry of Activity or Its Imitation?), ARKZ, July 18, 2013, accessed 
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38 Ruslan Izimov, Personal Interview, Senior Research Fellow at Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, Kazakhstan, August 25, 2013.  
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breakdown of the total sum as following: the Kyrgyz section—US$1.3 billion, the Uzbek 
section—US$2.2 billion and the Tajik section—US$3 billion. Line–D of the CAGP will be 
financed 100 percent by China.39 Agreements are signed with each country separately. Such 
achievement is in fact a result of an active Chinese energy policy in Central Asia, but it can 
hardly constitute a regional governance mechanism. Bilateral agreements within the SCO neither 
establish certain formal or informal practice nor take place within already functioning 
governance mechanisms as part of it. Such arrangements do not necessarily protect interests of 
all parties involved. The successful implementation of energy projects depends on a power 
balance that is determined by the extent of the major powers’ interests. Unless energy projects 
promoted by bilateral agreements are implemented within the framework of well-functioning 
mechanisms, it is difficult to consider such arrangements as truly representing regional-level 
energy governance. 
 In organizations that do not have their own financial institution (the SCO Development 
Bank) and possess a limited budget it is not surprising that energy projects are financed through 
bilateral arrangements. The SCO member states still cannot agree on the concept of establishing 
an SCO bank to finance projects, including in the energy sector, from the six-sides talk 
perspective. Currently, the SCO investment policy is carried on through bilateral arrangements 
between states mainly in the following format: Russia and China on one-side and Central Asian 
states on the other. During the last visit of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan from September 3–13, 2013, investment and loan 
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agreements worth US$48 billion were signed, out of which Kazakhstan will receive US$30 
billion, Uzbekistan will receive US$15 billion and Kyrgyzstan will receive US$3 billion.40  
 Again, what represents bilateral cooperation in the end is presented as cooperation within 
the SCO member states. Despite long-lasting negotiations on establishing the SCO bank, this 
level of integration has not been reached and cooperation in the energy sector remains in the 
format of interbank relationships. The chairman of Kazakhstan’s Development Bank, Bolat 
Jamishev has stressed the importance of four investment projects within the SCO framework that 
are worth US$3.5 billion, and which were initiated with Kazakhstan’s contribution through the 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan of US$900 million. These four investment projects are: (a) the 
second phase of the Kazakhstan electrolysis plant; (b) the Moynak HPP; (c) the Atyrau oil 
refinery plant; and (d) the expansion of the Aktau sea port.41 But in fact these projects were the 
result of interbanks cooperation within the framework of the SCO Interbank Consortium, in 
which banks of those countries directly involved in a particular project agreed to finance it. This 
Consortium incorporates the Kazakhstan Development Bank, the China State Development 
Bank, RSK Bank (Kirgizia), the state corporation “Bank for Development and Foreign Economic 
Affairs (Vneshekonombank—Russia),” the Tajikistan State Savings Bank “Amonatbank” and 
the Uzbekistan National Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs, but this does not involve six-party 
implementation and monitoring of energy projects.42  
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 Establishment of a SCO development bank is complicated by the fact that due to the 
difference in economic development and financial capabilities of the SCO member states they 
are not able to equally contribute to the budget of the bank from which energy projects are 
supposed to be financed. The largest contributor could be China, and it would want higher voting 
quotas in the promotion of particular initiatives. This, however, contradicts the main principle of 
cooperation within the SCO, which is the consensus-based decision-making mechanism. Russia, 
another major player in the SCO, is doing its best not to allow China to take such a leading 
position in the financial agency on which the development of the organization is so highly 
dependent. 43  In the absence of a well-functioning financial institution of the organization, 
expecting fair regional-level cooperation would be problematic. 
No United Position over the Energy Security Concept 
 The SCO member states often engage in the dialogue with different expectations, which 
prevents reaching consensus on a number of issues and developing energy strategy and action 
plans on further implementation of regional-level energy projects. In 2007, during the second 
session of the Eurasian Economic Forum in Xi’an, China, the SCO secretary general Bolat 
Nurgaliev stated that “for the time being the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization do not have a united position over the common strategic energy concept.”44 After a 
round of negotiations during the summit, heads of the energy ministries of all member states 
failed to formulate a single SCO energy policy. Member states agreed to use expert-level 
discussions to develop a strategy amenable to all. 45 The SCO member states still do not have a                                                         
43 Huasheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 8. 
44 Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Chronicle of Main Events at SCO in 2007 (Beijing: 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2007), accessed January 15, 2013, 
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united position over the water-energy nexus, export–import balance, or the latent competition 
between China and any other customer for the Central Asian energy resources. Without reaching 
common understanding on these issues, it is impossible to develop a common strategic energy 
security concept. 
 The SCO Energy Club, as it was mentioned earlier, is a formally existing agency the 
main objective of which is to recommend its member states on the regional energy sector 
development. There is, however, another framework for cooperation as well. Most of the 
economic and as a result energy projects have been slowed down in pace due to the fact that 
decisions taken by the SCO bodies must be implemented in accordance with the procedures of 
member countries’ national legislation.46 Making declarations turned to be much easier than 
further implementation of projects. During the Third International Conference on “SCO Energy 
Forum/ Caspian Paradigm,” participants supported the idea to establish regular SCO member 
states’ parliamentary meetings to address energy security and energy development issues. Since 
there is neither permanent nor effective multilateral enforcement mechanism, it was agreed the 
parliamentarians’ meetings might create the platform for negotiations on a number of pressing 
issues.47  
 All SCO member states consider energy as a strategic resource and want to use 
organization to promote their energy interests. The analysis of the SCO intergovernmental 
mechanism to promote regional-level energy projects shows that bilateral and trilateral 
agreements prevail over six-sided talks. State actors’ desire to keep the bilateral format of 
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interaction is not a problem, unless actors that do not support that format due to asymmetry in 
power balance cannot change it. However, to what extent a set of bilateral arrangements can 
represent an effective regional mechanism is questionable. Currently, all energy initiatives are 
implemented within the broader economic cooperation framework. The SCO Energy Club is the 
only agency specifically designed to deal with energy security and energy-led economic 
development issues and it does not have an enforcement power. Mutually exclusive interests of 
the SCO member states—countries’ interests, not the interests of certain groups—prevent them 
from developing common energy security strategy.  
The Eurasian Economic Union  
 Russia has always been a key player in the Central Asian energy sector. Despite the fact 
that it has kept engaged with Central Asian states on a bilateral basis in the areas of oil, gas and 
electricity export/import relations, Russia has been periodically encouraging regional integration 
processes, which, among a variety of areas of cooperation, are designed to include the 
strategically important energy sector as well. The EEU was launched on January 1, 2015 
according to the agreement among the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. An 
agreement to incorporate Kyrgyzstan in the EEU was signed on December 23, 2014.48 It joined 
the Union in May 2015. Tajikistan is another candidate. The EEU is the final stage of an 
economic integration process, which started in 2000. In 1999, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan signed an agreement on the Customs Union and Common Economic 
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Space. 49  The document determined three levels of integration: the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC); the Common Economic Space and the Customs Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia; and the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Institutional Apparatus of the EEU 
 The EurAsEC was created in 2000 with full membership of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Uzbekistan joined the organization later in 2006. The presidents of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed the agreement on establishing the Single 
Economic Space (SES) in 2003. However, the SES became operational only starting from 
January 1, 2012. The process of establishing the Customs Union (CU), a single customs area, 
took three years from 2007 until 2010, when it was enacted on January 1, 2010. In 2012, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission began to work as the permanent supra-national regulatory body 
of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. The Commission set up a deadline of 
January 1, 2015 for the codification of international agreements, which would establish a legal 
and regulatory framework of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, on the basis of 
which the EEU was to be founded.50 
 As a successor of the EurAsEC and the CU, the EEU inherited a mechanism designed to 
regulate a wide range of intergovernmental relations. The remaining unresolved and pressing 
issue is the free movement of some particular types of energy resources. So, to have a clear 
vision of what to expect from energy export/import relationships within the newly established 
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EEU, it is important to understand how regional-level cooperation in the energy sector has been 
developed within the EurAsEC and the CU. 
 For a period of ten years, the EurAsEC had developed two conditions to promote regional 
cooperation in the energy sector: economic (including the energy sector) integration and 
institutional apparatus. 
 The Council on Energy Policy, within the EurAsEC and now the EEU, is the main 
agency responsible for the development and implementation of regional-level energy projects. 
Along with the Council on Energy Policy, the other agencies involved in the process of 
establishing a unified energy system are: (a) the Electricity and Nuclear Policy Department; (b) 
the Oil and Gas Policy Department; (c) the Advisory Committee for Electricity; and (d) the 
Advisory Committee for Oil and Gas. The Advisory Committee for Oil and Gas established in 
2012 is, for instance, responsible for Eurasian Economic Commission board proposals 
concerning the development of common energy policies in the field of oil and gas, energy 
markets, determining the bases for pricing and tariff policy in the field of gas transportation.51 
Conceptual Framework of the EEU 
 In 2003, the Council on Energy Policy adopted fundamentals of the EurAsEC energy 
policy, which were designed to establish unified energy, information and transportation 
systems.52 The policy prioritized joint activity oriented toward rational use of energy resources 
and formation of the common complementary fuel-energy complexes of the Community member 
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states based on increasing efficiency of energy systems, development of transit potential and 
creation of favourable conditions to increase intergovernmental supply of energy resources.  
 Having realized the importance of the energy sector to complete the process of economic 
integration, the EurAsEC set a number of key objectives in its energy policy: 
• developing mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy sector and joint efforts to 
establish the common energy market; 
• adequately supplying the internal market with energy resources and increasing exports to 
third countries; 
• establishing a wholesale market of electricity; 
• rationally using water, fuel and energy resources; 
• extending cooperation in developing, processing, and exporting new hydrocarbon 
resources; 
• developing transit potential; 
• ensuring energy security and creating conditions for stable economic growth.53  
 Based on the principles of respect for states’ sovereignty and national interests as well as 
mutual responsibility for the decisions made and actions taken, the EurAsEC member states set 
the course toward ensuring energy security by forming the common market of energy 
resources.54 Despite having a comprehensive and a well-developed conceptual understanding of 
what and how they want to improve energy security, no significant progress has been made in 
terms of energy sectors integration in the region. 
                                                        
53 Eurasian Economic Commission, “Fundamentals of Energy Policy.” 
54 “Energy independence—endowment of EurAsEC member states with local energy resources based on market 
demands, as well as the potential for usage and/or reservation of alternative sources to import fuel and energy. 
Energy security—the security of the EurAsEC member states’ energy sector against internal and external conditions, 
processes and factors posing a threat to its stable development and energy independence” in Eurasian Economic 
Commission, “Fundamentals of Energy Policy.” 
 218 
 It was expected that the next stage of economic integration, which was the CU of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia of 2010,55 would turn plans to liberalize energy markets into 
reality. Although, to a certain extent, barriers preventing free movement of resources had been 
eliminated, neither the EurAsEC nor the CU succeeded to develop an effective regional 
mechanism regulating energy trade. Russia, the strongest supporter of an economic integration, 
confronted the formation of common energy markets, which bore an additional financial loss. 
Exporters’ Interests Do Not Match Those of Importers’ 
 Currently, out of five Central Asian states only Kazakhstan has been a founding member 
of the EEU. Kyrgyzstan has recently joined it. Negotiations on the inclusion of Tajikistan are in 
progress. Taking into account the fact that Russia is using its influence in the region and may 
succeed in getting all these states on board, the EEU can be considered a regional platform 
capable of affectring energy supply relations in Central Asia. To make the below presented 
analysis applicable to future EEU energy relations, I decided to approach the issue of 
effectiveness of this mechanism from the perspective of both importing and exporting states.  
 The EEU member states pursue energy resources differently depending on whether they 
hold the status of importing or exporting country. Importing countries pursue energy resources as 
a market commodity similar to other products. They want to receive those resources for the 
lowest price possible and then further dispose of them on their own accord. Exporters, in 
contrary, consider energy as a strategic commodity and would not refrain from using this 
strategically important resource to gain political and security leverage. The EEU eliminated 
customs tariffs allowing free movement of products among its member states. However, free                                                         
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Customs Union and the Common Economic Space 
of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation (Astana: Mfa.kz, 2015), 
accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/en/foreign-policy/integration-processes/customs-union. 
 219 
movement of products within the EEU excluded more than a hundred items for Kazakhstan and 
Belarus including and especially the most traded oil, natural gas, electricity and oil products.56  
 The irony is that among many of the 2012 graphs displaying the international rankings of 
member states of the CU and the SES by goods output indicators, (See Figure 9) the Eurasian 
Economic Commission decided to choose the one indicating the share of those products that 
Kazakhstan and Russia have a large share of but that are not regulated by the CU.57 
Figure 9: Production (the CU and the SES Share of Global Total), 2015 
 
 Energy (re) export/import as well as transit relations have always been important issues 
on the CU agenda. Belarus imports large quantities of Russian energy resources for a discounted 
price and based on annually renewed bilateral agreements. Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to 
regulate current supplies of crude oil and oil products for a year starting from January 1, 2014. 
To the question of whether Central Asian region is ready for the common energy market, the                                                         
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answer is, to certain extent, yes. There is a history of parallel operations of regional energy 
systems, and there are a number of agreements signed among Central Asian states regulating 
almost all aspects of energy trade and movement of energy resources within the CAES. 58 
However, Russia insisted on using a bilateral format for regulation of the movement of these 
particular types of energy resources. Absence of common oil, gas and electricity markets within 
the CU raised concerns in both Kazakhstan and Belarus.  
Conflicting Fundamental Positions  
 The shadow economy of the Republic of Belarus benefitted from re-export or/and export 
of products from refined Russian oil to the European markets. Kazakhstan has been looking 
forward to the integration of energy sectors with Russia, which would allow it to sign direct 
contracts with European customers using Russia as a transit country only. Kazakhstan imports 
more energy resources than it exports to Russia, and Belarus is the only importer of Russian 
energy. Building on its reputation as mainly an exporter of energy, Russia will keep postponing 
the process of liberalization of energy markets as long as it can. Meanwhile for the other Union 
member states free movement of energy resources will continue to remain a pressing issue on the 
agenda.  
 Since Kazakhstan is both an importer and exporter of energy resources, its foreign energy 
policy differs depending on how it positions itself. Within the CU, Kazakhstan, as an importer of 
energy resources, voted for the liberalization of oil, gas and electricity markets, which would 
allow it to import oil products and electricity without customs tariffs from Russia. However, out 
of 140 products of the Group 27, only six of them do not fall under the regulation of the Union, 
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including natural gas in a gasified form, crude oil and oil products and electricity. 59  This 
condition implies that neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan enjoys free access to the Russian energy 
market and the possibility to transit electricity and oil products is limited. Having placed 
strategic interest in energy resources to use them as an instrument to influence the Union 
members and potential candidates along with the fact that it earns high revenue from customs 
fees, Russia is not willing to liberalize its energy market yet.60 
 Countries that import more energy resources, which are not regulated by the CU, than 
they do export lose more revenue, because custom tariffs increase the price for a unit of energy 
sold to external markets. From January to March 2013, the volume of Kazakhstani crude oil and 
gas condensate supplies to Russia accounted for 17,692.8 tonnes, while the volume of the 
Russian exports to Kazakhstan of these same products was 100 times more in the amount of 
1,977,205.7 tonnes. During the same period, Kazakhstan imported 56,362,278 thousand litres of 
oil products from Russia, while exported 181,4 thousand litres of the same products to Russia.61 
A large amount of these refined products come from the Kazakh crude oil and natural gas, which 
is exported to Russia, refined and then sent back to Kazakhstan. In this regard, Kazakhstan 
would want these items of the group 27 to move freely within the territory of the CU. Currently, 
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http://rbth.co.uk/international/2013/10/28/eurasian_economic_union_to_replace_customs_union_31237.html.  
61 Customs Union and Single Economic Space, The Volume of Import Supplies of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 
States – Members of the CU and Single Economic Space for January-March 2013 (Moscow: Customs Union and 
Single Economic Space, 2013), accessed December 1, 2014, 
http://www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201303/Documents/i201303_10.pdf; and Eurasian Economic Commission, The 
Volume of Export Supplies of the Republic of Kazakhstan to States – Members of the CU and Single Economic 
Space for January-March 2013 (Moscow: Customs Union and Single Economic Space, 2013), accessed 




Russia–Kazakhstan energy export/import relations are regulated by a bilateral agreement 
renewed every year. Even though the Russian government applies a preferential pricing policy 
toward members of the Union, in the absence of an effective/multilateral mechanism designed to 
regulate energy movement, most of the now EEU (inherited the CU regulations) member states 
will remain vulnerable. 
 Kazakhstan’s position changes when it comes to export of energy resources to third 
parties, because in this case it is a major exporter of crude oil. Export of oil and gas is the driving 
force of Kazakh economy, which generates 25 percent of GDP and more than 70 percent of 
overall export. Kazakhstan is not interested in energy markets of other Union member states, 
where Russian products already dominate. It focuses on external markets. 62  In this sense, 
Kazakhstan supports energy policy promoted by the Russian side, which secures revenues from 
customs tariffs from exporting oil and gas to external markets. The money from customs tariffs is 
directed to the budget of the exporting state and is not distributed according to the regulations of 
the Union. Within the Union (the CU and now the EEU), export of energy resources is regulated 
by bilateral agreements. But the money coming from re-export of energy goes back to the budget 
of the energy-producing state. Belarus used to benefit from importing Russian crude oil and 
natural gas, refining these resources and re-exporting these oil products to the European markets. 
Belarus produced 1.7 million tonnes of petroleum and gas condensate and refined 21.7 million 
tonnes of this same product from Russian resources in 2012. 63 Now, Belarus is obliged to 
transfer the difference that it earns from re-exporting energy to the Russian budget. Belarus                                                         
62 “Neftegazovaya Otrasl Obespechivaet 25% VVP RK: Dobicha Nefti v Kazaxstane Virosla Bolee Chem v Tri 
Raza (Oil and Gas Industry Provides 25 percent of GDP of Kazakhstan: Oil Production in Kazakhstan Increased 
Three Folds),” Kapital.kz, 2013, accessed March 5, 2014, http://kapital.kz/economic/21860/neftegazovaya-otrasl-
obespechivaet-25-vvp-rk.html.  
63 Belstat, “Belneftekhim” Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ministry of Power Engineering of 
Russia, accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://eurasiancommission.org/en/act/energetikaiinfr/energ/energo_stat/Pages/neft.aspx. 
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transferred US$4 billion to the Russian budget in 2012, which was US$1 billion more than it did 
in 2011.64  
Table 24: Extraction and Refining of Oil and Gas Condensate in 201265 
 Million tonnes 









 Unregulated energy supplies, however, are negatively affecting the volume of energy 
trade among the Union member states. As a result, the volume of energy trade as a share of the 
total trade among CU member states showed the following dynamics: 34.9 percent in 2011, 33.4 
percent in 2012, and 28.9 percent in 2013.66 This contradicts the main principles of the Union, 
which focus on the increasing trading dynamics and energy-trade-driven economic development. 
Besides, in the absence of common terms of regulations parties may choose to employ 
protectionist measures that negatively affect trading dynamics. For instance, import of Russian 
oil products was restricted by decree from the government of Kazakhstan on April 23, 2013. 
                                                        
64 “Rossiya Gotova Snyat Ogranicheniya v Tamojennov Soyuze Esli i Drugie Sdelayut Toje Samoe (Russia Is 
Ready to Give Up Restrictions in Customs Union if Others Do the Same),” Voice of Russia, Interfax, October 25, 
2013, accessed May 5, 2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_10_25/Russia-ready-to-give-up-restrictions-in-
Customs-Union-if-others-do-the-same-Putin-5313/?slide-1. 
65 Belstat, “Belneftekhim.”  
66 “Serie Zoni’ Tamojennogo Soyuza—Rezul’tat Nedointegracii (‘Grey Zones’ of the Customs Union—the Result 
of Incomplete Integration),” Eurasian Economic Commission, January 20, 2014, accessed May 1, 2015, 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/22-01-2014-2.aspx. 
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Isolated National Energy Systems 
 In addition to the above-mentioned regulatory challenges within the Union, Central Asian 
countries have to deal with physical isolation of their energy systems from that of Russia’s. 
Russian electric power grids are only connected to the northern part of Kazakhstan and west 
Kazakhstan’s electric power zones. Southern parts of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s (as well as 
potential candidate Tajikistan) energy systems are part of the Central Asian electric power grids 
and gas pipeline networks. On top of that southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan are 
connected to the Kazakh electricity system through Uzbekistan, which is not even considering 
membership of the EEU. Establishing the EEU energy system will not only take time, but will 
also require investments that the regional actors are not willing to provide. In this sense, it is 
quite challenging to establish a parallel operation of the unified energy system when such 
systems do not physically exist.  
 Minister of Energy and Infrastructure of the Eurasian Economic Committee, Daniel 
Akhmetov once claimed that a common oil and gas market between Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia could be created by January 1, 2015.67 Not surprisingly, this statement was followed by 
the announcement that the Union member states are not yet ready to completely liberalize energy 
markets. The chairperson of the Eurasian Economic Commission Viktor Xristenko later 
announced that a common oil and gas market would be formed by 2025. The President of 
Belarus reacted aggressively to this by saying, “We bought the product, processed and then sold 
it—the gain is ours. We are told that this is a specific product and thus we’ll do it this 
                                                        
67 “Obshiy Rinok Nefti i Gaza Belarusi, Rossii i Kazakhstana Mojet Bit Sformirovan k 1 Yanvarya 2015 Goda – 
Minister EEK (Common Oil and Gas Market of Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan Could be Formed by January 1, 




way…Russia first suggested taking it to the level of bilateral agreements. That is why we started 
these negotiations.”68 There was a similar reaction from the government of Kazakhstan.  
Russian Opposition and Future Prospects 
 Russia strongly opposes the liberalization of energy trade within the Union for such items 
as oil, natural gas and electricity. One could argue that an economic loss forces Russia to 
confront removing customs tariffs for those particular items. But the fact that annually renewed 
bilateral agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan and now Kyrgyzstan already exclude export 
tariffs for oil products, gas and electricity, imply that it is not about the financial loss but rather 
political leverage (threat of declining the renewal of contracts) that Russia is not ready to give 
up.  
 Terms of the EEU came into force on January 1, 2015. Within the EEU framework 
member states will use a single-mechanism regulating economy to harmonize their legislation, 
create unified energy, transport, and communication infrastructure, a coordinated tax system and 
a trade and customs policy aimed at ensuring the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
labour force. But the concept of establishing common energy markets will only be adopted in 
2016 and the program will be developed by 2018. It is also expected that the common electricity 
market of the EEU will be formed by 2019 and oil and gas market only in 2025. The 
liberalization of energy markets should be accompanied by a harmonization of the laws between 
the Union member states and the establishment of supra-national financial centres to implement 
regional-level energy projects. 69  Even though the Russian government applies preferential                                                         
68 “Lukashenko Napravilsya v Kazaxstan, Chtobi Podpisat ne Sovsem Tot Dogovor o EAES, na Kotoriy 
Raschitivala Belarus (Lukashenko is Heading to Kazakhstan to Sign not the Same Agreement on the EEU that 
Belarus Was Expecting),” May 28, 2014, http://news.tut.by/politics/400916.html. 
69 Eurasian Economic Commission, “Important Events in the Activity of the Department of Energy,” 2014, accessed 
January 5, 2015, http://eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/energetikaiinfr/energ/events/Pages/default.aspx. 
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energy pricing and a customs tariff-free policy toward members of the Union, in the absence of 
an effective/multilateral mechanism designed to ensure free movement of energy resources, most 
of the EEU member states will remain vulnerable. And there should be a good reason for Russia 
to let the common energy markets of the EEU be formed, such as to keep the Union afloat. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States 
 The CIS as a governance mechanism was established to sustain intergovernmental 
relations among former Soviet Union member states in almost all areas of interaction, including 
the energy sector. Founded on December 8, 1991, the CIS is the former Soviet Republics’ oldest 
institutional framework. Central Asian states joined it two weeks later on December 21, 1991 
with full membership, except Turkmenistan, which is an associate member of the organization. 
The CIS’s competence extends to activities in the realm of trade, finance, security, human rights, 
social and economic development, including cooperation in the energy sector. But since it does 
not possess an effective enforcement mechanism, it is often considered a loose association of 
states rather than an organization capable of strengthening regional cooperation. However, over 
the quarter of a century of its existence, the CIS succeeded to develop a comprehensive legal 
basis by which to regulate a wide range of intergovernmental activities including in the energy 
sector, which can be and often is used by other regional institutions in the process of developing 
their own integration initiatives.  
Main Energy Agencies of the CIS 
 The CIS has developed an energy sector governance apparatus, which encompasses: the 
Intergovernmental Council for Oil and Gas; Electric Power Council of the CIS; the 
Intergovernmental Council on cooperation in the spheres of chemicals and petro-chemicals; CIS 
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member states’ Committee on Using Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes. 70  The 
Intergovernmental Council for Oil and Gas, for instance, is responsible for a number of key 
activities including making projections on how to secure sufficient supplies of oil, gas and their 
refined products for the ten to fifteen year perspective, arranging bilateral and multilateral 
agreements based on these projections, analyzing the process of implementation and other 
activities ranging from research to practical moves to ensure stability and reliability of common 
energy systems’ operation.71  
 The CIS has probably the most comprehensive package of intergovernmental agreements 
regulating the electricity sector in the former Soviet republics, including in Central Asian 
countries. 
Table 25: Main Agreements and other documents in the Energy Sector within the CIS72 
1. Agreement on Coordination of Interstate Relations in the Power Sector of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, signed by the Council of Heads of Governments on February 14, 1992 
2. Treaty on Ensuring Parallel Operation of Power Systems of the States – Members of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, signed by the Council of Heads of Governments on November 25, 1998 
3. Decision of the Council of Heads of Governments on Implementation of the Treaty on Ensuring Parallel 
Operation of Power Systems of the States – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 
November 28, 1998 
4. Agreement on Transit of Electricity and State’s Power Capacities – Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States on January 25, 2000 
5. Agreement on Mutual Assistance in Cases of Accidents and Other Emergency Situations at Electric 
Power Facilities of States – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on May 30, 2002 
6. Agreement on Cooperation of States – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the 
Field of Energy Efficiency and Conservation, signed by the Council of Head of Governments on 
October 7, 2002                                                         
70 Commonwealth of Independent States, Information on Bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Internet-Portal CIS, n.d), accessed June 10, 2014, http://www.e-cis.info/page.php?id=2374. 
71 “Commonwealth of Independent States Executive Committee, Intergovernmental Council on Oil and Gas (Minsk: 
Commonwealth of Independent states, n.d), accessed June 10, 2014, http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=2498. 
72 The list of agreements is retrieved from the official website of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Executive Committee: http://www.cis.minsk.by/index.php.  
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7. Agreement on the Establishment of Reserves of Resources and Their Effective Use to Ensure Stable 
Parallel Operation of Power Systems of States – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
signed by the Council of Heads of Governments on September 15, 2004 
8. Decision of the CIS Economic Council of the Regulation on the Energy Council of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States in the new edition of March 11, 2005 
9. Decision of the CIS Economic Council on the Main Directions and Principles of Cooperation of States – 
Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Field of Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation from March 11, 2005 
10. The Concept of Common Electricity Market Formation of States – Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, approved by the decision of the Council of Heads of Governments on November 
25, 2005 
11. Decision of the Council of states of Governments on Establishing a Common Time for Reading Electric 
Power Meters of Electricity Moving through Interstate Transmission Lines in States – Members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States of November 24, 2006  
12. Agreement on Harmonization of Customs Procedures when Moving Electricity Across the Customs 
Borders of States – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on November 22, 2007 
13. Protocol on Amendments and Additions to the Agreement on Coordination of Interstate Relations in the 
Field of Energy of the Commonwealth of Independent States from February 14, 1992 on November 22, 
2007 
14. Agreement on the Formation of a Common Energy Market of States – Members of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States from May 25, 2007 
15. Agreement on Cooperation Among States – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
the Field of Exploitation of Interstate Transmission Lines of National Electric Power Systems from 
November 20, 2009 
16. Protocol on the Stages of the Formation of the Common Energy Market of the CIS Member States from 
May 21, 2010 
 
Conceptual Instruments of the CIS 
 The CIS has also adopted its own “Development Strategy 2020” and has been working on 
establishing the United Energy Space by promoting cooperation in such areas as energy 
efficiency, rehabilitation of the parallel operation of the CIS countries’ Unified Electric Power 
Systems and the development of a stable mechanism for electricity transit. The CIS is 
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particularly concerned about the security of energy transit. Transmission lines of the CIS 
member states were constructed during the Soviet Union and now cross territories of several 
countries. The CIS countries acknowledge that it is necessary to establish a well-functioning 
energy system to ensure stability and security of electricity and hydrocarbons’ transit (transit of 
energy produced in one country and going out to another country over the territory of the third 
country, as well as transit of energy produced and to be consumed in one country that is being 
transported over the territory of another country),73 but fail to provide transit security due to the 
absence of an enforcement mechanism.  
 On November 20, 2009, the CIS member states adopted the concept for energy sector 
cooperation, which is absent in most of the regional institutions in Central Asia. Having placed 
strategic importance in energy development, the CIS Council declared the energy sector to be a 
key area of interaction in 2009. Trans-boundary transmission lines connecting several countries 
received particular attention from the Council, because such networks required coordinated 
actions to be taken and the CIS offered the platform for joint regulation.74 The action plan 
adopted on May 21, 2010 was supposed to take a practical approach to address first priority 
projects,75 most of which are yet to be realized.  
                                                        
73 Commonwealth of Independent States Executive Committee, Agreement on Transit of Electricity and State’s 
Power Capacities – Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Minsk: Commonwealth of Independent 
states, n.d), accessed June 5, 2014, http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=1946. 
74 “Commonwealth of Independent states Executive Committee, Energy is the Key Area of Cooperation of the CIS 
Countries in 2009 (Minsk: Commonwealth of Independent States, 2009), accessed June 5, 2014, 
http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=13376. 
75  Commonwealth of Independent States, O Razvitii Sotrudnichestva Gosudarstv – Uchastnikov SNG v Sfere 
Elektroenergetiki. Problemi i Perspektivi (On the Development of Cooperation of CIS Member States in the Field of 
Energy. Problems and Perspectives) (CIS Internet Portal, 2013), accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.e-
cis.info/page.php?id=23654. 
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Separated Sub-Regional Energy Systems 
 Having adopted the strategy, developed the concept and action plan the CIS member 
states still could not agree upon using balanced methods for oil, gas, and electricity supply and 
transit. The main reason for disagreement over the shipment methods is that not all energy 
systems of the former Soviet Union were connected to one another. On top of that, two decades 
of independent energy policies broke down even existing systems into smaller pieces. Since the 
CIS energy systems are not properly connected, it turned to be quite difficult to ensure 
coordinated operation of those systems. For instance, Central Asian electric power grids are not 
properly connected to that of the Russian and other CIS member states. Turkmenistan left the 
CAPS system in 2003, but it is the withdrawal of Uzbekistan that impacted the coordinated 
operation of the CAPS the most. Uzbekistan’s withdrawal left the electric power sector of 
Tajikistan in complete isolation. Only Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan sustain electricity 
trade on annually prolonged bilateral contracts. Even though the infrastructure connecting 
Central Asian countries’ electric power sectors is still in place, the CIS as a governance 
mechanism fails to encourage or enforce state actors to reinstate parallel operation of the electric 
power grids.   
 CIS member states’ energy systems may not all be connected to each other, but there is 
one problem that is almost equally important for them all. It is the necessity to take coordinated 
actions to respond to emergency situations and to establish information sharing mechanisms 
when an accident occurs.76 Unilateral gas and electricity supply cuts within an interdependent 
energy system negatively affects the availability of energy to meet population and economic 
                                                        
76 Commonwealth of Independent States Executive Committee, 44th Meeting of the CIS Electric Power Council 
Took Place on November 1, 2013 (Minsk: Commonwealth of Independent States, 2013), accessed June 7, 2014, 
http://www.cis.minsk.by/news.php?id=2252. 
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needs. The CIS countries signed an agreement on mutual assistance in cases of accidents and 
other emergency situations at electric power facilities on May 30, 2002. Unfortunately, the CIS 
lacks an enforcement mechanism to encourage and, if necessary, force its member states to 
comply with terms of the agreement.  
Lack of Regional Enforcement Mechanism 
 One of the main drawbacks of quite an impressive conceptual basis of the CIS is the fact 
that most of signed intergovernmental agreements are not binding in nature. Recommendation-
type agreements require signing additional documents with a detailed action plan. However, 
turning recommendations or general guidelines into documents forcing/encouraging states to 
comply with terms of agreements has proved to be quite challenging. With almost no success in 
strengthening regional energy integration, the CIS has been ascribing some bilateral cooperation 
to its merits. CIS countries approved the framework program for cooperation to develop nuclear 
power. 77 Within this framework, “Rosatom” and “Kazatomprom” signed a memorandum on 
May 29, 2014 regarding cooperation in the construction of the first Kazakhstani nuclear power 
plant using Russian reactors with the capacity ranging from 300 MW up to 1200 MW.78 It was 
presented as one of the many achievements of the organization. Development of hydro-power 
potential of Kyrgyzstan is also to a certain extent ascribed to the fruitful cooperation within the 
CIS. Kyrgyzstan has prioritized construction of Kamabarata–1 and –2 HPP with total capacity of 
2260 MW. First aggregate of Kambarata–2 was put into operation in 2010 with the capacity of                                                         
77 Commonwealth of Independent States Executive Committee, Results for the last 20 years and Objectives for the 
Future (Minsk: Commonwealth of Independent States, 2011), accessed June 15, 2014, 
http://www.cis.minsk.by/news.php?id=289. 
78 State Committee of the CIS Member States, Rossiya i Kazaxstan v Blijayshee Vremya Podpishut Soglashenie o 
Stroitelstve v Kazaxskom Gorode Kurchatov Atomnoy Elektrostancii (Russia and Kazakhstan will Sign an 
Agreement to Build in the Near Future Nuclear Power Plant in the City of Kurchatov in Kazakhstan) (2014), 
accessed June 20, 2014, http://sng-atom.com/?q=node/448. 
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120 MW. In 2012, the Russian company “Inter RAO UES” signed agreement with Kyrgyzstan 
on the terms of Kambarata–1 HPP construction. The construction process was expected to start 
by 2013, but due to political and financial constraints, it is still in the negotiation stage. The 
governments of Russia and Kyrgyzstan also signed a set of agreements on further exploitation of 
the Upper Narin cascade HPPs (Akbulun HPP, Naryn HPP–1, Naryn HPP–2, and Naryn HPP–
3).79 However, to the question of whether the above-mentioned projects could have been agreed 
upon and implemented without the CIS, the answer is probably “yes.” While those projects with 
a low probability of success would not have been realized even through the CIS governance 
mechanism, projects that have a high chance of realization on the bilateral basis are presented as 
a consequence of cooperation within the CIS framework. 
Limited Financial Capabilities 
 During the period in between 1961 and 1985, the former USSR put online from 8 to 12 
GW of new generation capacities annually.80 After the break down of the Union, however, newly 
independent states have been annually introducing new power generation capacities in average 3 
times less than in the Soviet years. Underfinancing was rated the main reasons for such a decline. 
Every member state brings to the table of negotiations what concerns them most. During 
Tajikistan’s CIS chairpersonship in 2011, for instance, the government emphasized the need for 
realization of first priority projects such as establishing common energy space, restoring parallel 
operation of the countries’ electric power systems and development of single mechanism of 
electricity transit across the territories of the CIS member states.81 With a limited budget, the CIS 
                                                        
79 Commonwealth of Independent States, “On Development of Cooperation.”  
80 Ibid. 
81 Commonwealth of Independent States Executive Committee, Koncepciya Predstavitelstva Respubliki Tadjikistan 
v Sodrujestve Nezavisimix Gosudarstv (The Concept of Republic of Tajikistan’s Chairmanship in the 
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could not even support these investment projects. While there were to some extent political 
reasons involved, most of the agencies within the CIS enlist underfinancing as the main 
challenge preventing timely and effective realization of projects promoted by the councils of oil 
and gas and power sectors.82  
 To sum up, despite the fact that the CIS has developed a comprehensive conceptual 
framework for the development of regional-level energy projects, it lacks an effective 
enforcement mechanism. Underfinancing is a constant and a very serious obstacle for the 
organization to positively respond to member states’ requests on maintaining and improving 
regional energy infrastructure facilities. Similar to other intergovernmental multilateral 
institutions such as the SCO and the CU/EEU, the CIS ascribes to itself the merits of any signed 
bilateral agreements and implemented projects. At the same time, however, 20 years of activity 
within the CIS was a good experience for other integration processes in the region such as the 
EurAsEC, the CU and the EEU to strengthen their activity.  
The World Bank Promoted Regional Energy Governance Projects 
 The World Bank is one of the main contributors to the set of projects designed to improve 
the level of energy security, promote energy led economic growth, and address water-energy 
nexus problems in Central Asia. The World Bank has been co-chairing and partnering with a 
wide range of multilateral institutions in promoting and implementing energy projects on the 
local, national, and regional levels in the region. Some major World Bank’s large-scale Central 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Commonwealth of Independent States in 2011) (Minsk: Commonwealth of Independent States, 2011), accessed 
June 25, 2014, http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=18743. 
82 Commonwealth of Independent States Executive Committee, Informaciya o Reshenii Nekotorix Voprosov, 
Negativno Vliyayushix na Mnogostoronnee Torgovo-Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo v Ramkax SNG (Information 
of Solving Some Issues Negatively Affecting Multilevel Rrade Cooperation within the CIS) (Minsk: Commonwealth 
of Independent States, n.d), accessed June 20, 2014, http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=408.  
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Asian energy sector development initiatives are: the CAEWDP; CASA–1000; and, the 
assessment studies for the Proposed Rogun Hydro-power Project in Tajikistan.  
Main World Bank Programs in the Energy Sector in Central Asia 
 According to Saroj Kumar Jha, regional director for Central Asia, the World Bank is 
currently supporting thirty-two country-specific investment projects in energy and water sectors 
in Central Asia.83 Some of these projects have regional significance. The CAEWDP is one of 
those World Bank initiatives designed to not only improve water management and development 
of hydro-power potential, but also promote regional cooperation in the energy sector.  
 The CAEWDP was a four-year project from January 2010 to January 2014, co-financed 
by the World Bank and national governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan.84 It had three pillars of activity. 
• Energy Development—to promote the highest value energy investments and their 
management. Areas of focus include: infrastructure planning, winter energy security, 
energy trade, energy accountability, and institutional development; 
• Energy-Water Linkages—to improve the understanding of linkages between water and 
energy at the national and regional levels. Areas of focus include: energy-water 
modelling, regional hydrometeorology, climate vulnerability, and energy-water dialogue; 
• Water Productivity—to enhance the productivity and efficiency of water use in both 
agriculture and energy sectors.85 
                                                        
83 World Bank, “Q&A with Saroj Kumar Jha, Regional Director for Central Asia, On the Current Status of the 
Rogun Assessment Studies” Speech, Third Riparian Meetings on Rogun Assessment Studies, August 12, 2012. 
84 World Bank, Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), accessed 
May 5, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/caewdp. 
85 World Bank Group, Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program (Washington, DC: World Bank, n.d), 
accessed May 10, 2014, 
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 The World Bank initiated this program to “improve diagnostics and analytical tools to 
support the countries of the region in well-informed decision-making to manage their water and 
energy resources, strengthen regional institutions, and stimulate investments.” 86  One of the 
World Bank’s recent initiatives was to establish a network of institutions to promote an exchange 
of experiences and equip state agencies, civil society, and other relevant institutions with the 
skills necessary to address water, energy and climate change-related issues.87  
 Since 2007 the World Bank has been facilitating extensive consultations with 
governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Afghanistan to ensure riparian views and concerns are taken into account in the terms of 
reference for the assessment studies of the Rogun Hydro-power Project in Tajikistan: Techno-
Economic Assessment Study (TEAS); and, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. 88 
Consultations were also undertaken with civil society and representatives of potentially affected 
communities in Tajikistan. To raise its credibility among Central Asian downstream countries, 
the World Bank succeeded to reach an agreement with the government of Tajikistan according to 
which starting from 2010 no new construction would commence until assessments are completed 
and communicated to the representatives of all countries involved.89  
 Upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have a surplus of hydroelectricity production in the 
summer period. When Uzbekistan withdrew from the CAPS and cut the electricity import in the 




87 World Bank, Central Asia Regional Workshop on Environment and Climate Change: Learning, Partnerships, And 
Knowledge Exchange (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/01/24/central-asia-workshop-environment-climate-change. 
88 World Bank, Final Reports Related to the Proposed Rogun HPP (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), accessed 
November 5, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/brief/final-reports-related-to-the-proposed-
rogun-hpp. 
89 World Bank, Assessment studies for Proposed Rogun Hydropower Project in Tajikistan (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2014), accessed November 6, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/rogun-assessment-studies. 
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absence of other exporting options upstream states were forced to spill water. To somehow 
facilitate energy export-led economic growth of these countries, the World Bank started actively 
promoting the CASAREM initiative to move the extra-generated electricity from Central Asian 
upstream countries to South Asian energy markets. As a first phase of the initiative, it was 
decided to concentrate on CASA–1000 transmission lines to transit 1,300 MW of electricity.90 
At 1,222 km long, running through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan (PS Datka 
(Kyrgyzstan) – PS Khujant (Tajikistan) – Rogun HPP (Tajikistan) – Kabul – Peshawar), the line 
includes: 500 kV DC line 750 km long through Tajikistan (117 km) – Afghanistan (562 km) – 
Pakistan (71 km); 500 kV AC line through Kyrgyzstan (substation Datka, 452 km) – Tajikistan 
(PS Khujant, 20 km). With a total length of 472 km, CASA-1000 is supposed to link regional 
electricity producers with southern energy markets.91 
 All three projects are closely interlinked. Improving the livelihood of people in Central 
Asia, through the development of upstream countries’ hydro-power potential, export-led 
economic growth and energy security, was chosen to be a priority in the World Bank’s activity in 
energy sector in Central Asia. Construction of giant HPPs will largely be justified only in 
combination with the possibility to export electricity to external markets. Moreover, according to 
the World Bank and the CAREC reports, development of the Rogun and Kambarata dams will 
strengthen water management in the region.  
                                                        
90 World Bank, World—Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA 1000) 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/06/16435491/world-central-asia-south-asia-electricity-
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The World Bank’s Contribution to Addressing Regional- level Energy Security Challenges 
 Stability of water and energy supplies within the Central Asian region was ensured by a 
resource-sharing mechanism developed during the Soviet era. This mechanism turned the whole 
region into a system of interdependent entities. When the Soviet scientists and engineers 
designed the system, they did not take into account national borders of the Central Asian states. 
Rational use of resources was the main objective. Central Asian upstream states of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan released water and electricity in exchange for electricity and hydrocarbons from 
downstream countries. However, this resource-sharing mechanism could not withstand current 
geopolitical realms. The incompatibility of the energy policies with the development of regional 
cooperation is negatively affecting the security of the CAES and causing shortages of energy and 
irrational uses of water and energy resources in the region. Acknowledging the seriousness of the 
problem, regional state actors still fail to achieve a solution amenable to all. Fundamental 
disagreement between the region’s water demand for irrigation and the use of water for HPPs 
have led to a latent conflict between upstream and downstream countries. Being guided by the 
belief that the CAES insecurity cannot be solved without first addressing factors affecting water-
energy balance in the region, the World Bank has decided to make water-energy nexus issues a 
priority in its activity in the region. 
 There are two main projects capable of having impact on the water-energy balance in the 
region: Rogun and Kambarata–1. Disintegration process of the CAES forced Kyrgyzstan to 
search for energy supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan and develop coal-fired TPPs to meet its 
growing energy needs. Completely isolated from outside world and having experienced 
significant shortage of energy, the Tajik government turned Rogun, the highest HPP in the 
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world, into a strategically important national project, with the hope and expectation that it will 
help country get out of energy crisis.92  
 Between 1963 and 1978, Soviet scientists and engineers in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) 
conducted assessment studies of the Rogun dam. They revised the studies in 1981. The main 
objective for building Rogun was to improve water regulation for irrigation in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan as well as an electricity supply for Central Asia. The construction started in 
1982. 93  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, financing the construction from 
Tashkent and Moscow stopped. Devastated by the civil war that occurred in Tajikistan after 
gaining its independence and the breakdown of the Soviet economic system, the Tajik 
government could not afford to continue building the dam on its own. In 1993, a mud flood 
significantly damaged the dam. The project was stalled until Tajik authorities decided to restart it 
to meet its growing energy needs. Construction of the facility occurred on a trans-boundary river 
with potential consequences for water withdrawal, and in the absence of the supra-national body 
(Moscow), negotiations with downstream countries were necessary. Once designed in 
Uzbekistan by mostly Uzbek scientists, this project, ironically, faced serious criticism and 
confrontation from Uzbek authorities.94  
 In 2010 an inspection request was sent to the Executive Secretary of the Inspection Panel 
by representatives of the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, “Ecoforum – Civil Society,” the 
deputy of the Parliament and one hundred NGOs. They wanted the inspection committee to 
assess the social, ecological, and humanitarian impact of the Rogun HPP on riparian states. The 
                                                        
92 Dagikhudo Dagiev, Personal Interview, Research Associate at the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, Astana, 
Kazakhstan, May 25, 2014.  
93 World Bank, “Environment and Social Impact Assessment for Rogun Hydro Power Plant, Environmental and 
Social Impacts” (V Round of Dialogue, Almaty, Kazakhstan, July 14, 2014). 
94 Sami Sharif Hamid, Personal Conversation, Director, the Directorate of the Flooding Area of Rogun HPP of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, Almaty, Kazakhstan, July 15, 2014.  
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very same arguments, put forward by the ecological movement, were used by the government of 
Uzbekistan before and after the World Bank’s independent investigation. Uzbekistan stressed the 
worst-case scenario by arguing that in the case of dam failure, waves 245–280m high (in the area 
of Nurek HPP) and 6–7m in Kazakhstan could result in disaster. According to the initial 
estimations, destruction of six hydroelectric power plants could flood 5 million people in 700 
settlements in four countries (Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). 
Authorities highlighted that over three million people residing in Uzbekistan might be affected 
by the flooding and turn to the government for assistance and refuge. In addition to reservations 
that the dam was initially built in the late 1980s and may not meet current [not specified what 
kind of] standards, the Uzbekistani side is also concerned about the amount of water that could 
be taken by Tajikistan to fill the dam. Reallocation of water supplies would lead to water 
shortages for irrigation by 22 percent.95 Tajik authorities claim that there is certain amount of 
water that Tajikistan has been spilling for many years, which is rightfully allocated to it by 
Protocol 566 and Nukus Declaration. According to the assessments, between 2005 and 2011 
Tajikistan has annually spilled 1.2 km3 of water. It is expected that using the water that is 
rightfully allocated to it will be sufficient to fill Rogun in 16 years without breaking current 
agreements and practices.96  
 The World Bank shares the Tajik authority’s optimism. Having optimistic expectations 
that there will be no natural disaster capable of destroying the Rogun dam, Tajik authorities are 
focusing on the positive prospects that this project brings to Tajikistan and the other Central 
Asian states. The primary objective of Rogun is to generate electricity to meet the needs of                                                         
95 World Bank, To Executive Secretary, The Inspection Panel (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), accessed 
May 10, 2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/258598-
1297718522264/Request_for_Inspection_Eng.pdf. 
96 World Bank, “Environment and Social Impact Assessment.” 
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Tajikistan. Rogun will significantly increase electricity production capacity of the country, and 
the surplus of electricity (clean and renewable) will be exported to neighbouring countries. The 
export revenues can then be spent on thermal electricity and gas purchases from downstream 
Central Asian states. Rogun will also provide flood routing capacity, and effectively extend the 
life of Nurek HPP and the Vakhsh cascade by over one hundred years by retaining sediments. 
Water storage capacity of the dam could improve water flow regulation potential and manage 
water shortages in dry years.97 
 Unable to resolve contradictions over the construction of the Rogun dam, Central Asian 
states agreed to move on in the negotiation process only after a panel of an independent experts 
conducted assessments of economic, environmental, and social impacts. During the fifth and the 
last round of discussions on the Environment and Social Impact Assessment for the Rogun 
Hydro-Power Plant, which took place on July 14–19, 2014 in Almaty, experts presented their 
concluding remarks. After a series of rounds, the World Bank-supported group of experts 
concluded that the 335m high Rogun dam must be the most economically efficient and with no 
major impact on people’s livelihood and the eco-system of the region. (See Table 26/27) 
 Tajikistan suffers from a critical shortage of electricity supply in the winter period, during 
which electricity demand exceeds supply capacity by around 25 percent. Electricity scarcity can 
be overcome only by introducing additional power generation capacities. Due to a limited fossil 
fuel reserves and an unfavourable environment to develop either solar or wind energy, the 
government decided that only further development of hydro-power potential can supply 
sufficient electricity. Most of the power generation capacities are run-of-river type HPPs. 
However, low river flows in wintertime affects the level of electricity production in the country. 
Different from other HPPs, Rogun is designed as a storage-type plant capable of storing enough                                                         
97 World Bank, “Environment and Social Impact Assessment.” 
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summer water to produce the required electricity in winter period. Without coordinated 
regulations, however, this may have a major impact on the availability of water for downstream 
countries’ agricultural needs.98  
 If Tajikistan succeeds to attract investments and reinstate the construction process in 
2015, 5–6 units of the HPP will start producing electricity in less than five years. The urgent 
need for the construction of the Rogun dam is justified by the fact that building HPPs in between 
the Rogun and Nurek dams is impossible until Rogun is put into operation. For instance, the 
proposed Shurob HPP with the capacity of 850 MW cannot be built without Rogun.99  
Table 26: Summary of Technical and Economic Assessment Studies for Rogun dam: Key 
Data100 
Key Parameters FSL1290 FSL1255 FSL 1220 
Dam Height [m] 335 300 265 
Reservoir active storage [hm3] 10,300 6,450 3,930 
Area at FSL [km2] 170 114 68 
Filling period [yr] 16 13 9 
Minimal operating lifetime [yr] 115 75 45 
Annual average cascade [TW] 34.4, 34.3, 34.1 32.5, 32.4, 32.2 30.2, 30.1, 29.8 
 
Table 27: Summary of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Studies for Rogun 
dam: Key Data101 
Key Parameters FSL 1290 FSL 1255 FSL 1220 
Summer flow Amu Darya 
Intended Operation [km3] 
37.4 37.4 37.4 
Summer flow Amu Darya 
Maximizing winter energy [km3] 
30.0 30.9 33.5 
Resettlement # Villages 77 36 25 
Resettlement # Households 6035 2433 1825 
Resettlement # Persons 42,000 18,000 13,000 
                                                         
98 World Bank, “Analysis of Alternatives.” 
99 Ibid. 
100 World Bank, Report on the 5th Riparian Information-Sharing and Consultation Process on the Assessment 
Studies of a Proposed Rogun Hydropower Project (Washington, DC: World Bank, June 16 – July 29, 2014), 
accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/central-
asia/Rogun%20Assessment%20studies%20Fifth%20Consultation%20Report_eng.pdf. 
101 World Bank, Report on the 5th Riparian Information-Sharing and Consultation Process. 
 242 
 Since Uzbek authorities consider CASA–1000 and Rogun interlinked, they oppose these 
projects. Despite the fact that both the government of Tajikistan and the World Bank has 
presented the advantages of building Rogun, Uzbekistan has made it clear that it perceives the 
project as a national security threat to the country. Furthermore, even though it is argued that the 
CASA–1000 and Rogun projects are not linked102 by looking at the route of transmission lines, 
which pass along the Rogun HPP,103 one may conclude that the electricity generated in this plant 
will be used for export.  
 There is currently a surplus of electricity production in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the 
summer period, and it is assumed that CASA–1000 will transport this extra electricity to 
southern neighbours. However, Afghanistan and Pakistan are mostly in need of electricity import 
in winter and the only projects that provide these opportunities are Rogun and Kambarata–1.104 
In this sense, following the policy of other Central Asian producers, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
will increase exports of electricity even at the expense of domestic consumption. Desire to export 
electricity in wintertime will make Rogun and Kambarata–1 economically attractive, but with 
limited contribution to energy security projects. 
 The final reports were released on July 2014.105 According to the assessment, the highest 
(335m) possible option of the dam was found the most economically efficient. Both Tajik 
government and potential investors approved. The assessment, however, did not bring expected 
results. Uzbekistan is still opposing the damn, arguing that while an assessment has been 
conducted in the area of the upper Amu Darya River, it did not take into account possible 
                                                        
102 World Bank, “Q&A with Saroj Kumar Jha.” 
103 World Bank, “CASA-1000 Project Risk Assessment.”  
104 President of the Republic of Tajikistan, The Annual Message to the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan 
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consequences for downstream Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan. The World Bank, 
which has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the assessment of the Rogun dam, arrived at 
the similar conclusions as the designers of the dam 40 years ago. Uzbek political scientist 
Tolipov asked whether the Uzbek government would comply with the result of independent 
investigations if it concludes that Rogun does not pose a threat to downstream countries? And, in 
addition Tolipov asked, how would the Tajik government continue construction of Rogun in the 
case of World Bank approval and continued Uzbek government opposition?106 What the Central 
Asian countries now have is the same opposing the project Uzbek government and limited 
opportunities for Tajik authorities. These results could of course be used if anyone decides to get 
involved in building the dam, but security risks over the project imply that such engagement 
would entail unacceptable conditions for Tajikistan. As it stands right now the World Bank 
efforts to bring Central Asian states closer to the resolution of the conflict failed, since there has 
been progress on neither CASA–1000 nor Rogun.  
The Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia 
 The environmental dimension of energy security suggests that Central Asian countries 
should enjoy not only sufficient and uninterrupted, but also clean and sustainable supplies of 
energy. Brown economies and highly inefficient energy sectors of the Central Asian states 
indicate that this aspect of energy security requires urgent attention. Having placed strategic 
interest in fossil fuels, Central Asian governments pooled their efforts and allocated their 
resources to the development of this particular part of the energy sector. Thus, projects designed 
to develop of RES and reduce greenhouse gas emissions remain underinvested. One of the main                                                         
106 Farkhod Tolipov, Personal Interview, Director of Bylim Karvoni Non-governmental Research and Training 
Center, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 29, 2013.  
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regional governance innovations designed to promote the environmental dimension of energy 
security is the Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia (CAREC centre).  
 The CAREC centre was established in 2001 by founding members Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, as well as the UNDP and the European 
Commission.107 The head office of the CAREC centre is located in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Country 
offices operate in all five Central Asian states. The idea behind establishing the CAREC centre 
was to promote multi-sector cooperation in addressing environmental problems in Central Asia 
at the local, national and regional levels. The main areas of activity of the centre in the energy 
sector include: (a) supporting programs and initiatives on the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions in Central Asia; (b) assisting in implementation of Kyoto protocol; (c) increasing the 
use of renewable energy; and (d) enhancing energy efficiency in Central Asia.108 The CAREC 
centre has successfully brought some experts from the region to share their understanding of 
certain regional-level problems and prospects in addressing these challenges within the following 
programs: Environmental Management Program; Education for Sustainable Development; Water 
Initiatives Support; Climate Change and Sustainable Energy; and Inter-program Activity. 109 
However, there is little evidence pointing to the fact that this knowledge sharing leads to large-
scale practical changes in the energy sectors of the Central Asian countries.  
 The CAREC centre pursues three main objectives: (a) establishing inter-sectoral 
dialogue; (b) attracting advanced knowledge and technologies by creating necessary 
opportunities; and (c) promoting governance mechanisms by increasing the role of non-state                                                         
107  Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, About CAREC (Almaty, n.d), accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://www.carecnet.org/about-carec/?lang=en. 
108 Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, Climate Change and Sustainable Energy (n.d), accessed 
April 10, 2014, http://www.carecnet.org/programmes-and-activities/climate-change-and-sustainable-
energy/?lang=en. 
109 Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, Programmes (n.d), accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://www.carecnet.org/programmes-and-activities/?lang=en. 
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institutions in general and civil society organizations by providing conditions for environmental 
protection and sustainable development of the region. Obviously, practical implementation of 
energy projects in the form of building facilities and establishing energy supply networks is not 
the primary objective of this particular institution. It is the practical changes in Central Asian 
countries’ energy sectors that the governments and more importantly people want to achieve. 
Governance initiatives in Central Asia fail in actively engaging civil society organizations into 
strategically important energy sectors.110 
Central Asian Initiative on Sustainable Development  
 The decision to establish a sub-regional partnership to strengthen cooperative dynamics 
was made during the ministerial meeting of the Central Asian countries in Almaty in 2001. The 
Central Asian Initiative on Sustainable Development (CAI) within the CAREC centre was 
established as a regional platform designed to promote cooperation and partnership between 
Central Asian countries in the field of environmental protection.111 There are several priority 
areas of the CAI focusing on some vulnerable aspects of energy security in the region, such as 
enhancement of environmental management, strengthening of the civil society’s role, promotion 
of education for sustainable development, ensuring coordinated water resources management, 
sustainable energy development and promotion of environmentally sustainable livelihood.112  
 One of the main goals of the CAREC centre is to improve awareness among experts 
within the Central Asian countries on how to ensure sustainability of energy sector by 
introducing environmentally-friendly policy initiatives. The “Climate Change and Sustainable                                                         
110 Alexey Yusupov, Personal Interview, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Head of Office Almaty, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 
October 15, 2013.  
111 Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, Central Asian Initiative on SD, (n.d), accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://www.carecnet.org/international-processes/central-asian-initiative-on-sd/?lang=en. 
112 Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, CAREC’s Key Contributions (Almaty, n.d), accessed 
April 25, 2014, http://www.carecnet.org/about-carec/carec’s-key-contributions/?lang=en. 
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Energy” program was designed to contribute to increasing the level of RES in the overall energy 
balance, improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in Central Asian 
countries. The CAREC centre conducted a survey among experts within Central Asian countries 
to identify main challenges along the way toward increasing energy efficiency and RES within 
“The Gap Analysis in the Area of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency in Central Asia” 
project.113 Central Asian experts within the “Planning for Energy Security and Sustainability in 
Central Asia” project reviewed energy-environment nexus problems and identified the main 
energy security threats in the region. Based on the assessment of the environmental dimension of 
energy security challenges, experts developed scenarios for the sustainable development of the 
region. 114  According to the survey and the developed scenarios, Central Asian countries 
acknowledge the seriousness of the environmental damage caused by their economies and energy 
policies. It is, however, difficult to establish cause and affect linkage between the above-
mentioned projects and infrastructure construction and modernization of energy facilities. 
Regional Environmental Centers do not possess sufficient funds to build energy facilities on their 
own. The CAREC centre, however, focuses on communicating the results of studies through 
training experts and decision makers, with the aim that this education will have an impact toward 
building energy facilities and investing in energy efficiency. 
 Within the project on “Promoting Adaption and Mitigation Strategies on Climate Change 
in Central Asia,” Central Asian experts were trained so that they share common understanding 
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over how to address environmental challenges. 115  The CAREC centre organized several 
workshops related to international climate negotiation procedures and necessary measures to 
promote coordinated climate change adaptation initiatives.116 During these workshops, national 
experts and government officials together with representatives of multilateral institutions 
reviewed strategies of the Central Asian countries of promoting of RES, energy efficiency and 
adaptation measures to climate change.117 The idea behind organizing such workshops is to 
encourage experts to come up with a set of recommendations concerning policy options to 
address the impact of climate change on availability of energy resources and promotion of RES 
in the energy balance of the region.118 
 One of the biggest drawbacks of this particular regional governance mechanism is the 
fact that it is limited to gathering experts and writing reports. As an output, the CAREC centre 
provides recommendations with no enforcement mechanism to implement suggested measures. 
When the results are communicated to the governmental bodies responsible for the promotion of 
sustainable energy development initiatives, they accept the proposals, but highlight that their 
respective countries cannot afford a large scale economic, social and energy sectors reform.119 
Moreover, some of the projects within the CAI failed to engage Uzbekistan. Without Uzbekistan,                                                         
115 Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, Integrated Approach for the Development of Low Carbon 
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a key actor in addressing issues that the CAI set as its priority areas of activity, it will be difficult 
for the CAREC centre to develop a common strategy on addressing energy security challenges to 
bring significant changes. According to Almaz Akhmetov, an expert on sustainable development 
and RES initiatives in Kazakhstan within the CAREC centre, except for climate-change related 
issues and issues regarding cooperation in the energy sector, energy security concerns that bear 
regional importance and water-energy balance are excluded from the agenda.120 Since regional-
level initiatives are often perceived by governmental representatives to be politically sensitive, 
most of the projects are limited to local- and country-level initiatives. 
Concluding Remarks 
 One of the biggest challenges preventing timely resolution of disagreements over water 
withdrawal and energy supply balance between upstream and downstream Central Asian 
countries was the lack of effective regional governance mechanisms capable of forcing or 
encourage actors in the energy sector to coordinate their actions and address energy security 
challenges. Intergovernmental agreement between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan on using water-energy resources of the Syr Darya basin intended for multilateral 
contracts on exchanging water and electricity for gas and coal. However, starting from 2008 
Uzbekistan has only been signing bilateral agreements.121 During 2013, Kyrgyzstan initiated a 
number of meetings between Central Asian upstream and downstream countries to discuss the 
technical parameters of Kambarata–1 HPP. Uzbekistani representatives had always been invited, 
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 249 
but never accepted the invitation.122 This indicates the extent of politicization of water-energy 
nexus in Central Asia.123 None of the above studied regional-level energy governance platforms 
succeeded to actively engage either Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan in collectively addressing 
energy security challenges. Events in which Uzbek representatives participate often exclude 
topics related to water-energy disputes in the region.  
 When economic gains or personal profits are placed above energy security concerns, at 
least for the Central Asian countries, counting on intergovernmental institutions, which claim to 
promote cooperation in the energy sector for the benefits of all, may not bring the expected 
results. There are governance innovations in the form of specifically-designed mechanisms to 
promote energy security. While some of these mechanisms aim to change the way actors 
perceive energy security challenges, such as Central Asian Regional Environmental Centers, 
others are more practical and results oriented. The CAREC has the largest number of energy 
projects practically implemented in Central Asia, including those promoted within the Central 
Asian Energy Strategy for Regional Cooperation. However, how can energy sector projects that 
are implemented within the CAREC and budgeted US$4 billion over two decades compete with 
US$50 billion energy investment package made by the Chinese President in just one visit? 
 The above-mentioned energy governance innovations succeeded to establish a 
comprehensive conceptual framework and institutional apparatus to promote regional 
cooperation in the energy sector. However, the fact that intra-Central Asian energy cooperation 
has been declining over the last several years while negatively affecting the level of energy 
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security in the region indicates that existing mechanisms are entirely not capable of ensuring 
security of the CAES. 
 This analysis shows that the regional platforms lack an effective enforcement mechanism 
to implement terms of agreements and ensure full-scale realization of regional-level projects in 
the energy sector. None of the existing governance mechanisms is specifically designed to 
improve energy security through facilitating intra-Central Asian cooperation. Development of 
cooperation within the proposed five corridors is negatively affecting energy trade within Central 
Asia. Different perceptions of energy security by the energy sector governors are leading to 
policies that distance Central Asian states from each other, which turns to be a major obstacle for 
establishing a common energy market. Even though the name of the programs and institutions 
contain “Central Asia” it mainly represents a geographical scope within which various projects 
in the energy sector are implemented. Most of the initiatives’ practical contribution, however, is 
limited to country- and local-level energy projects. Those projects limited in number that 
successfully engage representatives of several Central Asian states or deal with regional-level 
problems end up providing recommendations only. 
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CONCLUSION  
 Energy sectors of the Central Asian countries were designed to operate within the CAES 
irrespective of national borders. Coordinated operation of the Central Asian electric power grids 
and gas pipeline networks within the framework of the resource-sharing mechanism not only 
ensured stability and reliability of energy supplies, but also provided conditions for using energy 
resources in the most rational way. However, recent transformation of the CAES, in which intra-
Central Asian energy cooperation is no longer a priority, has negatively affected the level of 
energy security in the region. In the trade-off between pursuing establishing independent energy 
systems and strengthening regional cooperation in the energy sector, regional state actors 
decided to give preference to the former. While there are a number of domestic as well as foreign 
factors affecting the decision-making process, the analysis shows that a transition to a completely 
independent energy system requires sustaining regional energy trade for at least the short- to 
medium-term. It has also become clear that without properly functioning regional-level energy 
governance innovations, strengthening and sustaining energy cooperation within the CAES will 
be a difficult task to accomplish.  
 A long history of cooperation, inherited energy infrastructure, interdependence, and 
complementarity of energy sectors suggest that strengthening intra-regional energy cooperation 
will improve security of the CAES, and even more important in this context, is that it will do so 
in the most cost-efficient way. There are, however, several external as well as domestic obstacles 
preventing regional state actors from engaging in a more dynamic and cooperative energy trade. 
Energy-thirsty regional and global customers perceive Central Asia as a source of energy and 
promote projects to move energy out of the region, thus threatening availability of sufficient 
resources for domestic and intraregional consumption. While these actors support stability in the 
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region, they may not be interested in an integrated Central Asia that is capable of dictating its 
own terms. Power asymmetry in favour of external customers may force regional energy 
producers to act in a way that may sometimes affect availability of sufficient energy supplies for 
both the population and economic needs of the Central Asian republics. And asymmetrical 
interdependence between Central Asian downstream hydrocarbon producers and upstream 
consuming states is affecting the availability of sufficient energy supplies for intra-Central Asian 
needs.  
 Central Asian policy makers who started prioritizing the strengthening of national energy 
systems within their respective countries resulted in the irrational use of energy resources, 
investment in costly energy projects and eventually difficulties to sustain affordable energy 
prices. Most importantly, despite the fact that Central Asian countries acknowledge the 
importance of regional energy cooperation and the necessity to establish well-functioning 
mechanisms to address energy insecurities, there is no effective intra-Central Asian initiative 
promoting such cooperation. Several energy sector integration initiatives/regional energy 
governance innovations that are put in place to manage Central Asian energy resources either 
lack effective enforcement mechanisms or intentionally leave some aspects of the energy sector 
development (energy security or management of major sources of energy) out of regulations. 
 Maximally secure CAES requires the establishment of the regional energy governance 
mechanism which ensures reliability of energy supplies, encourages coordinated actions among 
actors to respond to energy insecurities, and engages all actors (state and non-state) in 
strengthening national energy sectors by providing conditions to improve regional energy 
cooperation. However, currently none of the regional-level energy governance mechanisms 
successfully draw enough resources to encourage energy actors to use energy resources in the 
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most rational way and ensure sustainability of energy supplies for both the population and 
economic needs. In this research work, energy security is defined as a condition that states enjoy 
when they can be confident they will have adequate and sustainable energy supplies for the 
population and economic needs for the foreseeable future. Even though the CAES is in the 
process of disintegration, until Central Asian countries establish independent national energy 
systems, which are for some of them a long-term goal, regional cooperation in the energy sector 
remains an important component to ensure security of the CAES. The research also shows that 
energy security for Central Asian countries in the short-run can be ensured through intra-Central 
Asian energy trade and coordinated operation of interdependent energy sectors.  
Competing Aspects of Energy Cooperation within the CAES 
 Scholars and Central Asian policy makers have failed to arrive at a shared definition of 
energy security or at least agree upon key elements of it, because there is often a conflict of 
interests as a consequence of which one’s energy security is promoted at the expense of others or 
energy security interests are sacrificed for the sake of financial gains, political or economic 
leverage. Central Asian energy cooperation has three components that are closely interlinked 
and, due to inappropriate management, sometimes become mutually exclusive.  
(a) Energy supply security prioritizes Central Asian countries’ availability and affordability 
of sufficient supplies of energy now and for the foreseeable future.  
(b) Energy export security aims at ensuring energy demand (through either long-term 
contracts or diversification of energy export routes) to generate revenues from selling 
energy to external markets.  
 254 
(c) Water-energy nexus, a legacy of the Soviet Unified Energy System of Central Asia, based 
on resource-sharing mechanism that ensures a stable supply of water for irrigation 
purposes in exchange for energy resources.  
Regional and global powers’ interest in Central Asian resources has been growing over 
the past decade. Unfortunately, energy export capacity does not match the volume of gas that the 
regional producers are taking obligations to supply. Tempted by financial revenues from 
exporting energy resources, Central Asian producers continue to increase the volume of exported 
energy even at the expense of domestic consumption needs, as is clearly illustrated in the 
example of Uzbekistan. 
 Governments, as key energy policy decision makers, have to balance prioritizing 
different aspects of energy sector cooperation such as energy security, environmental concerns, 
economic growth and development, etc. In this sense, while making a decision to improve other 
aspects of energy sector development, state and non-state actors should keep in mind the 
importance of energy security concerns.  
 HPPs’ primary goal has shifted from the water mode of operating, which established a 
well-functioning water management system, into an energy mode, which prioritizes increasing 
electricity production capacity, thus might affect the water withdrawal and energy supply 
balance in Central Asia. This has led to serious disagreements between regional state actors 
resulting in frequent energy supply disruptions and energy trading mechanisms failures.  
 While all these aspects of energy cooperation should not necessarily be mutually 
exclusive, the analysis shows that conflict over water distribution and construction of giant HPPs 
along with increasing the volume of energy export are negatively impacting availability of 
energy resources for domestic and intra-regional needs.  
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Changing the Dynamics of the Central Asian Power Balance 
 Central Asia is not the only region where non-cooperative dynamics between states in the 
energy sector impact availability of sufficient and stable energy supplies. What distinguishes this 
region, however, is the fact that initially Central Asian countries’ energy sectors were designed 
to operate within a unified energy system. But intra-regional energy trade within the framework 
of the resource-sharing mechanism, which ensured stability of energy supplies in Central Asia, is 
currently being compromised. 
 Almost complete dependence on the Russian pipeline network to export oil and natural 
gas has put Central Asian states in a very vulnerable position (low prices for oil and gas, 
economic dependence, political pressure, etc.). Thus, diversification of energy export routes by 
building alternative pipeline networks promoted by regional and global energy consumers was 
supported by Central Asian energy exporters. However, limited energy export capacities along 
with other economic, geopolitical and security factors have forced Central Asian producers to 
increase energy exports even at the expense of domestic and intra-Central Asian consumption. 
 Ups and downs in energy production and consumption, certain progress in the 
construction of new facilities and the maintenance of existing ones did not significantly affect the 
power balance among Central Asian states and with Russia throughout 1990s. Yet, it was clear 
that the CAES has undergone transformation from the condition in which political and economic 
borders were disregarded into intraregional energy relationships in which states are highly 
concerned about their sovereignty. In the late 1990s, Turkmenistan started considering 
development of an independent energy system. Uzbekistan has also been working on 
strengthening its own national energy system. At that time, however, their energy policies did 
not imply complete breakdown of the unified CAES.  
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 Having benefitted from re-selling Central Asian resources, Russia had been mostly 
blocking all energy projects designed to diversify Central Asian countries’ energy export 
dependence on Russia. While Russia was also interested in importing Central Asian energy, it 
needed these resources only to fulfill its obligations to supply natural gas to the European 
customers. In such asymmetrical interdependence, Central Asian exporters were forced to 
comply with game rules set by the Russian government that were rarely in favour of the former. 
Since the higher the cost of the termination or drastic alteration of energy relations for an actor, 
the more vulnerable this actor is and Central Asian states left in this more vulnerable position. 
Currently, the majority of Central Asian energy resources are transported through Russian and 
Chinese pipelines. However, neither China nor Russia considers Central Asian energy as a vital 
source for their economy. 
 So, despite the fact that there are a number of proposed energy projects capable of 
changing the power distribution in the region, only China has succeeded to significantly 
challenge the established balance. In 2012, gas export to China and Iran exceeded the volume 
transported to Russia for the first time. Currently, China is the major importer of gas and, taking 
into account the projected increase of gas exports in this direction, it will remain the major 
importer in the future. China is also quite interested in importing electricity from Central Asian 
upstream countries. In this sense, Central Asian countries in an attempt to escape from extreme 
dependence on the Russian pipeline network are falling into the same trap of high dependence on 
China. Further diversification of energy export routes is important for Central Asian states since 
it can minimize the cost of drastic alteration of energy relations with either China or Russia, but 
does not necessarily contribute to the level of energy security of the latter. 
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 While in energy export/import relations with external customers Central Asian exporters 
represent weaker players, in energy supply relations within the region oil and gas producers 
retain the upper hand. During the Soviet Union and right after its collapse, mutually beneficial 
resource-sharing mechanisms ensured energy security and contributed to economic stability to 
some extent. However, the current state of natural resource management in Central Asia can 
easily be characterized as conflictive. Higher prices for energy paid by external consumers have 
tempted downstream countries to redirect resources to the outside world and then equate the 
price for upstream Central Asian countries. Having experienced severe energy shortages to meet 
the economic and population needs of the country, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have shifted from 
water to energy mode in operating their HPPs, which is capable of affecting current water 
withdrawal level in the region. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are now planning to speed up the 
construction of two giant HPPs to generate more electricity and develop their own fossil fuels to 
improve the level of energy security by decreasing their dependence on oil and gas as well as 
thermal electricity coming from downstream neighbours. But the construction of the Rogun and 
Kambarata dams, perhaps predictably, was critically and sometimes aggressively accepted by 
Uzbekistan. 
The Problem of Hunting a Stag (Maximally Secure Central Asian Energy System)  
 Central Asian energy sectors were initially designed to operate within a unified energy 
system turning regional state actors interdependent on each other. Having mutually benefited 
from cooperation in the energy sector, Central Asian states were supposed to keep 
bartering/trading energy and sharing resources. During the Soviet Union instructions coming 
from a supra-national political centre (Moscow) ensured the stability of energy supplies and 
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coordinated operation of the CAES. Throughout the 1990s, regional state actors continued 
cooperating in the energy sector by inertia, because there were neither domestic nor external 
major factors threatening intraregional energy trade in Central Asia. The CAES, however, had 
later undergone certain internal as well as external transformations, which affected the level of 
intraregional cooperation in the energy sector consequently leading to energy insecurity.  
 The analysis of the CAES security shows that there is no individual payoff greater than 
what actors can achieve through cooperation. In this sense, there should be little incentive for 
Central Asian states to cheat on each other by simply calculating the payoffs. So the dominant 
strategy of Central Asian countries’ is to choose cooperative dynamics. Regional state actors, 
however, chose establishing independent energy systems and increasing energy exports to 
external customers, having perceived it as the most optimal strategy at this particular stage of 
interaction. Since cooperation in the Central Asian context to improve energy security is always 
preferred to defection in terms of overall payoffs, regional state actors’ failure to ensure 
coordinated operation of energy sectors can be considered a problem of coordination (the SH) 
rather than cooperation (the PD).  
 SH, unlike PD, has a shadow of the future component built in. The SH model has tension 
between short-term, low-value but high-probability payoff and long-term, high-value but low-
probability payoff. In the Central Asian case, governments are concentrating myopically on 
higher-probability short-term payoffs to the detriment of long-term payoffs (in the form of more 
robust energy security). 
 The theory implies that if a stag appears in the beginning of hunting, hunters would most 
likely go for a stag. If the hunting takes more time, there emerges a risk that someone would 
defect by being tempted by a hare running through bush. In the Central Asian case, there was no 
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need for hunters to test their true commitment to the common cause in the prolonged hunting 
because they have already been benefitting from cooperation and know that they have all 
preconditions to trust each other.  
 While security of the CAES is a stag that actors can achieve in case they choose to pursue 
intra-Central Asian energy cooperation, regional state actors nonetheless started prioritizing 
establishing independent national energy systems. Turkmenistan had officially withdrawn from 
the CAPS did not completely suspend energy export/import relations with other Central Asian 
states until Uzbekistan cut off the unified system. Now Turkmenistan is retaining the status of 
neutrality by refraining from becoming involved in conflicting water/energy nexus relationships. 
As a hub of the CAES, Uzbekistan’s decision to withdraw from the CAPS and alter the stable 
gas supply to neighbouring countries seriously affected the level of cooperation, which have led 
to a different extent to a decreased level of energy security in all five Central Asian states. 
Guided by the belief of self-sufficiency, Uzbekistan continues to refrain from full-scale 
reintegration of the CAES, even despite the fact that isolationist energy policy toward 
neighbouring states is negatively affecting its own energy security. Uzbekistan’s decision to 
withdraw from the common energy system was partly justified by the fact that Central Asian 
upstream states started expressing a willingness to develop their hydro-power potential through 
the construction of the giant HPP. The Uzbek government then used its energy leverage as a 
“weapon” to influence the decision making of its counterparts. Kazakhstan, relying on its 
financial capabilities, also decided to secure itself from any sort of dependence on unreliable 
southern partners.  
 High incentive to hunt a stag and all preconditions for sustaining cooperative dynamics 
was supposed to prevent state actors from defecting. In the SH game it is always preferable to 
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hunt a stag under the condition that others hunt it too. And it is better to hunt a hare if other 
players hunt hares. While each player always had in mind strengthening their energy systems, in 
fact most of the actors were forced to hunt hares because Uzbekistan preferred a hare to a stag. 
Decreasing levels of energy security proves the fact that the consequences of the CAES 
disintegration are more severe than was probably assessed by the Uzbek government and go 
beyond the scope of the Central Asian upstream countries alone. So basically what was 
perceived as a mild dilemma (an insignificant difference in terms of payoffs between cooperation 
and defection), in fact turned to be a severe issue.  
 Trade-offs between short- and long-term gains seem to be one of the key challenges 
preventing regional state actors from achieving greater energy security through cooperation. The 
level of economic and energy sector development as well as the extent of vulnerability to energy 
security threats differ from country to country in the region. Whereas some enjoy abundance of 
fossil fuel deposits to meet energy needs, others possess yet underdeveloped extensive hydro-
power potential. In this sense, while some need a stag more than others, for some a juicy hare 
looks more attractive at this stage. This could explain why the CAES, which was based on trust 
and cooperation to maximize benefits and use energy resources in the most rational way, is in the 
process of disintegration. Having a history of long-term cooperation in the energy sector, some 
Central Asian countries decided to deceive each other in an attempt to take maximum advantage 
of their energy resources by strengthening national energy systems and pursuing independent 
energy policies.  
 During the Soviet period, the CAES was operated from Tashkent, but was still controlled 
by Moscow and it was not the Central Asian states’ choice to decide whether to defect or 
cooperate. Within the water-energy nexus, in which water and energy were considered closely 
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tied to each other, all Central Asian states enjoyed fair distribution of resources and benefits. 
Energy supply networks were largely operated within a closed circle with no possibility to export 
energy other than in the Russian direction, so the regional energy producers were not tempted by 
hard currency paid by external customers. Currently, however, there is no longer a supra-national 
body dictating the terms of cooperation. Water and energy sectors are still closely interlinked, 
but while some actors operate HPPs within an energy mode, others insist on keeping the water 
mode. On top of that, rapidly increasing external demand for Central Asian energy resources and 
physical capability to move that energy is a very tempting hare, which regional state actors 
cannot resist to pursue.  
 High external market prices for oil and gas in combination with slowly increasing energy 
production capacity, in addition to the fact that Central Asian countries have succeeded to 
diversify their dependence on Russia by obtaining access to China, Europe, Iran, and in limited 
quantities to other markets transformed the CAES in which hydrocarbon producers are 
incentivized to cheat on Central Asian upstream countries and redirect their export to newly 
opened energy markets even at the expense of intraregional consumption.  
 Having justified its defection on regional energy cooperation by low regional prices 
compared to what was offered by external customers, Uzbekistan succeeded to achieve more 
favourable terms in the electricity and gas trade. Central Asian upstream countries are now 
willing to pay a good price for the oil and gas supplied by their downstream neighbours. 
However, there was another reason, which was perhaps more important, for Uzbekistan to 
choose non-cooperative dynamics. Uzbekistan also decided to defect to make Central Asian 
upstream states give up the idea to pursue the construction of giant HPPs capable of affecting the 
status quo water withdrawal balance, which perfectly suits its interests.  
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 The SH game implies that a hunter who chooses to go for a stag takes a risk that others 
may choose not to. A hunter who pursues a hare runs no such risk, because his or her payoff does 
not depend on others. And, hunters have to make a choice between high probability lower selfish 
gains and low probability higher collective benefits. The pay-off matrix for the hunters 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) is if they capture the stag 
(reintegrate CAES). Since Tajikistan was completely isolated from the CAES, when Uzbekistan 
stopped energy supplies/transit to its upstream neighbour, it is the most obvious winner from 
taking the stag. Kyrgyzstan is the second big winner. Kyrgyz government succeeded to ensure 
energy supplies from Kazakhstan directly and with the support of the Russian side as a 
middleman. The only way to supply thermal electricity and natural gas to the southern parts of 
the country is through Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is a weaker winner, because it is financially 
capable of purchasing both gas and electricity from neighbours as well as increase its own 
production and transportation capacity. It is still important though for Kazakhstan to sustain 
regional cooperation in the energy sector because establishing an independent energy system 
takes time, and it is cost efficient to exploit existing energy supply channels. Turkmenistan has 
essentially little stake in the CAES right now in terms of physically supplying sufficient amount 
of energy to meet its domestic needs. Thus, it has basically retrenched from the region to focus 
on integration into the global energy system. But it can still benefit from intraregional energy 
trade, which adds clean hydro power to the country’s consumption balance and allows its natural 
gas to be used in a more rational way. Since Turkmenistan is connected to its major energy 
markets through the Central Asian states, it would want to take part in ensuring transit security 
throughout the region as part of a greater energy cooperation. For Uzbekistan, the share of the 
stag now turned to be higher than was expected when it decided to compromise stable energy 
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supply and transit relationships within the region. And the hare that it was after does not seem as 
juicy and attractive anymore. The rewards from the CAES will slowly turn in reverse when fossil 
fuels near their completion and renewable hydro power start having greater importance. 
 Regional state actors are struggling to equalize the payoffs through greater cooperation in 
the energy sector, because Central Asian upstream countries gain more in the short run, while 
downstream countries can only expect to receive higher benefits in the long run. Being unable to 
coordinate the trade-offs between short- and long-term benefits, Central Asian countries are 
losing a chance to hunt a stag. Equalizing long-term payoffs is possible under the condition of 
trust, in which some energy actors would be willing to pay more now, expecting to receive 
higher benefits in future. Another possibility is to establish relationships with equal amounts of 
energy contributed by each party. The main goal is to convince all hunters to coordinate and not 
to defect on the other hunters.  
 In an environment of uncertainty, where Central Asian governments are no longer sure 
about the intentions of their neighbours, the best way to encourage actors to cooperate is to 
improve communication channels. Communication in this sense is a good tool to alleviate the 
fear of uncertainty and being cheated by others. For the moment, however, communication 
among Central Asian countries is limited to cheap talks. To encourage regional state actors to 
communicate more actively and not only with their counterparts, but also with other actors 
engaged in the Central Asian energy sectors to promote and sustain cooperation within the 
CAES, several regional-level governance mechanisms were put in place. Unfortunately, the 
extent of cooperation and, consequently, security of the CAES remains limited suggesting that 
regional energy governance innovations face serious challenges preventing them from achieving 
the goal for which they were designed.  
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 The SH game is about the trade-off between low-risk short- and high-risk long-term 
rewards. The main line of argument in the case of the CAES is that non-cooperative dynamics in 
the region’s energy sector is the result of state actors’ desire to pursue immediate gains due to 
inability to coordinate their actions to achieve greater long-term benefits. This, however, does 
not undermine the extent of domestic energy sector governance drawbacks and the problem of 
corruption. Central Asian governments and elites in general, who benefit from natural 
endowment rents perhaps only care about maximizing short-term profits. Lack of transparency of 
the region’s energy sectors and unaccountability of ruling elites make it possible for elites to fill 
their pockets from exploiting resources without caring about long-term energy security. Central 
Asian countries are, to a different extent, authoritarian states in which powerful actors can extract 
rents without penalty and without concern for the long-term public good. Domestic energy sector 
mismanagement may overshadow the problem of regional-level cooperation and coordination. 
Internal governance problems in the region indeed affect the regional-level cooperation in 
Central Asia. Presumably, if these countries were genuine democracies, and if their energy 
infrastructures were owned and operated by public agencies for the public benefit, they would be 
more attuned to long-term energy security concerns. The research has shown that the Central 
Asian energy sectors are controlled by the ruling elites who have a low level of accountability to 
the public.  
 The analysis of the Central Asian energy sector development also indicates that the extent 
of intra-Central Asian cooperation does not overall threaten the elite’s personal profits. Trading 
energy resources with external customers constitutes the main sources of income for the 
government in most of the Central Asian states, while subsidized domestic energy markets pose 
bigger threats. Unless domestic energy sector governance problems are solved, achieving a well-
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functioning regional-level energy governance mechanism may be problematic. However, intra-
Central Asian trade may contribute to mitigating domestic crisis without compromising revenues 
from exporting energy to external markets. Besides, regional-level energy governance 
innovations, introduced to deal with energy security challenges within the region can 
hypothetically contribute to improving domestic energy sector management. The dissertation 
makes it clear that there are many regional-level energy governance mechanisms that are not 
working very well in terms of ensuring security of the CAES. Both the mistrust among regional 
state actors and the wrong perception of high individual gains that affect regional cooperation, as 
well as the problem of domestic energy sector mismanagement, have a negative effect on the 
security of the CAES. But the analysis shows that the inability to coordinate their strategy to 
achieve a long-term payoff by ensuring security of the CAES determines the regional state 
actors’ desire to pursue short-term gains in the form of strengthening their national energy 
systems.  
Attributes of a Maximally Secure Central Asian Energy System 
 This research shows that there are several key attributes of a maximally secure CAES that 
should be prioritized in addressing energy security challenges in the region. Central Asian 
countries cannot ensure their energy security, at least in the short- and medium-term, without 
restoring and sustaining energy trade among each other, since all external actors are interested 
and have successfully implemented projects designed to move energy resources out of the 
region. Using energy resources rationally would be possible only through intraregional energy 
trade (monetary exchange of energy resources), in which Central Asian upstream countries 
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supply hydroelectricity in summer time in exchange for downstream neighbours’ thermal electric 
power and hydrocarbons in the winter period. 
 Central Asian countries successfully cooperated when there was a supra-national body 
controlling energy sectors in the region. Regional state actors had also operated within a unified 
energy system on their own after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Having become 
vulnerable to newly emerging energy security threats, Central Asian authorities realize that 
without governance innovation in the form of a well-functioning regional energy governance 
mechanism, which is based on collaboration of various energy actors, ensuring the energy 
security of this region would be a difficult task to accomplish. To be considered effective, 
regional energy governance mechanisms must be capable of ensuring the following attributes of 
a maximally secure CAES: 
• Reliability and stability of sufficient energy supplies both in normal and emergency 
situations; 
• Possibility to take coordinated actions for a timely and effective response to sudden 
energy supply cuts;  
• Transit security of energy resources through Central Asian states; 
• Effective enforcement mechanisms to encourage Central Asian states to fulfill their 
obligations, in which sacrificing some of their interests would still be better than non-
compliance with terms of intergovernmental agreements;  
• Joint investments in maintenance and modernization of trans-boundary electricity 
transmission lines and pipeline infrastructures as well as the development of the Central 
Asian (hydro) power sector by bringing financial resources and qualified expertise 
together from multilateral-institutions, civil society, and national governments. Joint 
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ownership can align commercial interests of all Central Asian countries and as a result, 
encourage them to cooperate;  
• Transparency and accountability of energy sectors; 
• On the country level, developing the RES and increasing energy efficiency of energy 
producing, consuming, and transportation facilities through the exchange of technology, 
expertise, and financial resources; and  
• Development of the Central Asian (mainly focusing on five Central Asian states) 
Regional Energy Cooperation Strategy and Action Plan, because achieving the above-
mentioned goals also depends on whether Central Asian energy governors share common 
understanding regarding what constitutes the core of energy insecurity, the seriousness of 
energy security challenges, and policy options to overcome those obstacles. 
Lack of Effective Regional Energy Governance Mechanisms 
 The CAES has experienced both a highly authoritative vertical management by a supra-
national body and a cooperative dynamic within the resource-sharing mechanism without any 
regulatory institution after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Most of the above-mentioned 
conditions that are now expected of the regional-energy governance mechanisms were provided 
by a single political centre (Moscow). Currently, however, the ongoing disintegration of the 
system proves that Central Asian countries are no longer capable of sustaining a maximally 
secure CAES. It has also become clear that ongoing disagreements between Central Asian 
countries cannot be resolved and more importantly future large-scale tensions prevented without 
an effective regional energy governance mechanism in the region. In this regard, there is a need 
for governance innovations that could provide conditions in which sacrificing some of their 
 268 
interests due to integration of energy networks into a broader system would still be better than 
non-compliance with terms of intergovernmental agreements.  
 To ensure energy security through improved regional cooperation and energy trade, 
several regional-level energy governance innovations (mechanisms) were introduced within the 
following institutions/program: the ADB promoted the CAREC; the World Bank-supported 
CAEWDP, the CASA–1000, Assessment Studies of the Rogun Regional Water Reservoir in 
Tajikistan; the Central Asian Regional Environmental Centre; the SCO; the CIS; and, the EEU. 
However, the analysis of these mechanisms shows that their contribution to improve the security 
of the CAES is rather constrained.  
 As a contribution to the studies of (energy) governance, this research, by studying the 
Central Asian regional-level energy governance innovations, highlights that: (a) several 
governance mechanisms dealing with a range of issues, including energy security, may not be as 
effective as a single mechanism that is specifically designed to ensure security of sufficiency and 
sustainability of energy supplies—a number of recently established governance mechanisms 
failed to effectively replace one hierarchical supra-national Soviet management system to ensure 
security of the CAES; (b) asymmetrical power balance among key actors may negatively affect 
the capability of the governance mechanism to simultaneously promote interests of all—the 
Central Asian regional-level energy governance innovations failed to balance the trade-offs 
between interests of greater powers and weaker states; (c) prevailing nature of the bilateral 
format of negotiations may be an obstacle to the success of multilateral arrangements within the 
governance mechanisms; (d) transparency and accountability is key integral part of an effective 
governance mechanism—due to lack of transparency Central Asian leaders prioritize economic, 
including personal gains of certain elite groups, and political revenues over greater energy 
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security; (e) without an effective enforcement mechanism an attempt of the governance 
innovations to promote sustainability of energy sectors through greater cooperation in the energy 
sector may be easily challenged by the short-term benefits oriented state energy policies; (f) 
comprehensive institutional and conceptual instruments of the governance mechanisms do not 
necessarily guarantee practical implementation of regional energy projects; and (g) there are 
negative consequences of an underestimated importance of the shared views and values among 
energy actors for the development of regional energy security strategy.  
Complementarity of the Regional Governance Mechanisms 
 Regional energy governance institutions/programs were established for various purposes. 
The CIS was supposed to keep former Soviet countries within already established political, 
security, economic, and energy ties. The EEU promotes greater economic integration, including 
within the energy sector. The SCO was initially established to fight security threats, but later 
turned to stimulate economic development and stable energy export/import relations. The World 
Bank and the ADB backed programs were designed to promote energy-led economic growth, 
transport communication, trade, water-energy balance, and energy security. Mechanisms vary 
from those established right after disintegration of the Soviet Union, such as the CIS, to 
relatively recently emerged ones like the World Bank initiatives. Some of the regional 
mechanisms have been gradually developed: the EurAsEC integration process was transformed 
into the CU of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia and have now reached the EEU level; and, 
having started as a security organization, the SCO is currently engaged in economic and energy-
sector related activities. There are governance mechanisms encompassing some Central Asian 
countries (the EEU) and all regional producers (the CAREC centre) as well as major external 
customers (the CIS, the SCO, and the CAREC). Some mechanisms are practical results oriented, 
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such as the CAREC, while others are designed to increase awareness of the Central Asian 
decision makers concerning the changing dynamics of energy security threats and how to ensure 
sustainability of energy sectors (the CAREC centre). 
 All these institutions and programs in combination can hypothetically promote 
cooperation among Central Asian countries leading to greater energy security. Competing energy 
projects promoted by various organizations, failure to pool resources together to promote joint 
initiatives, and the gap between conceptual and practical results oriented programs affect 
successful implementation of the regional-level energy projects through energy governance 
mechanisms.  
Competing Nature of the Regional Energy Governance Mechanisms 
 The CAES development strategy concerns several closely interlinked dimensions 
including energy-led economic growth, energy export security, stable water withdrawal balance, 
and energy supply security. While Central Asian governance mechanisms, to some extent, deal 
with all these aspects of energy sector development, different actors have different preferences. 
The lack of communication among regional energy governance mechanisms resulted in 
promotion of some aspects at the expense of others. The EEU focuses on integration of the 
Central Asian countries’ economies into the Russian-dominated union. The SCO prioritizes 
stability of energy export to China, avoiding conflictive competition with Russian interests over 
Central Asian resources. The CAREC and the World Bank initiatives are designed to enhance 
energy-led economic growth and energy security thus encouraging the Central Asia-South Asia 
partnership, which has potential but so far has failed to achieve considerable progress. Finally, 
the CIS promotes cooperation among former Soviet Union republics.  
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 There are several competing energy corridors to move energy from and within Central 
Asia: Central Asia–East Asia; Central Asia–South Asia; Intra-Central Asia Cooperation; Central 
Asia–Russia; Central Asia–European Union. Despite significant energy reserves, development of 
these resources is currently limited. Development of each of these energy corridors is backed by 
a particular governance mechanism. Intra-Central Asian trade and the Central Asia–South Asian 
corridor largely depend on multilateral assistance from regional programs. Russia is relying on 
the EEU to protect its energy interests in the region. China claims to ensure stability of energy 
supplies through the SCO. The Central Asian case clearly illustrates how major powers use their 
influence within certain institutions to compete for energy and at the same time avoid conflict 
over resources. 
 Some attributes of the CAES can immediately contribute to the security of energy 
supplies for population and economic needs: reliability and stability of sufficient energy supplies 
both in normal and emergency situations; the possibility to take coordinated actions for a timely 
and effective response to sudden energy supply cuts; transit security of energy resources through 
the territories of the Central Asian states. However, security of energy supplies for Central Asian 
countries can only be ensured through intraregional cooperation, because each country possesses 
complementary sources of energy necessary to ensure short-term sufficiency and long-term 
sustainability of energy supplies. All of the institutions/programs encompass exporting and 
importing states, in which Central Asian countries represent the former. Moving energy out of 
the region threatens availability of sufficient and affordable energy supplies for population and 
economic needs of the Central Asian states. Such cooperation does contribute to the budget of 
the regional exporters, but not to the energy security level since in the condition of limited 
 272 
energy production, state actors are increasing export capacity at the expense of domestic 
consumption. 
Comprehensive Conceptual and Institutional Instruments Are Insufficient 
 The CIS, the EEU, and the CAREC have developed comprehensive conceptual tools 
backed by institutional apparatus to promote regional cooperation in the energy sector for 
member states. However, the analysis shows that possessing well-developed conceptual and 
institutional instruments does not necessarily ensure effective implementation of the regional-
level energy projects. The CIS has probably the most comprehensive package of 
intergovernmental agreements regulating the oil, gas, and electric power sectors in the former 
Soviet republics, including Central Asian countries. However, since the CIS does not possess an 
effective enforcement mechanism and is considered a loose association of states most of signed 
intergovernmental agreements, which are not binding in nature, turning recommendation-type 
agreements into documents capable of forcing states to comply with terms of agreements proved 
to be quite challenging.  
 The EEU has indeed established an effective mechanism regulating the movement of 
almost all types of energy resources. But the most important sources are still intentionally left out 
of regulatory frameworks. Free movement of products within the Union excludes more than one 
hundred items for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus including the most traded oil, 
natural gas, and electricity. 
 The CAREC is the only organization that has adopted the Central Asian Energy 
Cooperation Strategy. Regional cooperation, which the CAREC has been actively promoting, is 
supposed to be a powerful instrument to implement national projects that benefit all participating 
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states. However, practical contribution of this mechanism due to certain political constraints is 
still limited to a few regional-level projects in the form of technical assistance. 
The Problem of Promoting Sustainability 
 Having focused on local-level energy projects, the CAREC does not only develop fossil 
fuel sectors but also promotes the renewable energy potential of the Central Asian region. And 
the CAREC centre aims to indirectly contribute to the promotion of regional cooperation in the 
energy sector in Central Asia by increasing the awareness of experts and policy makers regarding 
emerging energy security obstacles and the necessary policy initiatives to address these 
challenges. Development of a shared position over the energy security concept may incentivize 
state actors, multilateral institutions, and NGOs to jointly invest in maintenance and 
modernization of trans-boundary electricity transmission lines and pipeline infrastructures as 
well as the development of the Central Asian (hydro) power sector by pulling financial resources 
and qualified expertise together. The CAREC and the CAREC centre provide platforms for RES 
development and increasing energy efficiency of energy producing, consuming, and 
transportation facilities through the exchange of technology, expertise, and financial resources. 
However, since Central Asian governments’ contribution to the development of RES is limited, 
and subsidized energy sectors affect private companies’ desire to actively engage in ensuring 
sustainability of energy supplies, contribution of these organizations would remain insignificant.  
Governance Innovations without Financial Institutions 
 Without financial institutions in an environment of high uncertainty in cooperation 
between unreliable state actors, counting on public-private partnerships can be problematic 
especially when it comes to realization of regional-level security-sensitive energy projects. 
 274 
Regional-level energy projects are usually capital-intensive and the implementation of which 
requires considerable money devoted specifically for this particular purpose. But the analysis 
shows that financial constraints are often considered a major challenge for all the above studied 
governance mechanisms. Intergovernmental organizations failed to establish well-functioning 
financial agencies due to disagreements over the share of contribution to the budget and 
distribution of gains/power. For instance, cooperation within the SCO is based on consensus, but 
member states cannot equally contribute to the budget. Those contributing more want to have 
more votes, which contradicts the consensus principle. Most of the agencies within the CIS enlist 
underfinancing as the main challenge preventing timely and effective realization of energy 
projects. The CAREC has invested in total US$4.6 billion in energy sector development projects 
for the last two decades in all member states. While this amount was sufficient to promote a 
number of local-level sustainable energy initiatives, it can hardly cover the cost of large regional-
level projects. One of the principles promoted by the program is to establish public-private 
partnership by encouraging the private sector to take part in implementing such projects. High 
security risks and non-market mechanisms dominated energy trade negatively and affected the 
private sector representatives’ desire to actively engage in energy sector development initiatives 
to distribute gas, oil products, and electricity to the local markets. In this regard, state actors and 
energy companies prefer bilateral arrangements to cooperation within multilateral framework.  
Prevailing Bilateral Arrangements 
 Taking good advantage of asymmetrical interdependence, major powers within 
intergovernmental organizations use regional governance platforms such as the SCO, the EEU, 
and the CIS to promote their energy interests. Lack of transparency and accountability on both 
the Central Asian countries and major customers’ (Russia and China) sides created an 
 275 
environment in which it is easier to use a bilateral format of negotiations to promote energy 
projects. The question remains of whether bilateral agreements represent a governance approach 
in the context of the Central Asian energy sector management and trade. Separate bilateral 
arrangements-based cooperation in the Central Asian energy sector did not result from 
established formal or informal practices within multilateral institutions and can hardly be 
considered a governance mechanism. In the Central Asian context, however, successful 
implementation of regional-level energy projects largely depends on the power balance, which is 
determined by the extent of major powers’ interest over the region’s energy resources and 
regional state actors’ ability to counterbalance external influence. In this regard, unless energy 
projects promoted by bilateral agreements are a direct result of the governance innovation and 
are implemented through a particular regional mechanism, it is problematic to consider such 
arrangements representing regional-level energy governance. 
 The analysis of the SCO intergovernmental mechanism to promote regional-level energy 
projects shows that bilateral and trilateral agreements prevail at six-sided talks. State actors’ 
desire to keep the bilateral format of interaction is not a problem, unless actors, which do not 
support that format due to the asymmetry in power balance cannot change it. Currently, both 
regional exporters and importers may seem to support bilateral arrangements, but the former can 
hardly rely on such a format as an instrument to sustain mutually beneficial cooperation in the 
strategically important energy sector. Prevailing bilateral cooperation within the SCO in the end 
is presented as a direct result of regional governance mechanism. Such a format in energy supply 
relations prevails because the SCO member states still cannot agree upon a united position over 
the common strategic energy concept.  
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No United Position over the Energy Security Concept 
 Actors engaged in interaction within existing regional energy governance mechanisms 
often retain different, opposite and thus conflictive fundamental positions. Encompassing energy 
importing and exporting countries in highly politicized multilateral institutions such as the SCO, 
the EEU, and the CIS affects the possibility to establish well-functioning governance 
mechanisms, within which realization of projects is supposed to rely largely on persuasion and 
all participants’ interests are equally taken into account. Such conflictive dynamics is clearly 
illustrated in the case of the EEU, where member states’ positions change depending on whether 
they retain the status of importing or exporting countries. Importing countries vote for 
liberalization of energy markets, while exporters want to keep the control over strategically 
important resources. 
 Some intergovernmental organizations with sufficient resources, including technological 
capability, financial resources, and qualified expertise, to promote regional-level energy projects 
such as the SCO, still lack a unified position over energy security, and export-import balance. 
Without reaching a common understanding on these issues, it is impossible to develop a common 
strategic energy security concept that could guide actions ensuring a coordinated management of 
the Central Asian energy sectors. Thus, currently major powers promote regional governance 
innovations to improve their position and secure energy interests. Russia is promoting the EEU, 
but opposes common regulation of major energy resources, while China promotes the SCO 
regional framework, but relies on bilateral agreements. 
 Conversely, there are governance mechanisms in Central Asia that seem to achieve 
certain underplay among member states over the importance of regional energy cooperation, at 
least officially. Adopting regional strategy for cooperation and working out action plans can be 
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an asset for Central Asian countries to improve energy policies to ensure that their energy 
security interests are taken into consideration. Such strategies would suggest that the Central 
Asian energy governors share a common understanding regarding what constitutes the core of 
energy insecurity, the seriousness of energy security challenges, and policy options to overcome 
those obstacles. The CAREC has adopted a regional cooperation strategy in the energy sector, 
yet without sufficient resources and support from its member states, achieving their set up goals 
has turned problematic.  
Isolated Energy Systems 
 In the Central Asian context, there is currently a problem of the physical isolation of 
energy sectors. Not all energy systems of the former Soviet Union were connected to each other. 
Within the CIS framework, the CAES is still isolated from that of other member states. Since the 
CIS energy systems are not properly connected, it has turned out to be quite difficult to ensure 
coordinated operation of those electric power grids and pipeline networks.  
 Within the EEU, while Russia is connected to the northern electric power grids of 
Kazakhstan, southern parts of the country, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are physically isolated 
from the Russian electric power grid and gas pipeline systems. Russia can potentially ensure 
supply of energy resources to other EEU members by serving as a middleman between 
Uzbekistan and Central Asian upstream states to transport energy through the Uzbek energy 
system. The middleman role of Russia would have greater affect if Uzbekistan joined the EEU. 
Uzbekistan, however, is currently not considering membership in the organization. Establishing 
the EEU energy system, avoiding Uzbek territory, will not only take time, but will also require 
investments that the regional actors are not willing to provide. In this sense, it is quite 
challenging to establish parallel operation of the unified energy system when such a system does 
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not physically exist. There are currently no electric power grids or pipeline infrastructures 
connecting Central Asian resources with the broader South Asian energy markets. 
 The cost of the construction of CASA–1000 electricity supply networks promoted by the 
CAREC and the World Bank initiatives are estimated around US$1 billion. However, none of 
these institutions takes responsibility for covering the total cost of building electric power grids. 
Aside from security issues, physical disconnection between Central Asian resources and the 
South Asian market is currently the biggest challenge along the way toward facilitating energy 
trade-led economic growth and energy security. 
 Currently, there are gas and oil pipeline networks connecting Central Asian hydrocarbon 
resources with Russian and Chinese energy markets. As was previously mentioned, these energy 
corridors are constructed to move Central Asian resources to outside markets. Attractive in terms 
of potential input to the budget of the Central Asian producers, these projects have limited 
contribution to these countries’ energy security. Out of five energy corridors, only the intra-
Central Asian region is interconnected through electric power and gas supply networks forming a 
complete energy system. The resource-sharing mechanism, however, no longer contributes to 
energy security of the Central Asian states through exchange of resources.  
Lack of Enforcement Mechanism  
 Although the primary goal of institutions and programs designed to ensure security of the 
CAES through governance innovations is, among many other issues, to ensure region’s energy 
security, most simply lack enforcement mechanisms. Even though the infrastructure connecting 
Central Asian countries’ energy sectors is still in place, the CIS as a governance mechanism fails 
to encourage or enforce its Central Asian members to reinstate coordinated operations of their 
energy sectors. The World Bank has released the final assessment report of the Rogun dam 
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according to which the highest possible option of the dam was found to be the most 
economically efficient. It was perhaps expected that once independent experts released the 
results of assessments both public and private sectors would rush to invest in the project. 
However, no further progress has been made in this direction due to absence of mechanisms 
ensuring implementation of the project in which all actors’ interests are taken into account. Since 
the CAREC currently focuses on local-level energy projects, Central Asia, within the framework 
of the regional energy cooperation strategy, represents only a geographical area composed of 
separate units rather than integrated region. Due to lack of enforcement mechanisms, the 
CAREC representatives cannot go beyond conceptually justifying the importance of regional 
cooperation. The EEU is quite selective in regulating types of energy and mineral resources. It is 
expected that the common electricity market of the EEU will be formed by 2019 and the oil and 
gas market only in 2025 if at all. The recently established SCO Energy Club is specifically 
designed to deal with energy development issues, including energy security and energy-led 
economic growth, but provides only recommendation-type documents with no binding power. 
The SCO Energy Club is thus just a formally existing agency whose main objective is to provide 
recommendations to member states on how to respond to energy security challenges and to 
promote regional cooperation.  
Recommendations 
 The dissertation finds that intra-Central Asian energy trade has several direct positive 
effects on the level of energy security in the region. Regional state actors inherited pipeline and 
electric power networks saving them from considerable upfront investments in infrastructure, 
which most of Central Asian states would fail to afford. Comparative advantage in developing 
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complementary energy sources provides conditions for using energy in the most rational way. 
Since the volume of electricity and natural gas export/import in the region is relatively 
insignificant, such trading arrangements do not threaten the availability of energy to external 
customers and thus, do not provoke immediate confrontation from their side. Central Asian 
energy trade does not only solve the problem of uneven distribution of resources, but also 
ensures sufficiency of affordable energy supplies. In this sense, there is an urgent need to restore 
intra-Central Asian energy trade, at least in the average amount traded within the last decade, 
while temporarily refraining from the further development of projects capable of affecting water 
distribution and energy supply balance. Promote dialogue among those experts who directly 
advise decision makers so that they can reach united position regarding key attributes of the 
Central Asian energy security is also recommended. Central Asian governments should also take 
full advantage of the assistance offered by multilateral programs. Although intra-Central Asian 
energy trade, based on annually renewed agreements signed just to meet energy demand peaks, 
does not necessarily require regional-level energy governance mechanism, long-term 
sustainability of energy supplies is directly linked to well-functioning governance mechanism. 
 This analysis shows that reinstating intra-Central Asian energy trade is currently the most 
optimal policy option to ensure availability of energy resources at lower prices, provide stability 
of supplies to meet energy demand peaks, and diversify sources of energy in the consumption 
balance in the short- to medium-term perspectives. To achieve these goals the research provides 
several recommendations.  
 First, it is recommended that Central Asian countries reinstate energy trade in the average 
amount of resources being exchanged over the past decade on the basis of annually renewed 
bilateral agreements:  
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• export of 500 million m3 of gas per year to Kyrgyzstan and 300 million m3 per 
year to Tajikistan from Uzbekistan under the condition that trading partners set a 
justified price;  
• electricity supply of 800–1,800 GWh annually (depending on wet and drought 
years) from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in exchange for the same amount of 
electricity supply from Uzbekistan;  
• 1000 GWh electricity supply annually from Turkmenistan to Tajikistan and the 
same amount in reverse direction via swap deals with Uzbekistan; 
• 3.5 billion m3 per year gas supply to southern regions of Kazakhstan either 
directly from Uzbekistan or via swap deals from Turkmenistan. 
 Second, to reinstate and sustain intra-Central Asian energy trade, it is advisable for 
decision makers and the experts counselling them to reach shared position over key attributes of 
the CAES and develop a Central Asian energy security strategy. 
 Central Asian decision makers often fail to reach consensus over water-energy balance 
and take coordinated actions to respond to energy security challenges, because they prioritize 
different aspects of cooperation (energy supply security, increasing export capacity, water, and 
energy modes of HPPs) in their energy policies. 
 It is recommended to use existing governance platforms for a more active dialogue 
among experts directly advising decision makers from such institutions as: 
• Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the president of Kazakhstan, and the 
Library of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan;  
• Center for Economic Research, Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the 
President of Uzbekistan;  
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• National Institute for Strategic Studies of Kyrgyzstan;  
• Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan; and  
• National Institute for Strategic Planning and Economic Development of 
Turkmenistan. 
 Third, if there is a need for a trade-off between energy cooperation and construction of 
large HPPs in the region, until Central Asian republics reach a solution amenable to all, it is 
recommended that: 
• Tajikistan having completed 70m of the Rogun dam, starts operating two blocks 
of the HPP; 
• Uzbekistan reinstates supplies of gas and thermal electricity to Tajikistan to cover 
the country’s winter energy needs; 
• parties provide guarantees that no further construction of the dam will be pursued, 
unless agreed by both downstream and upstream countries, and no sudden 
unilateral energy supply cuts will take place. 
 Fourth, one of the main counter-arguments from the Uzbek side regarding the 
construction of the 335m high Rogun dam was the fact that studies conducted by the World Bank 
assessed environmental and social impact for only the Vaksh River basin around the dam. Uzbek 
authorities conclude from this that the dam can potentially be destroyed and the consequences for 
the downstream countries will be devastating. It could be recommended that regional state actors 
seek a second round of independent expertise on environmental, social, and economic impact 
assessment of large HPPs on downstream Central Asian states, under the condition that these 
states grant full access to facilities and data necessary to conduct the assessment. The main focus 
of the assessment would not be the extent of damage in case of failure of the dam, but rather 
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possible measures that could be taken capable reducing the extent of devastation. The assessment 
period will serve as a time frame for postponing further construction of Rogun, restoring energy 
trade, and breaking the status quo in the relationships between Uzbekistan and Central Asian 
upstream countries.  
 Fifth, it is also recommended that Central Asian governments seek financial and technical 
assistance in implementing regional-level energy projects from multilateral programs and NGOs 
within the CAREC. Having limited financial capabilities, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 
may resist getting involved in projects that require relatively large investments to upgrade or 
build new energy infrastructure, train personnel, or introduce new technologies on their own. 
Support from multilateral institutions will be a good incentive to pursue regional-level energy 
projects. Attracting foreign investors through public-private partnership initiatives within the 
program might be a good alternative to reduce dependence on external state actors such as China 
or Russia. 
 Sixth, throughout the analysis it became obvious that only intra-Central Asian energy 
trade and cooperation can contribute to the security of the CAES. And, hypothetically, promotion 
of the Central Asian energy security would depend on energy governance innovations with the 
membership of all five regional state actors specifically designed to ensure security of the CAES. 
Since regional state actors are financially incapable and often unwilling to equally contribute to 
the formation of such mechanisms and the relevant institutional apparatus, Central Asian states 
themselves would refrain from making moves in this direction. External players have their own 
interests over the region’s resources, which do not include strengthening the CAES through 
integration of regional energy sectors. In this sense, the most optimal strategy would be to take 
advantage of all existing regional governance mechanisms by promoting communication among 
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them. Energy trade within the Central Asian region can restore trust and promote energy 
resources exchanging mechanisms. As the first step toward establishing a maximally secure 
CAES, reinstating energy trade does not necessarily require complex regional energy governance 
mechanisms. As the research shows, energy-trading arrangements within current geopolitical 
realities have a greater chance of implementation through bilateral format of negotiations and 
agreements. Regional-level energy governance mechanisms in the short-term perspective must 
provide a platform for negotiations to conclude either bilateral or multilateral agreements, 
contribute to the transparency of the process and ensure implementation of those agreements. 
Ensuring sustainability and reliability of energy supplies within the CAES, however, has to be 
backed by well-functioning regional-level energy governance mechanism. Once Central Asian 
countries restore cooperation in their energy sectors, there will be ground for either establishing a 
new energy governance mechanism specifically designed to improve energy cooperation and 
ensure energy trade-led economic growth as well as the security of energy supplies within the 
Central Asian region or concentrate on transforming one of the existing mechanisms into an 
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